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Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to 
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings 
LENN! B. BENSON• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Plenary Power Meets Plenary Power 
To become a United States citizen, a lawful pennanent resident 
alien1 must successfully demonstrate a knowledge of United States his-
tory and government.2 A standard examination question is: "How many 
• Associate Professor at New York Law School. In preparing this Article, I especially 
appreciate the assistance of Martin Bloor and Lisa Schatz, students at New York Law School 
and the financial support of the school. I am grate.fa/ for the comments of Gerald Neuman, 
Margaret Taylor and Peter Schuck I also benefitted from discussions with many people in-
cluding Stephen Legomsky, Denise Morgan, Hiroshi Motomura, Nancy Morawetz, Stephen Yale-
Loehr, Lucas Guttentag, Linda Bosniak, Jeff Heller, Pamela Goldberg, Michael Botein, Charles 
Weisse/berg and Stanley Mailman. 
1. A lawful pennanent resident alien is a person who may Jive and reside on a permanent 
basis within the United States subject to removal due to specific violations of the immigration 
laws. See Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") § 101(a)(20). Lawful admission for per-
manent residence is ordinarily a prerequisite to qualifying for naturalization as a United States 
citizen. Although the Constitution does not use the term "alien," it is used in statutory lan-
guage. Under the INA, an "alien" is any person not a citizen or national of the United States. 
See INA § 101(a)(3). At times in this Article, I will use the term "alien" to achieve precision 
in quotations of statutory and other legal material or legal clarity. I have .adopted "noncitizen" 
as a less prejudicial tenn. 
The term "alien" unfortunately raises many negative images. Many writers are beginning 
to question the use of the tenn "alien." For example, Gerald Neuman points out that using 
the tenn alien "calls attention to [the person's] 'otherness' and even associates them with non-
human invaders from outer space." Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Servic-
es, Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Prorection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 
1428 (1995). 
2. INA § 312(a)(2) states that no person shall be naturalized as a citizen of the United 
States who cannot demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the fundamentals of history, 
and of the principles and form of government, of the United States. For a general discussion 
on the United States history and government knowledge requirements, see 4 CHARLES GORDON 
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 95.03(4](c] (1997). 
"Fll'St published in: 29 Conn. L. Rev.1411 (1997)." 
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branches are there in the federal government of the United States?"3 
The correct answer of course is three branches. However, where im-
migration enforcement is concerned, the more accurate answer might 
appear to be two branches-Legislative and Executive. Why no judi-
cial branch? The evisceration of judicial power is due to important 
recent legislation that purports to eliminate, or at least radically curtail, 
judicial review of immigration proceedings. 
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA")4 eliminated judicial review of deportation and exclusion or-
ders for noncitizens convicted of "aggravated felonies." This legislation 
also eliminated a traditional, frequently granted, waiver of deportability 
for long term lawful residents. Judicial review was further restricted in 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 ("IIRAIRA").5 IIRAIRA repealed a longstanding provision that 
authorized judicial review in the circuit court of appeals and guaranteed 
habeas corpus review upon detention. Although IIRAIRA created a 
streamlined form of review in the circuit court of appeals for some 
classes of noncitizens, it purports to bar disfavored groups and 
disfavored claims from review in any Article III court. In addition, 
IIRAIRA contains a multitude of individual statutory provisions that 
Congress independently designed to expedite, curtail, or eliminate what-
ever remains of judicial review. A more detailed description of the 
legislation is set forth in Part IV. 
Two forms of congressional plenary power-power over the juris-
diction of the Federal courts and power over immigration-shaped this 
legislation. The doctrine of plenary power in immigration law, a well 
3. AUSTIN FRAGOMEN ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 14-68, 14-69 (1997). 
4. The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 
1214 (April 24, 1996) [hereinafter "AEDPA"]. AEDPA also created a new form of deportation 
proceeding for noncitizens accused of terrorist activity which involved Article III court adjudica-
tion but severely curtailed the due process rights of the noncitizen respondent. This article will 
not address those provisions which are aimed at removals of noncitizens accused of terrorism. 
See Michael Scaperlanda, Are We That Far Gone? Due Process and Secret Deportation Pro-
ceedings, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 23 (1996) (describing the new terrorism deportation proce-
dures). 
5. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (a modified ver-
sion of the conference report on H.R. 2202 was included as Division C of the conference 
report filed in the House on H.R. 3601 (Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act (1997)) 
(H.R. REP. No. 104-863), and by a recorded vote of 370-37 (with 1 abstaining), the House 
agreed to that conference report. On September 28, 1996, the Senate, by voice vote, agreed to 
the conference report on H.R. 3610, and the measure was signed by the President, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), amended by, 104 Pub. L. No. 302 (Oct. 4, 1996)) [hereinafter 
"llRAIRA"]. The October 4 changes were part of a technical amendment bill. 
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known and frequently criticized legal construct,6 holds that Congress 
has plenary power to regulate the admission of aliens to the United 
States with few constitutional limits.7 The power to determine the 
substantive grounds for deportation (now called removal) have also 
been referred to as within the scope of this power.8 Yet, even as the 
courts recite the mantra of plenary power, they have preserved due 
process rights for noncitizens and have carefully evaluated the statutory 
authority for the challenged governmental action.9 Perhaps because of 
6. The plenary power of Congress and the Executive in immigration matters may more 
accurately be described as a doctrine that describes the extremely deferential standard that 
courts will apply in considering the constitutionality of government conduct in this area. Some 
influential articles on the scope of the plenary power include: Louis H. Henkin, The Constitu-
tion and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, I 00 
HARV. L. REV. 853 (1987), Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Ple-
nary Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. er. REV. 255; and Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation 
of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. I (1984). In recent decades, the majority scholarly 
view has been that the plenary power doctrine in immigration law would erocfe and would 
eventually be abandoned as courts allowed noncitizens to assert substantive constitutional rights. 
The development of the plenary power doctrine and its place in U.S. constitutional law is dis-
cussed and analyzed in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY-LAW AND 
POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 177-222 (1987). Ser! afsa GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANG-
ERS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND' FUNDAMENTAL LAW ch. 7 (1996). 
Recently Professor Legomsky has been less optimistic about the speed at which the plenary 
power doctrine will erode. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten More Years of Plenary Power: 
Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 l.J.ASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925 (1995). 
7. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v. United 
States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (federal government has inherent power to exclusively regulate the 
admission of noncitizens). See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (upholding statutory 
discrimination against the ability of illegitimate U.S. citizen children to sponsor their fathers for 
immigration as within the plenary power of Congress to control immigration admissions). It, is 
not as clear that the same judicial cfeference should be given to review of actions taken by the 
executive to enforce the immigration statutes as the deference afforded to review of congressio-
nal legislation. See the discussion of executive as distinguished from congressional plenary 
power in Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Alien Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the 
Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1146 n.301 
(1995). 
8. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (upholding the deportation of 
three long term permanent residents based on their membership in the Communist party al-
though the ground of deportation would be applied retroactively). See also Fong Yu Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893) (upholding congressional power to deport not just exclude 
under the Chinese Exclusion Acts). 
9. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (returning lawful permanent resident 
is entitled to due process in exclusion procedures); Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese Immi-
grant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (deportation procedures must comport with procedural due 
process). Hiroshi Motomura has thoroughly documented the use of statutory construction and 
procedural due process as substitutes for traditional constitutional analysis. See Hiroshi 
Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive 
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992) [hereinafter "Motomura, Procedural Sur-
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1414 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1411 
these judicial protections, Congress has again resorted to statutory limits 
on judicial review in an attempt to shield immigration actions from 
judicial interference. 10 
The power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of the lower fed-
eral courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has also 
been described as plenary. 11 Scholars concerned with the constitutional 
limits on this plenary power over jurisdiction have frequently written 
about ways in which congressional power might be limited or re-
strained. 12 Some have argued that the structure of our tripartite govern-
ment and the doctrine of the separation of powers mandates federal 
court jurisdiction at least for federal and constitutional questions. 13 
Others have argued that the constitutional guarantee of due process of 
law requires the right to challenge governmental conduct via some 
judicial process.14 A few have even found limitations on congressional 
rogates"]; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom 
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter 
"Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms"]. 
10. See the discussion of the motivations of Congress in creating the limits on judicial re-
view in Part llI. In the past, Congress has also granted detailed procedural rights to 
noncitizens facing removal, perhaps in recognition of the important interests at stake in deporta· 
tion. Other Congressional protections may have been motivated by reports of frequent agency 
errors. See, e.g., former INA § 242 (detailing the notice required in deportation hearings). 
11. Section 1 of Article III of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that 
"the judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." This section also 
contains the "Exceptions Clause" providing that the "supreme [sic] Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the 
Congress shall make." The assertion that congressional power over jurisdiction is plenary is in 
large part based on this power to create "exceptions" to jurisdiction. See PAUL BATOR ET AL., 
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 362-473 (3d ed. 
1988) [hereinafter "HART & WECHSLER"]. See also Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 
(1869) (holding that Congress had the power to create exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of 
the Supreme Court to hear habeas corpus petitions); cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 
137 (1803) (holding that the first judic:ary act improperly gave original jurisdiction to the Su-
preme Court to hear writs of mandamus). 
12. A large number of articles have been written on the scope of congres5ional power to 
control federal court jurisdiction. For example, articles representing a wide array of views are 
gathered in two symposium issues. See Colloquy, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990); Sympo-
sium, Congressional Limits on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 21 VILL. L. REV. 893 (1982). Other 
articles are cited infra. 
13. See, e.g., Leonard· G. Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional 
Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 21 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1982) (relying on the essential 
function of the federal courts to ensure conflict resolution between state and federal govern-
ments, uniform application of law and to protect individual from unconstitutional conduct by 
the elected branches); Lawrence Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Au-
thority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). 
14. See Paul Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 21 
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power in the language of the Constitution itself. 15 Still, others have 
made arguments based on the intent of the framers of the Constitution 
to limit the power of the elected branches. 16 These debates helped to 
defeat various bills that would have eliminated the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts in areas of particular controversy such as abortion, bus-
ing, prayer in public schools and other areas concerning civil rights. 17 
Unfortunately, scholarly attention to the intersection of the congressio-
nal power over immigration and the congressional power to eliminate 
federal court jurisdiction has not been as intense. 18 
VILL. L. REV. 1030, 1034-35 (1982) (limits such as due process and equal protection which 
are external to Article 111 can restrain congressional plenary power over jurisdiction). Most of 
these scholars have written in a context in which they assume that state courts are available as 
an alternative to the federal courts. Immigration cases have been reserved to the federal courts 
by exclusive jurisdiction statutes. See, e.g., former INA §§ 106, 279. State regulation of 
immigration has been limited by federal preemption and judicial doctrines concerning exclusive 
federal power to regulate immigration and foreign affairs. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 
33 (1915) (finding federal immigration law preempted state regulation of employment by 
noncitizens); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (exclusive federal authority 
to regulate admission of noncitizens); The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 560 (1884) (upholding 
federal taxation of noncitizen entrants to the U.S.); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1875) 
(invalidating a California statute authorizing state officials to exclude disabled or debauched 
noncitizens as unconstitutional interference with the conduct of foreign affairs). As will be 
discussed in Part IV, a subsection of the new immigration statute provides for Exclusive Juris-
diction in the Federal Courts and then goes on to state that "[except as provided in this section 
and] notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any 
cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien . . ." INA §- 242(g). 
15. This position was first articulated by Justice Story, in dicta, in Martin v. Hunter's Les-
see, 14 U.S. (l Wheat) 304, 328-31 (1816). Justice Story read the language of Article III to 
require some forms of mandatory vesting of jurisdiction. See Akhil R Amar, A Neo-Federalist 
View of Article Ill: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 
(1985) (arguing that Congress must vest some types of jurisdiction in the federal courts such as 
federal question, suits affecting ambassadors, and cases concerning admiralty). Professor Amar's 
arguments were further developed in Akhil R Amar, Article Ill and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1499 (1990), critiqued in Martin H. Redish, Text Structure and Common 
Sense in the Interpretation of Article ///, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1633 (1990), further elaborated 
in Akhil R Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A Reply, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1651 (1990). 
16. See Robert Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest 
for Original Understanding of Article Ill, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1984) (finding evidence in 
historical sources outside the text of the Constitution that the framers intended some forms of 
mandatory federal jurisdiction to protect federal supremacy). 
17. Some of these bills are discussed in Max Baucus & Kenneth R Kay, The Court Strip-
ping Bills: Their Impact on the Constitution, The Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL. L. REV. 988 
(1982). A fuller, historical perspective is presented in Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to 
Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. 
REV. 895 (1984). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note II, at 362-79. The legislative . 
history of restrictive immigration bills is discussed infra Part II and Part V. 
18. Ironically, many scholars were inspired to enter into the study of federal court jurisdic-
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The 1996 immigration legislation appeared to move the issue of the 
scope of these so called "plenary powers" from the realm of academic 
debate to biting reality for many noncitizens. Although the question of 
whether Congress can remove all judicial review of immigration matters 
is intriguing, I contend that Congress has not yet reached this point. 
By removing express grants of federal court jurisdiction, Congress has 
revived the default vehicle for judicial review, the writ of habeas cor-
pus. 19 I further contend that in reviving habeas corpus, Congress has 
defeated some of its own goals of streamlining judicial review and may 
have forced the "constitutionalization" of judicial review in immigration 
cases. Because habeas corpus jurisdiction remains, I will not explore 
the questions of whether Congress has the power to insulate immigra-
tion decisions from any review by an Article III court, or whether due 
process mandates Article III judicial review.20 
tion by the questions posed in the famous 1953 law review article written by Henry Hart, The 
Power of Congress to limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 
HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953). A significant portion of Professor Hart's discussion concerns the 
Supreme Court's confusion about judicial review in immigration proceedings. See id. at 1387-
1402. Hart specifically commented in his article that the immigration cases were ·"one of the 
most impressive examples of the general point . . . and currently provides a testing crucible of 
basic principle." Id. at 1389. A notable exception is Richard Fallon. See Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Of legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies and Article III, IOI HARV. L. REV. 915, 
967-70 (1988) (arguing that, at a minimum, Article III values require appellate judicial review 
legislative courts and administrative agencies, including the area of immigration). 
I suspect that this lack of attention from the scholarly world will soon end because the 
recent immigration legislation presents a fertile field for the exploration and mapping of the 
precise scope of congressional power to eliminate federal court jurisdiction. Even more impor-
tant than the scholarly response and analysis will be the federal judiciary's reactions and analy-
sis. The current and future federal court rulings on the constitutionality of these immigration 
provisions will tell us much about the judiciary's self-perceived ability and desire to preserve 
judicial review. As of June 1997, several cases discussing the power of Congress to eliminate 
the court of appeals' jurisdiction have rejected separation of powers and due process arguments 
and reaffirmed the right of Congress to eliminate lower court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Yang v. 
INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997) (neither Article III nor due process requires judicial review 
of discretionary agency decisions); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (I Ith Cir. 1997) (hold· 
ing that AEDPA § 440(a)(I 0) not only does not violate Article III, it is illustrative of the 
concept of separation of powers envisioned in the Constitution); Williams v. INS, 114 F.3d 82 
(5th Cir. 1997) (holding that the application of AEDPA to preclude judicial review did not 
violate separation of powers doctrine or due process clause). 
19. I will refer to both the constitutional Great Writ and the embodiment of that right in 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. In Part V of this Article, I will attempt to distinguish between the constitu-
tional and statutory writs of habeas corpus. 
20. The separation of powers or Article III argument in support of judicial review is based 
on the premise that judicial review is an inherent part of the balance of power between the 
branches of our government and that this separation is mandated by the structure or functional 
limits in the Constitution. See the articles discussed supra note 13. The due process argument 
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B. Everything Old is New Again 
Before a person can be removed from the United States, the gov-
ernment must have control over the body of the person. In immigra-
tion cases, this simple fact has always been the basis for habeas corpus 
jurisciiction. As I will discuss further, the right to habeas review leads 
me to the conclusion that Congress, in its efforts to "streamline" the 
removal of noncitizens from the United States, has not created a more 
efficient structure. In fact, it has inadvertently returned to an historical 
model of judicial review in immigration proceedings that was inefficient 
in its form and often ineffective in expediting the removal of 
noncitizens. Congress has taken us back to the future or, to describe 
the new legislation more precisely, Congress has taken us forward to 
the past.21 
This Article will focus on a key question raised by the re-emer-
gence of habeas corpus review.22 Which types of legal issues can be 
asserts that judicial process or at least judicial review of administrative process is required by 
the due process clause. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confasions About Due Process, Judi-
cial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309 (1993) (evaluating due pro-
cess as a theoretical basis for preserving judicial review). Although it is possible that the 
courts might narrow the scope of habeas corpus review to an empty shell that might not com-
port with requirements of due process or perhaps violate the separation of powers doctrine, this 
article does not explore due process or Article Ill theoretical constraints on congressional power 
to limit federal court jurisdiction. In most of the few cases decided to date, the arguments 
concerning separation of powers and due process have not been thoroughly explored because of 
the theoretical availability of habeas corpus review. See infra Part V (discussing these cases). 
In one case, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit found that habeas review was not avail-
able for the claims before him and further ruled that elimination of judicial review violated 
neither separation of powers restraints nor due process limitations. See Yang, 109 F.3d 1185. 
21. "Back to the Future" is the title of a popular film in which an inventor created a time 
travel machine designed to take him to the future. Through misadventure and ina~vertence, the 
machine travels backwards in time and the traveler must struggle to get back to his own time. 
See BACK To TuE FlTl1.IRE (MCA Universal 1985). 
22. llRAIRA also sought to curtail or restrict other forms of immigration litigation. Some 
of these restraints are discussed in Part IV. This Article focuses on the provisions aimed at 
eliminating judicial review of final orders of removal. I do not address all of the provisions 
in the legislation which might generally impact on litigation outside of the context of judicial 
review of a final order of removal. Additionally, I do not address the transitional provisions 
or retroactivity in general. For an analysis of the transitional provisions, see Lucas Guttentag, 
The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions'and Constitutional 
Rights, 74 INTERPRETER RELEASES 245-60 (Feb. 10, 1997). See also Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 
97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) (applying transi-
tional jurisdictional provisions and refusing to apply AEDPA bar on relief from deportation 
retroactively). I also do not address the power of Congress to insulate decisions made outside 
the United States by consular officers in immigration related cases. For a discussion of 
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heard in habeas corpus petitions? In the litigation concerning the new 
legislation, the United States government is arguing that AEDP A and 
IIRAIRA have effectively repealed the general statutory authority for 
habeas corpus review, limiting noncitizens to constitutional habeas. 
Alternatively, the government contends that habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 is limited to "substantial" constitutional questions.23 
Many noncitizens will raise constitutional challenges in large part to 
bolster their assertion of subject matter jurisdiction under habeas corpus. 
Congress has inadvertently encouraged attacks on congressional and 
executive plenary power to control immigration. To the degree that 
these constitutional challenges succeed, the unanticipated result of habe-
as corpus review may be to hasten the long awaited mainstreaming of 
immigration law into modern constitutional law.24 By channeling the 
battles into habeas corpus territory, Congress has entered a murky 
ground and raised the stakes to constitutional proportions. 
While judicial recognition of substantive constitutional rights in 
immigration law will have many benefits, limiting judicial review to 
exclusively constitutional claims creates significant problems. 
Constitutionalization will make it even harder for unrepresented people 
to challenge immigration decisions and many people will be harmed if 
lower courts reject substantive claims based on plenary power prece-
dents. It will distort the usual incremental changes in law produced by 
a dialogue among the branches of government. Judicial reliance on 
procedural due process surrogates for substantive rights will undoubted-
ly expand.25 This, in turn, increases the cost of administering the im-
migration laws and increases congressional reluctance to create any new 
substantive immigration rights. Constitutionalization may also increase 
nonreviewability of overseas decisions, see LEGOMSKY, supra note 6, at 144-51, and STEPHEN 
H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 348-57 (2d ed. 1997). See also James R. 
Na1Ziger, Review of Visa Denials by Consular Officers, 66 WASH. L. REV. I (1991) (critiquing 
the plenlll)' power doctrine as an illogical bar to judicial review of consular decisions). 
23. See, e.g., Kolster v. INS, 101 F.3d 785 (!st Cir. 1996) (government argued that statuto· 
ry habeas corpus had been repealed by AEDPA, and constitutional habeas is all that is avail· 
able); Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (government asserted that statutory habeas was re· 
pealed and constitutional habeas limited to substantial constitutional claims); Yesil v. Reno, 985 
F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y 1997) (same). The scope of both constiiutional and statutory habeas 
are discussed below in Part V. I will argue that under the new laws, habeas corpus review is 
not limited to constitutional "issues. 
24. See Schuck, supra note 6 (suggesting that the demise of the plenlll)' power doctrine will 
lead to the "mainstreaming" of constitutional immigration law). 
25. See Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 9. In this article, Professor Motomura 
identified many of the problems created by judicial reliance on due process surrogates. See Id. 
at 1699-1704. 
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unpredictability in immigration enforcement. I will discuss these impli-
cations and other unintended consequences of the Congressional attack 
on judicial review in Parts V and VI. 
II. HISTORY REPEATS: PATTERNS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
A. Restric[ions in Immigration Cases 
In some ways, the history of judicial review in immigration cases 
looks like an example of Newton's Third Law of Motion, that for ev-
ery action there is an equal, and opposite, reaction.26 As noncitizens 
challenged governmental decisions via writs of habeas corpus in federal 
courts and succeeded in overturning exclusi6n or deportation orders, 
Congress amended the immigration laws in an attempt to control the 
power of judicial review.27 The following history will begin with a 
focus on habeas corpus review of early immigration cases. It will also 
illustrate how habeas corpus review, in combination with other types of 
judicial review such as mandamus or declaratory judgment actions, led 
Congress to believe that judicial review unduly restrained immigration 
enforcement. The latter part of this section discusses other develop-
ments in judicial review that led up to the 1996 legislation. These 
latest changes are part of the continuing efforts of Congress to control 
the timing, scope, and nature of judicial review of immigration pro-
ceedings. 28 
26. See SIR ISAAC NEWTON, PRINCIPIA MA11IEMATICA (1987). I do not mean to suggest 
that all of the statutory changes are intended by Congress to counter the success of noncitizens 
in using judicial review to overturn the agency determinations. Some of the changes are based 
on erroneous perceptions of members of Congress. See infra note 158 (discussing the myth 
that judicial review created wholesale delay). This continuing interaction between Congress and 
the courts has also been aptly characterized as a "dialogue." See Note, Deportaiion and Ex-
clusion: A Continuing Dialogue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 761 
(1962) (analyzing the 1961 judicial review amendments and discussing some of the historical 
developments of judicial review in immigration cases) [hereinafter "Continuing Dialogue"]. 
27. This pattern is also explored in LUCY E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE 
IMMIGRANTS A:l[I 11IE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW (1995). This excellent history 
discusses the laws aimed at Chinese immigration from the period of 1882 to 1924. In the 
most recent legislative hearings, Senator Simpson described the limits on judicial review as an 
effective block to class action litigation. "We also got rid of layers of people who love to 
bring class actions and disrupt the normal course of INS work." 142 CONG. REc. Sll,711 
(Sept 28, 1996). 
28. For a general history of the immigration laws of the United States between 1875 and 
1917, see 1 GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, at § 2.02(2]. A curtailed history appears in 
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The Chinese Exclusion Acts were among the first federal statutes 
expressly to limit the admission of new immigrants.29 In this series of 
.restrictive statutes adopted prior to 1892,3° Congress sought to bar the 
admission of Chinese laborers. The first Exclusion Acts did not ex-
pressly provide for, nor did they expressly limit, judicial review of an 
executive official's admission decision. Some Chinese applicants imme-
diately challenged adverse admission decisions by filing writs of habeas 
corpus in federal court.31 In characterizing the habeas corpus petition 
LEGOMSKY, supra note 6. See also NEUMAN, supra note 6, at Pt. I; Motomura, Procedural 
Su"ogates, supra note 9, at 1625 (detailed historical analysis of the development of procedural 
due process as a substitute for substantive judicial review). Some of the history of habeas 
corpus and judicial review is presented in Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention 
of Aliens: Lessons From the Lives of Ellen Knauff and Jgnatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 
943-51 (1995). 
29. The Alien and Sedition Acts, enacted in 1789, were the first statutes passed of this 
kind. After these acts, it was not until 1875 that Congress passed restrictive immigration legis-
lation. Early Immigration Acts, such as the Immigration Act of 1819, 3 Stat. 488, were con-
cerned with the welfare of the immigrants, imposing such regulations as the number of people 
who were allowed on ships coming to the United States. However, later immigration legisla-
tion, such as the Immigration Act of 1882, 22 Stat. 214, had sought to protect the states from 
the, financial burden of indigent immigrants. In contrast to this goal, the motivating factor 
behind the Chinese Exclusion Act was the fear that the Chinese would be too successful and 
harm the white United States workforce. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 1-7. For an excellent 
discussion of early history of immigration controls, see Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
Immigration La.w (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833 (1993). 
30. In the ':hinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Congress suspended the admission of new Chi-
nese laborers for ten years but preserved the right of Chinese previously residing in the United 
States to return by presenting a certificate of identity which documented the prior residence. 
See Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58. Many Chinese people who fulfilled their prior residence 
requirement, but had left the United States prior to the passage of the act, lacked these certifi· 
cates. In these types of cases, the Secretary of the Treasury authorized the collectors to accept 
other evidence of prior residence in lieu of the certificates. The collector at the port' of San 
Francisco refused to take other evidence, making it necessary for the courts in San Francisco to 
become involved. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 18. 
31. Habeas corpus jurisdiction existed as a result of the fact that in order to execute an 
exclusion or deportation order, the government must take the noncitizen into its custody. In 
this period, the custody prerequisite was strictly construed. Noncitizens could only seek a writ 
of habeas corpus when they were actually in the custody of the executive branch of govern-
ment or in the custody of a transportation company under color of federal law. The petitioners 
seeking review relied on the federal statute granting habeas corpus jurisdiction to the federal 
district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § ·2241. This statutory grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction has 
existed since 1789 and provides for habeas corpus jurisdiction to prisoners "in custody under 
colour, or by colour of the authority of the United States." See Section 14 of the Judiciary 
Act of September 24, 1789, I Stat. 73 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c}(I)}. In 1867, the statute was amended to include "custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws or treaties of the United States." See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 
385 (1867) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). For a history of the writ of 
habeas corpus, see WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 12-
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as a challenge to the "legality" of the executive detention, federal 
courts also examined the evidence supporting the exclusion decision.32 
In many cases, the federal court overruled the admission officer's deci-
sion and granted the applicant admission.33 The federal courts also 
rejected the executive's statutory interpretations of various provisions of 
the Exclusion Acts. These cases expanded the classes of Chinese ex-
empt from a special documentation requirement and broadened the 
fonns of evidence that established membership in an exempt class.34 
Each time the litigation strategy of the Chinese succeeded, Congress 
amended the exclusion acts to plug the holes.35 In 1888, Congress 
expressly tried to insulate the admission decisions from judicial interfer-
63 (1980) and JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HER1Z, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE ch. 2 (1994) (discussing the history and use of habeas corpus). See also Student 
Articles, Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1238 
(1970) [hereinafter "Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus"]. See the discussion of 
habeas corpus after the 1996 legislation i'lfra Part V. 
32. See, e.g., In re Chin Ah On, 18 F. 506 (9th Cir. 1883) (finding that a customs certifi-
cate is not necessary evidence for Chinese laborers who had left the United States before the 
1882 Act went into effect); In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605 (9th Cir. 1882) (holding that 
Chinese merchants who lived outside of China on the passage of the 1882 Act could establish 
membership in the merchant class by parol evidence); In re Tung Yeong, 19 F. 184 (N.D. Cal. 
1884) (holding that certain Chinese people could land in the United States without custom-
house papers proving that they were merchants). 
33. In. San Francisco, petitioners were particularly successful. Lucy Salyer estimates that the 
federal district court in San Francisco reversed the collector of customs in 86% of the cases. 
See SALYER, supra note 27, at 28. See also Yeong, 19 F. at 185-91 (briefly discussing the 
three major types of claims that the courts were hearing at the time). 
34. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 28. The court interpreted certain provisions of the Ex-
clusion Act much more broadly than the customs officials. 
35. Section 6 of the Exclusion Act required that a person coming to the United States who 
was part of the exempt class provide documentation from the Chinese government that they 
did, in fact, belong to that class. Many merchants arrived at the border of the United States 
without the documentation and, as a result, customs officials sought to exclude them. Howev-
er, the courts· ruled that other evidence could be taken to prove membership in the exempt 
group. According to the courts, "Section 6 documentation," was not essential, provided the 
person could establish her membership in the exempted class with other evidence. See Chow, 
13 F. 605. In the Restrictions Act of 1884, 23 Stat 115, Congress attempted to redefine cer-
tain provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act in a narrower fashion than the manner in which 
the courts had been interpre~ing those provisions. The 1884 amendment expressly prohibited 
the taking of other evidence and strictly required that the Chinese', national produce the required 
documentation. Despite this new explicit statutory restriction on the taking of additional evi-
dence, the courts continued to reject customs officials findings in other areas. For example, 
Courts also affirmed the right to jus solis citizenship for Chinese children born in the United 
States, even though their parents could not have been allowed to be naturalized due to statutory 
racial discrimination. See In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (1884). This interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship by birth in the territory of the United States was upheld in 
United Stales v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 
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ence by providing that only the Secretary of the Treasury could review 
the admission officer's decision36 and "not otherwise."37 Again, appli-
cants for admission challenged the 1888 amendments. Several courts 
found that the finality provisions had never become law because Con-
gress had made the particular provision conditional upon ratification of 
a treaty with China.38 This treaty was never ratified. 
The finality provisions were next incorporated into the Immigration 
Act of 1891,39 which governed general immigration, not Chinese exclu-
sion alone. One historian has suggested, though it is not clear from the 
debates in the legislature at the time, that the purpose of making the 
decisions final was to prevent othe~ classes of immigrants from having 
the same success as the Chinese.40 
In Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,41 the Supreme Court considered 
whether the finality provisions would shield the admission decisions of 
the executive branch from judicial review. Nishimura Ekiu filed a writ 
of habeas corpus challenging her exclusion. She argued that, despite 
36. Congress originally assigned the responsibility for enforcing the immigration laws to a 
part of the Treasury Department Admissions decisions were made by "collectors" who deter-
mined admissibility and collected the appropriate federal head tax. The 1891 legislation created 
the position of Superintendent of Immigration in the Treasury Department. In 1903, Congress 
transferred the administration of the immigration laws to the Department of Commerce and 
Labor. In 1913, the functions were vested in the Department of Labor. Finally, in 1940, 
Congress moved the duties to the Immigration and Naturalization Service as a part of the De-
partment of Justice. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION PROCESS AND 
POLICY IOI n.2 (3d ed. 1995). 
37. Act of Sept 13, 1888, § 12, 25 Stat 476 (1888). Congress also voided the prior cer-
tificates for reentry to the United States and banned the readmission of prior residents. It was 
the new, 1ightened procedure which led to the exclusio~ of Chae Chan Ping who had obtained 
the certificate of identity before he left for China in 1887. He was refused readmission be-
cause Congress had voided the certificates in 1888, while he was in transit to the United 
States. The 1888 Act also banned all admission of Chinese. See Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding the 1888 Act as constitutional and within the power of 
Congress). 
· 38. See Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486 (1901) (noting that section 12 of the 
amendment was not in force); United States v. Gee Lee, SO F, 271 (9th Cir. 1892) (holding 
that section 12 of the amendment which made collectors' decisions final was not in force due 
to China's failure to ratify a treaty). 
39. See Immigration Act of 1891, § 8, 26 Stat 1084 (1891). This section provided that the 
decision of the inspection officer was final, except for administrative appeals to the superinten-
dent of immigration, whose actions were in tum subject to review by the Secretary of the 
Treasury. Section 13 of this statute contained an express grant of jurisdiction to the federal 
courts. However, the Supreme Court interpreted section 13 as only conferring jurisdiction over 
criminal and civil sanctions under the 1891 Act See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 
U.S. 651, 664 (1892) (this case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-44). 
40. See SALYER, supra note 27, at 27. 
41. 142 U.S. 651 (1892). 
265 
1997] BACK TO THE FUTURE 1423 
the finality prov1s1on, a review of evidence was an inherent part of 
habeas review. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that 
Congress had intended for the factual determinations to rest solely with 
the executive officers.42 Further, the Court's opinion appeared ~o re-
strict habeas corpus review to a consideration of whether the executive 
official had proper 'jurisdiction" over her detention.43 Courts, however, 
continued to review legal rulings in exclusion cases, interpreting 
Nishimura Ekiu to insulate only factual determinations.44 
Many Chinese sought to avoid the Chinese Exclusion Laws or other 
immigration laws by asserting a claim of United States citizenship. In 
United States v. Ju Toy,45 the Supreme Court appeared to accept the 
ability of Congress to insulate the decision of the immigration inspector 
from review by the judiciary. . Ju Toy claimed to be a United States 
citizen. The inspectors denied his entry. The court found that, even 
assuming that Ju Toy was a citizen46 and was entitled to constitutional 
protections, .due process did not necessarily require a judicial hearing.47 
42. See id. at 660. 
43. See id. at 663. For a discussion of the concept of jurisdictional review in habeas cor-
pus, see DUKER, supra note 31, at 225-48. See also Weisselberg, supra note 28, at 944 n.40. 
44. See SAYLER, supra note 27, at 31. In 1892, Congress renewed the suspension of the 
admission of Chinese for the next ten years and for the first time provided for the deportation 
of Chinese. The deportation procedure required a judicial hearing and judicial finding of de-
portability. This was in contrast to the administrative process for admission determinations. 
The 1892 Chinese Exclusion Act also invalidated the prior identity certificates and required new 
certification of residence in the United States prior. to May 5, 1892. To avoid deportation if 
the person lacked a new certificate, the Chinese applicant had to produce at least one "credible 
witness other than Chinese" to establish prior residence. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 
149 U.S. 698 (1893); see also United States v. Williams, 83 F. 997, 999 (N.D. Cal. 1897) 
(noting that a white person must testify). The certificate was obtained from the Collector of 
Internal Revenue. The deportation procedure required a judicial hearing before the person 
could be removed for lacking the necessary certificate. The Act did not expressly give the 
courts jurisdiction to review customs officials admission decisions but courts did review these 
decisions in habeas corpus. 
45. 198 U.S. 253 (1905). This particular case came as a challenge to the Immigration Act 
of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, § l, 28 Stat 372 (1894), which made the factual decision of the 
immigration inspector conclusive on the federal court hearing a habeas petition. 
46. The district court had found that Ju Toy presented evidence of citizenship. See Ju Toy, 
198 U.S. at 264 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
47. See id. st 263. But even though the Supreme Court determined that the factual findings 
of the inspectcr would not be set aside, the Supreme Court stated that the federal courts con-
tinued to have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the final decision and to determine if 
the proceedings themselves met the requirements of the Constitution. Justice Holmes stressed 
that petitioner "does not allege or show in any other way unlawful action or abuse of discre-
tion or powers by the immigration officers who excluded him." Id. at 265. Note, however, 
that the Supreme Court has afforded greater constitutional protection when dealing with cases of 
deportation, as opposed to the exclusion situation that arose in Ju Toy. In Ng Fung Ho v. 
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In the 190748 and 1917 Immigration Acts, 49 Congress continued the 
effort to limit judicial review by specifically providing that the decision 
of the admission inspector was a "final decision."50 Nevertheless, while 
the courts were grappling with precise meaning of this phrase, they 
often allowed the person to attack the deportation or exclusion orders 
through habeas corpus. In these habeas petitions, the courts heard 
constitutional challenges to the immigration procedures51 and constitu-
tional challenges to the substantive provisions of the laws.52 However, 
the courts did not limit themselves to constitutional challenges. They 
also heard non-constitutional claims53 such as challenges to the interpre-
tation of the statute,54 or whether "some evidence" supported the find-
ing.ss 
White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), the Supreme Court held that a person in deportation proceedings 
who made claims of United States citizenship was entitled to a full factual determination as to 
his citizenship by the federal district court. See id. at 284. The opinion distinguished Ju Toy 
as applying solely to admission decisions. See id. at 282. The continuing validity of Ju Toy 
was further weakened in Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (allowing declaratory judgement 
action to assert claim of citizenship made outside of the United States). Rusk, the new legisla· 
tion, and citizenship claims made at the port of entry, are discussed infra Part IV.B.3 and note 
184. 
48. Immigration Act of 1907, 34 Stat 898. 
49. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat 874. This act and the 1907 act, see supra note 48, 
regulated all immigration, not just the migration of the Chinese. 
SO. See Section 25 of the 1907 Act Prior to the 1907 and 1917 Acts, Congress used the 
same "finality" language in section 25 of the 1903 Act 
SI. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (acknowledging the right to due process in 
deportation procedures but ultimately rejecting due process challenge to statutory scheme and 
deportation hearing procedures). 
52. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
S3. While I characterize these claims as "non-constitutional" claims, in fact these types of 
claims might also raise due process issues. As the conception of due process has evolved, the 
types of claims which might be raised in habeas corpus has also expanded. See the discussion 
infra Part VI concerning possible implications of due process challenges to the new legislation. 
S4. See Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6 (1948) (rejecting executive's interpretation of 
multiple criminal convictions deportation provision); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 
(1947) (rejecting executive's interpretation of "entry"); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924) 
(rejecting executive's interpretation of findings necessary for deportation after conviction under 
Espionage Act); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) (finding that the government misinterpreted 
the statutory ability to deny entry based on the job market in a particular area). See also 
Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. S90 (1953) (rejecting executive's interpretation of pro· 
cedural regulation); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 908 (1950) (rejecting executive's 
interpretation of APA procedural requirements). 
SS. While exercising habeas corpus jurisdiction, courts reviewed the administrative record to 
determine whether the administrative decision was supported by "some evidence." In several 
cases, this type of review resulted in a victory for the noncitizen. See Chin Yow v. United 
States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) (finding that petitioner should be allowed to present evidence of his 
United States citizenship); F.x Parle Fierstein, 41 F2d 53 (9th Cir. 1930) (finding "insufficient 
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During the attacks on suspected communists, anarchists and other 
subversives, and during periods of war, Congress enacted statutes de-
signed to expedite the deportation of dangerous56 and "enemy aliens."57 
Although the Supreme Court repeatedly rejected the litigants' attacks on 
the constitutionality of the substantive provisions, it entertained their 
challenges under habeas corpus jurisdiction. Some important cases of 
this period illustrate that even during the height of the expansion of 
congressional power over the regulation of immigration, habeas corpus 
review nevertheless continued. As one article noted, "aliens have often 
been left to the mercy of administrative authority in habeas proceed-
ings, not because of limitation on the power of the writ, but because 
their substantive rights are limited."58 
In Bridges v. Wixon,59 the Supreme Court vacated a final order of 
deportation based on evidence finding that Harry Bridges belonged to 
an organization "affiliated with" the Communist Party.60 Bridges' habe-
as petition challenged the competence of the evidence and asserted the 
bad faith of the government throughout his prosecution.61 The Court 
evidence" to justify deportation); Maltez v. Nagle, 27 F2d 835 (9th Cir. 1928) (finding no 
conclusive evidence to support deportation); cf. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner 
of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) (finding there was some evidence to support deportation 
order and denying relief); United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924) (finding 
some evidence to support the deportation order); Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U.S. 673 (1912) 
(finding there was evidence to support the inspector's findings). See also Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Constitutional Requirement of Some Evidence, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 631 (1988). 
56. See March 1903 Act, § 2, 32 Stat 1214 (providing for the exclusion of anarchists). 
Many different statutes provided for the deportation of communists. See, e.g., Section 22 of 
the Internal Security Act of 1950, 66 Stat 205 (provisions related to communists' deportation), 
codified as § 24l(a)(6)(c) of the 1952 INA. 
57. See, e.g., Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). The petitioner was ordered deport-
ed by the Attorney General under a similar act, the Alien Enemy Act because of his affiliation 
with the Nazi party. See Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat 577, R.S. § 4607, amended by, 40 Stat 
531. While the Court found that the special grant of Executive War Powers authorized the 
Act is elimination of judicial review, nevertheless, the Court heard the habeas corpus petition 
seeking release from detention and challenging the ability of the Executive to deport without a 
hearing. This case does not rely on congressional power over immigration. Since 1798, the 
President has, in the interests of the national security, had the discretionary power to deport 
nom;itizens of a foreign nation with whom the United States is engaged in a .declared war. 
The Enemy Alien Act is currently codified in 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-23. 
58. Developments in the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 31, at 1243 (footnote 
omitted). 
59. 326 U.S. 135 (1945). 
60. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 429, § 23, 54 Stat 670, 671 (current version at 
18 U.S.C. § 2385), created a ground of deportation for "membership or affiliation with any 
organization, association, society, or group, that believe in, advises, advocates, or teaches . . . 
the overthrow by force of violence of the Government of the United States." 
61. Justice Murphy severely criticizes the government for the tactics and strategies used to 
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relied on a narrow statutory reading to find that Bridges was not de-
portable. Bridges also raised constitutional claims that the statute creat-
ed an ex post facto punishment, but the Court's habeas jurisdiction 
does not rely on these constitutional claims.62 
The constitutional issues which remained below the surface in 
Bridges, were directly resolved in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. 63 
Harisiades al)d two other permanent resident aliens filed habeas corpus 
petitions that challenged deportation based on past membership in the 
Communist Party.64 They argued that their deportation denied them 
attempt to deport Bridges, a prominent union activist See Bridges, 326 U.S. at 157 (Murphy, 
J., concurring}. The government never succeeded in deporting Mr. Bridges. Mr. Bridges ap· 
peared at an immigration law conference in 1987 to retell the story of his deportation hearings. 
Suddenly from the back of the room, Maurice Roberts, an esteemed immigration scholar and 
former BIA chair, rose to explain his role in the case. He stated that at the time of the Su-
preme Court's decision, he was working as an attorney for the INS and, based on the opinion, 
he recommended that the Justice Department give up. Mr. Roberts said, "I recommended that 
the government close your file" and the two men shook hands. See Statement of Maurice 
Roberts at "Great Moments in Immigration History," 1987 Conference of the American lmmi· 
gration Lawyer's Association, San Francisco, California (from author's notes taken at the Con-
ference}. · 
62. The Court would have had to overturn several precedential decisions to rely on the con· 
stitutional grounds directly. See, e.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); United States 
ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 154 (1923); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 
591 (1913) (deportation is not punishment but "simply a refusal ... to harbor persons whom 
it does not want"). Hiroshi Motomura has discussed the subconstitutional decision in Bridges 
as an example of "phantom constitutional norms" reasoning. He suggests that the Court is 
clearly focusing on the consequences of deportation and the constitutional claim that deportation 
should be treated in the same manner as criminal punishment See Motomura, Phantom Cons//. 
tutional Norms, supra note 9, at 567-68. 
63. 342 U.S. 580 (1952). 
64. The Alien Registration Act of 1940, 64 Stal 989, created a ground of deportation for 
membership or past membership in any organization which advocated the use of violence to 
overthrow the United States government Congress had specifically amended the Jaw to include 
past membership to overturn the Supreme Court decision the prior year in Kessler v. Strecker, 
307 U.S. 22 (1939) (habeas corpus petition challenging statutory interpretation). The Court 
read the prior deportation ground as allowing only the deportation of current members of the 
Communist Party. Once membi:rship ceased, the noncitizen was no longer deportable. Conse· 
quently, the Communist Party had expelled all noncitizen members. See the discussion of these 
statutes aimed at the deportation of subversives and Communists in ALEJNIKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 513-18. 
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fundamental rights,65 infringed First Amendment protections,66 and vio-
lated the prohibition on ex post facto laws.67 The Supreme Court re-
jected each of these substantive constitutional challenges. 
In Carlson v. Landon,68 a group of lawful p~rmanent resident aliens 
also sought to prevent their deportation as members of the Communist 
party under the Internal Security Act of 1950.69 The group filed indi-
vidual writs of habeas corpus challenging the retroactive application of 
the 1950 changes, and alleging that their detention pending deportation 
was unconstitutional because it violated due process. The Supreme 
Court rejected the substantive constitutional challenge stating that "[ s ]o 
long . . . as aliens fail to obtain . . . citizenship by naturalization, they 
remain subject to the plenary power of Congress to expel them ... "70 
Yet congressional plenary power over immigration did not suspend the 
power of the court to hear habeas petition.71 
Noncitizens also used habeas corpus petitions to attack the execu-
tive's interpretation and application of the Internal Security Act. In 
Galvan v. Press,12 the Supreme Court described Galvin's habeas petition 
as challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as well as the constitu-
tional validity of the act as applied to a long term permanent resident. 
Galvin argued that the Court should construe the term "member" to 
include only those people who joined the Party "fully conscious of its 
advocacy of violence."73 He contended that the evidence only showed 
that he had belonged to the Communist Party, but failed to establish 
65. The petitioners made a substantive due process argument that permanent resident aliens 
should have a "vested right" to remain or that they could not be deported on "unreasonable" 
grounds. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 584. See Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of 
the Lawfally Admitted Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 
69 YALE LJ. 262 (1959); Siegfried Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfally Admitted 
Permanent Resident Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE LJ. 1578 (1959) (criticizing 
Harisiades as a form of unconstitutional banishment and questioning the courts reasoning). 
66. See Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591-92. 
67. The Court characterized the application of the law as not being retroactive but found 
that even if it was, deportation was a civil sanction and therefore outside the constitutional 
prohibition on ex post facto criminal laws. See id. at 593-95. The ex post facto prohibition 
is found in U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
68. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
69. See The Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987. 
70. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 534. 
71. In recent litigation, the government has asserted that Carlson stands for the proposition 
that no judicial review is guaranteed by the Constitution. See, e.g., Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 
396, 399 (9th Cir. 1996). 
72. 347 U.S. 522 (1954). 
73. Id. at 525. 
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his personal awareness of the commitment of the Party to violence. He 
further argued that to construe the statute in any other manner would 
constitute a due process violation. 
In the majority opinion, Justice Frankfurter carefully considered 
Galvin's construction of the term "member" in the statute and reviewed 
the evidence presented in the administrative hearing. He found the 
administrative officer was "entitled to conclude" that the evidence es-
tablished Galvin's membership in the Party.74 He also rejected Galvin's 
due process challenge, noting that although this construction may 
"shock the sense of fair play-which is the essence of due process,"75 
the Court was not "writing on a clean slate.''76 
During this time, the Supreme Court decided two important immi-
gration cases.77 In United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy78 and 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,79 the Supreme Court upheld 
provisions of the 1941 Act80 that allowed the executive to exclude indi-
viduals without a hearing on national security grounds during the na-
tional emergency proclaimed on May 27, 1941 (World War 11).81 
Knauff, a noncitizen who married an American serving in the armed 
forces in Germany, and Mezei, a lawful permanent resident who sought 
reentry, were both excluded without an evidentiary hearing and without 
administrative or judicial review. The Supreme Court rejected the 
challenges made by Knauff and Mezei. 82 In a famous phrase, Justice 
Minton writing for the majority stated, "[w]hatever the procedure autho-
rized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is 
concerned. "83 
Knauff and Mezei established a new high watermark in the scope of 
74. Although the Court was not reviewing the facts under a "substantial evidence" standard, 
this opinion and others indicate that even in habeas corpus jurisdiction, the Court will evaluate 
the competence of the evidence. See, e.g., Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (discussed 
supra text· accompanying notes 59-62). 
75. Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530. 
76. Id. at 530-31. 
77. For an excellent discussion of the historical and legal context of both cases, see 
Weisselberg, supra note 28. 
78. 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
79. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
80. See Act of June 21, 1941, amending § I of the Act of May 22, 1918, 55 Stat. 252. 
81. See Presidential Proclamation No. 2523, 55 Stat. 1696. 
82. While the Court did hear the habeas petitions in both cases, the Court limited its review 
to whether the Attorney General could exclude without administrative or judicial hearings. See 
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206; Knauff, 338 U.S. 537. 
83. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544. 
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the plenary power doctrine at least as it applied to people seeking entry 
to the United States. They also led Professor Hart to criticize the. Su-
preme Court in his famous article, The Power of Congress to Limit the 
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic. 84 Hart ques-
tioned the Supreme Court's willingness to uphold a statute which al-
lowed the executive to act without any administrative process, fact 
finding, or opportunity for the alien seeking admission to even know 
the grounds for his or her exclusion. He argued that, at a minimum, 
the Court could have used its power in habeas corpus to inquire into 
the facts alleged to support the exclusion. 85 
Passage of the Declaratory Judgment.Act in 193486 and the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act in 194687 expanded judicial review of immigra-
tion proceedings. Both statutes, in combination with general federal 
question jurisdiction,88 made it possible for noncitizens to challenge the 
actions of the government in immigration proceedings without the ne-
cessity of waiting for actual arrest or detention that were the necessary 
predicates to habeas corpus jurisdiction.89 The government opposed 
these expansions of judicial review, and in the important case of 
Heikkila v. Barber,90 the Supreme Court held that the finality provisions 
limited noncitizens to review in habeas corpus. 
In Heikkila, the Court considered whether noncitizens could use 
the provisions of the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative 
Procedure Act ("APA") to challenge actions taken under the 1917 Im-
migration Act as amended by the Internal Security Act of 1950.91 
Section 10 of the AP A provides that a person suffering a wrong from 
84. Hart, supra note 18. 
85. See id. at 1391-96. 
86. 40 Stat 955 (current version at 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, et seq). 
87. 60 Stat 243 (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq.). 
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Neither the Declaratory Judgment Act nor the Administrative 
Procedure Act directly confer subject matter jurisdiction on a federal court See infra note 213. 
Other statutes used in combination with these acts included the mandamus statute. See 28 
u.s.c. § 1361. 
89. See LEIBMA.'1 & HERlZ, supra note 31, at § 8.2(d) n.42 (gathering cases analyzing cus-
tody in immigration cases as an element of habeas corpus jurisdiction). The modem interpreta-
tion of the custody requirement in habeas corpus is discussed infra Part V. 
90. 345 U.S. 229 (1953). 
91. See id. Three Courts of Appeals reached this issue: Judge Goodrich for the Third Cir-
cuit in Trinler v. Carusi, 166 F.2d 457 (3d Cir. 1948); Judge Bazelon for the D.C. Circuit in 
Kristensen v. McGrath, 179 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1949); and Judge McAllister for the Sixth Cir-
cuit in Prince v. Commissioner, 185 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1950). All held that a noncitizen for 
whom a deportation order is outstanding may challenge the validity of the order under the 
APA. 
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an agency action can seek judicial action, with the exception that it is 
not available if there is a "statute precluding judicial review."92 Exam-
ining the finality language of the 1917 Act and the historical interpreta-
tion93 of these types of provisions, the Court concluded that the finality 
provision precluded APA review.94 The Heikkila opinion goes on to 
conclude that noncitizens are not foreclosed from all judicial review but 
must be afforded habeas corpus review as a constitutionally required 
minimum.95 
Although Heikkila was decided after the passage of the 1952 Immi-
gration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the opinion expressly stated that 
the Court was not considering the effect of the INA.96 Two years after 
Heikkila, the Court heard an almost identical challenge in the case of 
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro.91 However, in Pedreiro, the Court found that 
the INA's provision making decisions of the Attorney General "final," 
although practically unchanged from the 1917 Act,98 was not intended 
to preclude APA review or the use of declaratory judgment actions.99 
92. APA § 10 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 703). 
93. Note that the often cited historical review ·in Heikkila is somewhat incomplete in that it 
leaves out many of the very important immigration acts that shaped the history of judicial 
review of immigration proceedings. See Heikkila, 345 U.S. 229. Justice Clark limited his his-
tory to the 1891 and the 1917 Acts. See id. at 232-34. These Acts do not represent a com· 
plete history of judicial review in immigration proceedings. 
94. See id. at 235. 
95. See id. at 234-35. 
96. See id. at 232 n.4. 
97. 349 U.S. 48 (1955). Neither Heikkila nor Pedreiro are clear about the claims cogniza-
ble in habeas review. In United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), 
Justice Clark, who also authored Heikkila, granted Accardi's habeas corpus petition which raised 
statutory and regulatory challenges to his deportation. The dissent criticizes this use of habeas 
corpus. See id. at 270-71. However, the dissent in Pedreiro, while arguing that habeas corpus 
is the only form of relief, cited the legislative history as saying that in a habeas petition the 
"court determines whether or not there has been a fair hearing, whether or not the law has 
been interpreted correctly, and whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the order 
of deportation." Pedreiro, 349 U.S. at 56. The confusion over the range of cognizable claims 
is discussed infra Part V. 
98. The 1917 Act provided, relating to deportation: "In every case where any person Is 
ordered deported from the United States under the provisions of this Act . . . the decision of 
the Attorney General shall be final." Section 19, 39 Stat 874, 889 (1917), amended by 54 
Stat 1238 (1940) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1252). By contrast, the 1952 Act provided, 
relating to deportation: "In any case in which an alien is ordered deported from the United 
States under the provisions of this chapter . . . the decision of the Attorney General shall be 
final." 66 Stat 210 (1952). 
99. It is interesting to note that Justice Frankfurter dissented in Heikkila, with Justice Black 
joining, noting the intent of the legislature evidenced by the legislative history. See Heikkila, 
345 U.S. at 237-41 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Justice Black's majority opinion in Pedrelro 
was essentially an expanded version of the Frankfurter dissent See Pedrelro, 349 U.S. at 48. 
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The Court gave a three-part rationale for its decision. First, the pur-
pose of the AP A was to remove obstacles to judicial review in subse-
quently passed statutes, such as the INA. Next, the Court cited the 
legislative history of both the AP A and the INA and concluded that 
Congress intended to allow for liberal judicial review. Finally, the 
Court looked to section 12 of the APA. Section 12 provides that "no 
subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify the provi-
sions of this act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so 
expressly." Since the INA did not expressly state the intention to su-
persede or modify the APA, it remained a viable avenue for review.100 
These statutes, in combination with habeas corpus review as a last 
resort, led to many novel and creative challenges and, in some notori-
ous cases, lengthy delay in the execution of deportation or exclusion 
orders. 101 In 1961, Congress adopted a new express provision for judi-
cial review of deportation and exclusion orders that was designed to ex-
pedite review· and avoid piecemeal litigation. Former INA § 106102 
established· a basic grant of judicial review through petitions for review 
of final deportation orders to the circuit court of appeals and writs of 
habeas corpus for exclusion orders in the district courts. 103 In addition 
to the petition for review, section 106 preserved the writ of habeas cor-
pus to challenge executive detention whenever the noncitizen was taken 
into custody.104 
Although section 106 was created as the "sole and exclusive" form 
Also interesting is the fact that Justice Clark, who wrote the opinion in Heikkila, and Justice 
Douglas, who had joined in that opinion, changed sides and went with the majority in 
Pedreiro. The rest of the majority in Heikkila dissent in Pedreiro, with the exception of Chief 
Justice Vinson and Justice Jackson, both of whom had .left the court. 
100. In Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. 180 (1956), the Court expanded this holding to 
encompass exclusion orders as well. Shung's importance is that its language seemed to have 
the effect of expanding all remedies available in deportation cases to exclusion hearings. 
101. The most famous case is that of Carlos Marcello. Mr. Marcello was first ordered de-
ported by the agency in 1953. He was never successfully removed and died at age 83 in the 
United States. See L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at A3. See also ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 904 (discussion of Mr. Marcello); Mark A. Mancini, The Carlos Marcello Case, in 
2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW 2 (1990). For a chronology of litigation in deporta-
tion proceedings against Mr. Marcello, see United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir., 634 
F.2d 964, 974 (5th Cir. 1981). Mr. Marcello was presented to Congress as an example which 
supported a more streamlined system of judicial review. 
102. 8 U.S.C. § llOSa (repealed in IIRAIRA § 306(a)). 
103. This ste.'Ute was modeled on the Hobbs Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-51. 
104. See former INA § 106(a)(IO). The INA also contained an express grant of habeas 
jurisdiction to test the validity of continued executive detention if the government had failed to 
remove the noncitizen within six months of the final order of deportation. See former INA § 
242(b). This provision was repealed in IIRAIRA. 
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of judicial review of final orders of deportation under fonner INA 
§ 242(b ), 105 litigation soon arose about the type of actions, orders and 
decisions of the agency that were within the tenn "final order." In an 
important case, Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 106 the Supreme Court held 
that final orders did not include decisions collateral to the deportation 
order. 107 Cheng Fan Kwok resulted in other types of immigration liti-
gation in which noncitizens challenged other decisions and actions of 
the INS. For example, noncitizens used this ruling to challenge denials 
of adjustment of status to lawful pennanent resident108 or the failure of 
the INS to approve or adjudicate an immigrant visa petition. 109 Profes-
sor David Martin noted that Cheng Fan Kwok seemed to indicate a 
willingness to expand judicial review, but also created new problems 
for the efficient enforcement of the immigration laws. 110 
105. Fonner INA § 242(b) set forth the structure of the deportation proceedings. 
106. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). ' 
107. In Cheng Fan Kwok, the Court had to detennine if a request to the district director for 
discretionary relief fell within a final order which would be reviewable by the court of appeals. 
The Court held that it was not, as it was collateral to a section 242(b) administrative hearing. 
See id. at 216. The Court distinguished discretionary relief from other types of relief, such as 
a stay of deportation or a denial of a motion to reopen, by noting that the latter two neces· 
sarily follow from a section 242(b) administrative hearing. See id. at 212. In a situation 
where the discretionary relief was sought from the district director, the administrative action is 
completely distinct from a section 242(b) proceeding, and therefore did not fall under the judi· 
cial review pattern prescribed by section 106. See id. at 212-13. In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 937-39 (1983), the Supreme Court created more confusion in this area. The opinion re· 
ferred to "all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent rather than only 
those detennination actually made at a hearing." Id. at 937 (emphasis added). This language 
apparently broadened the scope of section I 06 jurisdiction to allow Chadha to challenge the 
constitutionality of the one-house veto of the administrative grant of suspension of deportation. 
The confusion over the scope of section 106 final orders is discussed in ALEINIKOFF ET AL., 
supra note 36, at 919·21. See also Susan M. Akram, Traps for the Unwary, or Major Issues 
on Judicial Review of Deportation Decisions Under INA § 106, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NA· 
TIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 367 (1995). This article provides an excellent discussion of the 
types of claims found to be within and without the scope of section I 06 jurisdiction. Al· 
though section 106 has been repealed, analogous arguments will undoubtedly be made to ana· 
lyze the preclusive effects of the new section 242. 
108. See, e.g., Che-Li Shen v. INS, 749 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1984); Shahla v. INS, 749 
F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1984); ljoma v. INS, 854 F. Supp. 612 (D. Neb. 1993). But cf. Yeung v. 
Reno, 868 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding no jurisdiction to review denial of adjustment 
of status by district director). 
109. See, e.g., DeFigueroa v. INS, 501 F.2d 191 (7th Cir. 1974). 
110. See David Martin, Mandel, Cheng Fan Kwok, and Other Unappealing Cases: The Next 
Frontier of Immigration Reform, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 803 (1987). Martin advocates removing 
the provisions of fonner INA § 106 which vacated the federal court's jurisdiction if the non· 
citizen was removed (or voluntarily left) during the appeal. See fonner INA § I 06(c), 
IIRAIRA has removed this provision and there is now no statutory obstacle to continuing a 
petition for review after the noncitizen's departure or removal. The court of appeals may also 
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Federal courts were also willing to consider cases that presented 
"pattern and practice" violations of the immigration Jaws or cases that 
challenged the legitimacy of INS procedures without requiring individu-
al exhaustion of administrative review or the review provided in former 
INA § 106.111 Courts did not limit non citizens to the section 106 pro-
cedures when the issue to be presented in the case required the devel-
opment of a factual record in federal district court. Without the district 
court proceeding, the noncitizen could not establish an adequate record 
in the administrative agency, and thus the court of appeals would not 
have a record to evaluate when hearing an individual petition for re-
view.112 
Together, these patterns of litigation led to increasing congressional 
and administration frustration. Congress made only minor changes in 
the 1961 scheme for judicial review, and few were contemplated until 
the early 1980s when Congress considered several statutes for reform of 
the immigration laws. 113 The Administrative Conference of the United 
issue a stay pending the adjudication of the appeal. See INA § 242(b)(3)9B). The same 
should be true in habeas cases. Once the habeas petition is filed, even removal does not va-
cate the court's jurisdiction. See discussion infra Part IV. Unfortunately, the statute does not 
include Professor Martin's recommendation that the elimination of the departure rule should also 
be accompanied by a requirement that the government must bear the expense of returning 
noncitizens who are successful on appeal: "[t]his guarantee not only reflects simple fairness. It 
would also provide an added incentive for the Justice Department to look carefully at every 
appealed case or motion to reopen, before actual deportation, to see whether the Department 
would consent to a stay of deportation." Martin, supra, at 819. , 
111. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982) (class challenge to 
political asylum procedures). See also Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (1 lth 
Cir. 1986) (awarding attorneys' fees and reaffirms jurisdiction); but cf Dhangu v. INS, 812 
F.2d 455 (9th Cir. 1987); Gallanosa v. United States, 785 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1986); Bothyo v. 
INS, 783 F.2d 74 (7th Cir. 1986); Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985). 
These cases hold, generally, that the exhaustion requirement in INA § l06(c) cannot be waived. 
In IMMIGRATION PROCESS & POLICY, the casebook authors suggest that this exception to section 
106 was used too frequently and in one case had completely "eviscerated INA § l06(a) by 
tolerating a truly audacious 'end run."' ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 940-41 n.20 
(discussing Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
112. The purpose of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is to allow the agencies 
to develop their own records, and, possibly, correct their own errors. Exhaustion leads to a 
better record for judicial review. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738 (1975); Currie 
& Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 
75 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 35-36 (1975). David Martin has questioned this assumption when the 
administrative ;irocedures do allow for the development of an adequate record. See David 
Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1247, 1313-14, 1325 (1990). 
113. See Omnibus Immigration Control Act (including the Air and Expeditious Appeal, Asy-
lum and Exclusion Act) of 1981, S. 1765 and H.R. 4832, 97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981); Immi-
gration Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222 and H.R. 5872, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) 
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States ("ACUS") also commissioned several studies of these issues. In 
an article based on one of these studies, Stephen Legomsky described 
the prevailing attitudes: 
Recent congressional bills have taken aim at both administrative 
and judicial review structures in the field of immigration. With-
in the Department of Justice, there is talk of curtailing adminis-
trative review of certain controversial categories of decisions . . 
" . And the subject of judicial review has become a perennial 
battlefield in this corner of the law. Pressures are building, and 
something is certain to give soon. 114 
Professor Legomsky's detailed study suggested substantial revision in 
the administrative process and adjustments to the judicial review 
scheme under former INA § I 06 and other INA provisions. 115 Paul 
Verkuil's study focused on the initial administrative hearings procedures 
(S. 2222 passed the Senate on August 12, 1982 by an 80-19 vote, but H.R. 5872, and later 
H.R. 6514, never came to vote in the House); Immigration Reform and Con'trol Act of 1983, 
S. 529 and H.R. 1510 (1983) (S. 529 passed the Senate 76-18 on May 18, 1983, and H.R. 
1510 passed the House 216-211 on June 20, 1984. A conference began on September 13, 
1984, but no final agreement was reached and the legislation died when Congress adjourned on 
October 11, 1984). These bills contained provisions reforming and streamlining the administra-
tive and judicial processes. Supporters of the proposed legislation sought to eliminate or at 
least restrict the "multi-tiered" judicial review process and the "procedural morass" which al-
legedly had enabled dilatory tactics in the exclusion and deportation processes. See Immigra-
tion Reform and Control Act of 1982; Joint Hearings on H.R. 5872 and S. 2222: Before the 
Subcomm. on Immigration, Refagees and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, and the Subcomm. of Immigration and Refagee Policy of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, 
97th Cong., I St Sess. (Oct 14 and 16, 1981 ). 
114. Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency Adjudication: A Study 
of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1297, 1300 (1986) [hereinafter "Forum Choices") 
(footnotes omitted). 
115. Professor Legomsky's administrative recommendations were adopted by the ACUS, I 
C.F.R. § 305.85-4. His judicial review recommendations were not included. For example, he 
called for more clarity in former INA § 279 which granted subject matter to district courts 
over "all causes, civil and criminal, arising under any of the provisions of [title II of the 
INA]." Some courts read section 279 as precluding general federal question jurisdiction and 
others read it as an express general grant of federal court jurisdiction in immigration cases. 
Yet, some courts read this section to allow additional review of exclusion or deportation orders 
that were intended to be covered in section 106. Although Professor Legomsky did not invite 
Congress to use section 279 as a preclusion statute, the new legislation recognized the varied 
judicial interpretations. More than ten years after his study, Congress amended the provision to 
allow only the government to assert federal court jurisdiction under its terms. I discuss section 
279 in Part IV and in Lenni B. Benson, The "New World" of Judicial Review of Removal Or-
ders, in 2 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 32 (1997). It is beyond the 
scope of this Article to discuss all of Professor Legomsky's thoughtful recommendations and 
observations. 
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and identified factors which would be constitutionally required. 116 He 
noted that providing more expansive administrative review should mini-
mize the intrusiveness of judicial review. 117 Professor David Martin 
studied the adjudication of political asylum claims. 118 Many of his 
suggested administrative reforms were later adopted by the INS. 119 
During this same time period, Congress considered other major 
substantive changes to the immigration laws. The compromise legis-
lation finally adopted created the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
of 1986 ("IRCA"). 120 IRCA balanced the creation of employer sanc-
tions against two legalization programs designed to legitimate some 
existing undocumented populations. 121 
Although limits on federal court jurisdiction and review were pro-
posed during this time period, 122 rigorous opposition which questioned 
the constitutionality of the limitations123 and the compromise limitation 
of review for people seeking legalization under the "amnesty" and "sea-
sonal agricultural worker" programs forestalled any sweeping change of 
section 106.124 The compromise limitation consisted of language which 
specifically limited federal court review of claims raised by legalization 
seekers. The statutes provided that "there shall be no administrative or 
judicial review of a determination respecting an application for adjust-
ment of status under this section . . . there shall be judicial review of 
such a denial only in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or 
116. His study fanned the basis of Paul Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 
UCLA L. REV. 1141 (1984). 
117. See id. at 1180. 
118. Professor Martin's study is discussed in Martin, supra note 112, at 1325. 
119. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Techniques for Managing High-Volume Asylum 
Systems, 81 IOWA L. REv. 671 (1996) (discussing the proposals, refonns, and state of asylum 
adjudication prior to the 1996 legislation). 
120. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat 3359. 
121. The first program, called "amnesty," allowed people who could establish continuous un-
lawful presence prior to January I, 1982 to apply for pennanent residency. See INA § 245A. 
The second program was adopted to legalize agricultural workers who may have only made a 
seasonal appearance in the United States. See INA § 210. · 
122. Congress was interested in limiting the availability of administrative and judicial review 
to correct what it perceived as an inefficient system. See William Smith, Immigration Law 
Reform: Proposals in the 98th Congress, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 7 (1983). 
123. See discussion and materials infra notes 294-95. 
124. See S. REP. No. 99-132, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 48 (Aug. 28, 1985) (reasons that to 
insure "reasonably prompt detenninations" no judicial review is provided under the legalization 
program). But cf H.R. REP. No. 99-682, Pt I, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 74 (July 16, 1986) 
(providing for 'i11ited administrative and judicial review of denials of applications for legaliza-
tion). The final version of the law retains the latter approach. See IRCA §§ 210(e)(3), 
245A(f). 
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deportation under section 106."125 
The Supreme Court in McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center126 found 
that this language did not preclude pattern and practice violations or 
allegations of unconstitutional implementation of the legalization pro-
grams.127 The Court held that, despite the limit on review, the district 
court had jurisdiction to hear a class action challenging the procedures 
used in the seasonal agricultural worker ("SAW") program. In part, the 
Court's holding was based on the rationale that allowing the class ac-
tion would expedite the adjudication of the SAW claims. Justice 
Stephens rf.250ned that limiting review to individual claims filed in the 
court of appeals, after the exhaustion of the administrative procedures, 
would have the effect of creating even longer delays. 128 
' More than ten years after the creation of the legalization and sea-
sonal agricultural worker programs, several large class action Jaw suits 
were still raising challenges to the regulations and implementation of 
the program.129 Thousands of noncitizens class members awaited adju-
dication of their claims. 130 In Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc. ,131 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in McNary but rejected the 
lower court's certification order on ripeness grounds. The district court 
had certified a class including all people who would have qualified for 
125. INA §§ 210(e), 245A(f)(4). These sections authorized the creation of a single level of 
appellate review. The INS created the Legalization Appeals Unit. See 52 Fed. Reg. 16,190 
(May I, 1988). See also Francesco Isgro, Administrative and Judicial Review of Denials of 
Temporary Resident Status, 2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 473, 477 (1988) (written by the associate gen-
eral counsel of the INS, this article describes the legalization programs). 
126. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). 
127. See Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Meese, 791 F.2d 1489 (I Ith Cir. 1986); Haitian Refugee 
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982). 
128. The Court noted that waiting for individual deportation orders to be entered and re-
viewed would create long delays, delays that Congress had intended to eliminate when they 
passed the petition for review provision. See McNary, 498 U.S. at 490. The scope of the 
pattern and practice exception has been refined in subsequent cases; however, declaratory and 
injunctive relief are still viable remedies, though recently limited by IIRAIRA. See Robert 
Pauw, Judicial Review of "Pattern and Practice" Cases: What to Do When the INS Acts Un-
lawfal/y, 70 WASH. L. REV. 779 (1995). For a discussion of some of these limits in the new 
legislation, sec Benson, supra note 115. 
129. See Robert H. Gibbs, It Ain't Over 'Ti/ It's Over: Amnesty Issues Persist A Decade 
After /RCA, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1493 (Oct. 28, 1996). Robert Gibbs notes that over 
2.6 million people legalized their status under the !RCA programs but that tens of thousands of 
claims were still pending ten years later. This article also describes several class actions 
brought on behalf of people who failed to file claims for legalization due to the INS's improp-
er regulations. 
130. Two national class actions resulted in over 400,000 late applications. See id. at 1502. 
131. 509 U.S. 43 (1993). 
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legalization but did not apply due to the erroneous INS policy. The 
Supreme Court vacated the order and remanded to the lower court to 
determine whether members of the class had actually had their applica-
tions rejected132 or who could otherwise articulate a justiciable claim.133 
On remand, the district court narrowed the class to include persons who 
had actually filed an application and those who might have filed a 
claim but for the front desk rejection policy. 134 
Frustrated over the delays in adjudicating the IRCA legalization 
claims, Congress specifically addressed this and other similar class 
actions by limiting federal court jurisdiction to those persons who "in 
fact filed an application . . . or attempted to file a complete application 
. . . with an authorized legalization office of the Service but had the 
application and fee refused by that Officer."135 The government moved 
to dismiss the amended class based on this new jurisdictional statute. 
On April 30, 1997, the Ninth Circuit dismissed' the reconstituted class 
and upheld the constitutionality of Section 377.136 The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the new statute violated the separa-
tion of powers by finding that the statute was changing the law appli-
cable to the case rather than interfering with the judicial process. 137 
The Ninth Circuit also found that the statute did not completely immu-
nize the policy from constitutional attack so as to raise due process 
concerns because the statue only restricts claims to "those who have 
been directly affected by INS conduct."138 Attorneys for the plaintiffs 
in a similar case have filed an amended complaint asserting jurisdiction 
132. The INS had a policy which instructed employees of the legalization offices or the des-
ignated agencies to reject the applications of those who appeared statutorily ineligible at the 
"front desk." See id. at 61-62. 
133. A footnote in the opinion suggested the possibility that other persons could maintain a 
justiciable claim even though they had not been directly "front-desked." See id. at 66 n.28. 
134. Unpublished order, described in the 9th Cir. decision at 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094, at 
•6. 
135. IIRAIRA § 377 (amending INA § 245A(f)(4)). Section. 377(b) stated that the amend-
ment "shall be effective as if included in the enactment of [IRCA]." The Conference commit-
tee report described this section as intended to "put an end to litigation seeking to extend the 
amnesty provisions of [IRCA ), and to limit claims under that section to aliens who in fact filed 
an application for legalization under that section within the prescribed time limits, or attempted 
to do so, but their application was refused by an immigration officer." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 
I 04-828, at 230 (1996). 
136. See Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, No. 96-15495, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094 (9th 
Cir. Feb. 11, 1997). 
137. See id. at •11-12 (citing Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 (1992) (up-
holding a similfl!' Congressional statute which directly affected pending cases)). 
138. Id. at •iJ. 
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for a national class action under the writ of habeas corpus. 139 
Congress was also growing concerned over the numbers of 
noncitizens convicted of crimes, noncitizens incarcerated in state and 
federal prisons, and the relatively low number of deportations of con-
victed criminals. In a series of bills from 1988 to 1994, Congress 
amended the grounds of deportability to increase the ability of the INS 
to deport noncitizens. In an effort to expedite the deportation and 
removal process, Congress created a form of ministerial deportation. 140 
This procedure bypassed the normal administrative hearing, administra-
tive review and judicial review except in a very narrow form. 141 In 
this special procedure, the noncitizen would receive a form, A Notice 
of Intent to Deport, from a deportation officer of the 1Ns. t42 The 
noncitizen would then be allowed ten days to present a written rebuttal 
stating the grounds for why the person should not be deported. t43 A 
different officer of the deportation section would review the rebuttal 
and had the power to order the person deported. No other procedure 
was authorized except that the non citizen could seek judicial review in· 
the form of a habeas petition limited to the issues of alienage, identity, 
and proof of conviction. 144 
In the next section, I will explore some of the factors which moti-
vated Congress to adopt the 1996 legislation. I will describe the judi-
cial review provisions of the 1996 legislation in Part IV. 
139. See Gibbs, supra note 129, at 1502 (discussing LULAC v. INS, 956 F.2d 914 (9th 
Cir.), rev'd and remanded on jurisdictional ground sub. nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), and renamed Newman v. INS after the filing of an amended com-
plaint). 
140. These procedures were never widely implemented. In IIRAIRA, Congress repealed the 
statutory authority, replacing it with different streamlined procedures. See infra note 164 and 
discussion in Part IV. 
141. See Pub. L. 103-416, Tit II, §§ 223(a), 224(a), 108 Stat 4322. 
142. See fonner INA § 242A. 
143. See id. 
144. See id. § 106(d). Although the statute apparently created a limited fonn of habeas 
corpus procedure, nothing in the statute eliminated the general grant of habeas corpus statutory 
authority in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As will be discussed below, courts may view the failure to 
expressly repeal this other authority as a preservation of the writ of habeas corpus. See discus-
sion of implied repeal of habeas corpus infra Part V. 
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Ill. CONGRESS AND THE 1996 IMMIGRATION REFORMS 
"ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH!"145 
1439 
A number of highly publicized events and political factors led Con-
gress to reform judicial review of immigration actions. Immigration 
law became a prominent subject of political debate. 146 Immigration 
policy was debated by candidates for the presidency, 147 was the subject 
of state wide referenda, 148 and was a frequent topic in both state and 
congressional elections. Many state governments began calling for the 
federal government to do "something" about illegal immigration. 149 The 
145. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3, sc. 1. The rhetoric of battle or war is often 
used in the debates of immigration policy. 
146. Immigration law and policy is consistently front page news. A search on NEXIS re-
veals that between January of 1994 and May of 1997, the New York Times has published 23 
articles on .immigration related topics on its front page, and in California, where the topic re-
ceives much more attention, the Los Angeles Times has published 462 articles on immigration 
related topics on its front page since 1994. 
147. Some GOP candidates took extreme positions on immigration policy. Governor Pete 
Wilson pushed for a constitutional amendment to deny citizenship to children born on United 
States soil to undocumented noncitizens. See Ronald Brownstein, Immigration Debate Splits 
GOP Hopefals, LA. TIMES, May 14, 1995, at Al. Patrick Buchanan took the most extreme 
position, calling for a complete moratorium on most forms of immigration. See id. Currently, 
there are several bills pending in the House of Representatives that would either amend the 
Constibltion or the INA in an effort to restrict birth right citizenship. See H.RJ. Res. 60, 
lOSth Cong. (1997) (amending the Constibltion); H.RJ. Res. 26, 10Sth Cong. (1997) (same); 
H.RJ. Res. 4, lOSth Cong. (1997) (same); H.R. 7, lOSth Cong. (1997) (amending the INA). 
The Democratic National Platform welcomed legal immigration and supported legal immi-
gration policies but called for greater efforts to control illegal immigration. See 1996 PRESIDEN-
TIAL CAMPAIGN PRESS MATERIALS, 1996 Democratic Platform, Position Paper, Aug. 28, 1996. 
148. Proposition 187 in California was adopted in 1994 by nearly .60% of the votes cast 
See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 4821S(a) (West Supp. 1995); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130(a) 
(West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.S(c) (West Supp. 1995). Proposition 
187 prohibited the state of California from providing health, welfare, or schooling to undocu~ 
mented aliens. The proposition has been enjoined by the Federal District Court in Northern 
California primarily on the basis that immigration law is preempted by federal legislation and 
the state cannot permissibly seek to regulate this area See League of United Latin Am. Citi-
zens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction), 
aff'd sub. nom. Wilson v. City of San Jose, 111 F.3d 688 (9th Cir. 1997). Initially, the con-
ference report for IIRAIRA had provisions similar to Proposition 187, known as the Gallegly 
Amendment; however, this amendment was dropped due to an explicit veto threat from Presi-
dent Clinton. See 142 CONG. REc. HI 1071 (1996). 
149. Several states also filed suit against the federal government seeking reimbursement for 
the cost to the state associated with the presence of undocumented aliens. State claims includ-
ed unreimbursed medical expenses, welfare, schooling expenses, and housing. The suits argued 
that the federal government failed to adequately enforce the immigration laws both in prevent-
ing undocumented migration and in removing aliens found to be in violation of the laws. All 
of these suits were dismissed for failing to state a claim for relief. See e.g., Texas v. United 
States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997); California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 
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media and political statements often referred to an "out of control" 
border.150 Others wanted to reduce the numbers of legal immigrants.151 
The push for change occurred before the work of the United States 
Commission on Immigration had completed its study of existing immi-
gration policy.152 Many opponents to immediate legislative change ar-
gued that the reforms of the prior major legislation, or of the agency 
reforms, were not yet fully implemented. 153 
I997); Chiles v. United States, 69 F.3d I094· (11th Cir. I995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct I674 
(I996); New Jersey v. United States, 9I F 3d 463 (3d Cir. I996). In one case, state counties 
sued the federal government See Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. I996) (suit 
by New York state counties and legislators). llRAIRA also contains provisions which allow 
reimbursement to states for the cost of incarcerating illegal immigrant felons. See INA § 
24I(i). 
ISO. The rhetoric used to discuss this complex issue is often that used to describe invasions 
of enemies or pestilence. For example, the press routinely used imagery of invasion in report· 
ing the foundering of the ship, the Golden Venture, in New York Harbor. The Golden Ven· 
ture was operated by smugglers and carried approximately 285 people who sought illegal entry 
to the United States. See Robert McFadden, Smuggled to New York: The Overview-7 Die as 
Crowded Immigrant Ship Grounds Off Queens; Chinese Aboard Are Seized for Illegal Entry, 
N.Y. nMES, June 7, I993, at Al. Governor Pete Wilson and the Proposition I87 campaign 
used video footage of illegal entries at the Mexico border in campaign television commercials. 
See Dennis Love, Demagogue or Sav1ry1 Tactician? Can .Pete Wilson Turn Proposition I87, 
Affirmative Action Into His Issue?, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Apr. 9, I995, at Fl. 
Others analogize immigration to environmental disasters. For an excellent discussion of 
the inappropriate use of terms describing environmental pollution or abuse in the context of 
immigration poiicy, see Peter L. Reich, Environmental Metaphor in the Alien Benefits Debate, 
42 UCLA L. REV. IS77 (I995). Professor Kevin Johnson has also written about the inappro· 
priate images used to describe noncitizens. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los O/v/dados: Images of 
the Immigrant, Political Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993 
BYU L. REv. 1139 (I993). 
151. Congress did not enact the express limits on numbers and qualifications of new immi· 
grants originally proposed. Congress did raise the income level required to sponsor family 
members for immigration. See INA § 213. It may be that this change and others will in fact 
reduce the number of people who qualify for legal immigration. 
IS2. The United States Commission on Immigration Reform, headed by the late Barbara Jor· 
dan, was in the process of conducting a study which was to be published in June I997 which 
would provide recommendations concerning permanent and temporary legal immigration to the 
United States. See Testimony of Barbara Jordan, Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Re· 
form Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, House Judiciary Comm., Feb. 24, 
I997. However, llRAIRA was passed prior to the issuance of the commission's report, and 
many Democrats in the House complained that the House Conference Report was issued without 
their input See I42 CoNG. REc. Hl1071 (I996). The Commission had issued a report which 
called for better enforcement of the existing immigration laws. See RESTORING CREDIBILITY, 
U.S. CoMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION REFORM (I995). 
IS3. For example, many non-profit advocacy organizations argued that reforms such as expe· 
dited removal at the ports of entry were not needed since regulatory changes had greatly re· 
duced the number of applications for political asylum. See 142 CONG. REc. SI 1886-01, 
11906-11907 (I996). 
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Nevertheless, in 1996, Congress adopted several statutes which 
changed the enforcement of the immigration laws and, in many cases, 
the ability of people to immigrate to this country. First came the 
AEDP A, which was adopted by Congress near the anniversary of the 
bombing of the Federal Court building in Oklahoma City in April of 
1995. 154 On its face, this bill precluded aliens convicted of certain 
criminal offenses from seeking judicial review of final orders of depor-
tation or exclusion.155 Then on the last day of the session, Congress 
attached to one of the appropriations bills the IIRAIRA. 156 IIRAIRA 
primarily concerns the ability of the INS to enforce the immigration · 
laws of the United States. The statute blends together the formerly 
separate exclusion and deportation hearings by substituting a new "re-
moval" proceeding and creates a form of expedited removal at border 
posts, 157 eliminates several forms of relief from deportation, 158 restricts 
154. The immigration portions of the bill were in part originally inspired by the fear that the 
bombing in Oklahoma City had been the work of foreign terrorists. In June of 1997, Timothy 
McVeigh, a native born United States citizen and fonner member of the armed forces, was 
tried and convicted of conspiracy and murder in connection with the bombing. Even though 
there were no aJlegations that the Oklahoma bombing was in any way Jinked to foreign terror-
ists groups, some members of Congress were also seeking to speed the deportation of aliens 
after the delay in removing Sheik Rahman, the Egyptian cleric who was convicted of inspiring 
the bombing of the World Trade Center. See 142 CONG. REc. S3352-0l (1996) (Senator 
Hatch argued that the passage of AEDP A will help in the expedient trial and sentencing of the 
perpetrators of the Oklahoma City Bombing. Senator Bieden argued that the World Trade 
Center Bombing, along with Oklahoma City and the Locherbe, Scotland disaster, where a 
PanAm plane exploded due to a terrorist bomb, have made it necessary to pass the bill.). 
Sheik Rahman had been admitted to the United States as a tourist He delayed his deportation 
by applying for political asylum. When his application for asylum was denied he obtained the 
usual stay of deportation while he pursued judicial review of the denial of his application. See 
Robert D. McFadden, The Twin Towers: The Overview: Agents Step Up Search for Bombing 
Suspect's Links, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1993, at Al. Sheik Rahman was convicted of conspiracy 
to bomb the World Trade Center and sentenced to life in prison. 
155. The AEDPA also removed the ability of some criminal aliens to seek a waiver of ex-
clusion or deportation available if the alien had held lawful domicile for seven years and could 
demonstrate that he or she would face extreme hardship if deported or excluded. This waiver 
was called the section 212(c) waiver. 
156. See supra note 5. 
157. Although the statute appears to attempt to eradicate the differences which have been 
inherent in exclusion and deportation proceedings by creating a single type of "removal pro-
ceeding," many of the former distinctions between exclusion and deportation continue to be pre-
served, such as the differences in burdens of proof. The expedited removal provisions grant 
the INS authority to disregard the entry doctrine by treating some people who are physically 
within the United States territory as if they had not made an entry because they have not been 
inspected and admitted. See INA § 235(b)(l)(iii)(II). The entry doctrine reflected both statuto-
ry and constitutional differences between the treatment of noncitizens within the territory of the 
United States and those seeking admission at a port of entry. See Stanley Mailman, "Admis-
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preexisting waivers and discretionary fonns of relief, creates new bars 
to political asylum, including a time limit of one year from entry for 
such applications, and attempts to remove federal court review of ad-
ministrative action or severely curtail the scope and type of review 
available.159 IIRAIRA also completely repealed the fonner statutory 
sion" and "Unlawful Presence" in the New /IRA/RA Lexicon, in 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONAL-
ITY LAw I (1997) (discussing historical development of entry doctrine and the impact of 
IIRAIRA changes). 
The ability of Congress to eliminate the entry doctrine presents a serious question which 
implicates the tradition of recognizing that the Constitution requires greater due process 
protections for those noncitizens within the territorial borders of the United States. The wis· 
dom of the entry doctrine has long been the subject of debate. See T. Alexwider Aleinikoff, 
Aliens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Response to Martin, 44 U. PITI. L. REv. 237 
(1983) (arguing that the Constitution should not be interpreted differently for people depending 
on their immigration status); David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership In the National 
Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PITI. L. REv. 165, 230-34 (1983) (arguing 
that people who make illegal entries should not be afforded the same levels of due process as 
lawful entrants). This debate about the proper legal treatment of people who have made Illegal 
entries is also summarized as a dialogue in ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at 505-10. It 
is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the entry doctrine, but I note it here as one of 
the mwiy important examples of constitutional questions presented by the new legislation. Its 
, is hardly coincidental that Congress is limiting federal court jurisdiction at the very same mo· 
ment that it seeks to statutorily overturn a long-established judicial doctrine which afforded 
noncitizens greater due process protection. IIRAIRA also chwiged the re-entry doctrine for 
returning lawful permanent residents by defining a safe harbor period of six months absence 
during which a lawful permanent resident could return without having to re-establish admissibili· 
ty. See INA § 10l(a)(l3). But although this safe harbor may seem beneficial, it is not nec-
essarily consistent with the principles of due process which lead to the creation of the Fleutl 
doctrine, a judicially created exception to the re-entry doctrine for brief, casual, wid Innocent 
departures. See Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). 
158. For example, the elimination of suspension of deportation relief, see former INA § 244, 
was in direct response to the myth that aliens applying for suspension of deportation often 
abused this form of relief by delaying deportation proceedings until the requisite seven years 
had been established. See H.R. REP. No. 104-469, pt 1, at 122 (1996). By stripping or lim· 
iting noncitizens of various forms of relief, Congress completely disregarded a report issued by 
the Attorney General which had determined that noncitizens were not abusing the immigration 
system. See Justice Dept. Finds Aliens Not Abusing Requests for Relief, 68 INTERPRETER RE· 
LEASES 901 (July 22, 1991). This report was submitted to allay Congress' fears that deport-
able or excludable people were prolonging their stays in the United States by failing to consoli· 
date their requests for discretionary relief. The Justice Department concluded "that the number 
of cases in which aliens file multiple applications for relief or motions to reopen comprise Jess 
than five percent of the total caseload." Id. For an analysis of how the new cwiccllation of 
removal provisions and the restrictions on judicial review will result in the likelihood of arbl· 
trary and unjust decisions, see William C.B. Underwood, Note: Unrevlewab/e Discretionary 
Justice: The New Extreme Hardship in Cancellation of Deportation Cases, 72 IND. L.J. 885 
(1997). 
159. For Congress, the limitation on the availability of judicial review was implemented to 
eradicate the delay in the removal of noncitizens from the United States. However, this basis 
is nothing more than a myth. As an empirical matter, judicial review of immigration proceed-
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section governing judicial review of deportation and exclusion proceed-
ings which had been in place since 1961.160 The judicial review provi-
sions of the recent legislation are described in detail in Part IV. 
ings is not the major, or even a significant, cause of delay in the removal of noncitizens. In 
March 1996, the Inspector General conducted a random review of 1,000 files and concluded 
that the INS failed to remove 89% of the people who had outstanding final orders of deporta-
tion, but were not in the current detention of the agency. Of those detained, the INS was able 
to remove 94%. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Inspection 
Report, March 1996, Report No. 1-96-03. This disparity might suggest that increased detention 
should immediately be implemented to increase the rate of removal. I dispute that assumption 
for a variety of reasons including the increased cost along with purely humanitarian concerns. 
Nevertheless, the point is that these were final orders. There was no judicial review barring 
the agency's ability to remove the alien, and the agency did not argue that judicial review had 
prevented the removal of the aliens. 
Examining this from another angle, in fiscal year 1996, the Immigration courts (not in-
cluding the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA")) heard 262,572 cases, and completed ap-
proximately 246,426. See Prepared Statement of Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, Board of Immi-
gration Appeals, before the House Judiciary Committee Immigration and Claims Subcommittee 
concerning JIRA/RA, Federal News Service (February 11, 1997). These completed cases includ-
ed 150,121 removal (deportation, exclusion, and voluntary departure) orders; 7,469 grants of 
suspensions of deportation; 2,561 waivers under 212(c); 5,140 grants of asylum; and 4,138 
adjustments of status. See id. The Executive Office for Immigration Review anticipates ap-
proximately 300,000 cases for fiscal year 1997, with completed cases ranging from 270,000 to 
280,000, and for fiscal year 1998, the BIA expects approximately 325,000 cases and hopes to 
complete between 290,000 and 300,000. See id. The BIA, in fiscal year 1995, heard approxi-
mately 17,500 cases, with completed cases at roughly 12,000. See id. In fiscal year 1996, the 
number of cases rose 20,423, with completed cases rising by approximately a third to 16,721. 
See id. Of those 16,721 cases, 9,558 removal orders were issued. See id. The BIA projects 
approximately 24,000 cases in 1997, with completed cases between 20,000 and 22,000. See id. 
And for fiscal year 1998, Mr. Schmidt recognized that the, effects of IIRAIRk will be "felt at 
the appellate level," projecting a casefoad increase to at. least 26,000. See id. 
Moreover, in their important 1990' study evaluating the. number of immigration cases in 
federal courts, Peter Schuck anu' Theodbre- Wang found thar deportation appeals increased from 
twenty-three in 1979, to 111 in 19.90, and exclusion appealS' increased from two cases in 1979, 
to eight in 1990. See Peter H. S"chuck & Theodore Hsien Wang, Continuity and Change: Pat-
terns of Immigration Litigation in the Courts, 1979-1990, 45 STAN. L. REY. 115, 136 (1992). 
From 1991 to 1996, a search replicating the methodology used in that study found 208 cases 
in 1991, in 1992 and 1993, 204 and 284 cases respectively, in 1994 and 1995, 344 and 391 
cases respectively, and 401 cases in 1996. 
Therefore, I submit judicial review is not the root of our immigration system's problems. 
Congress' fearrthat noncitizens are exploiting the system has no basis in fact I do not assert 
that judicial review may never cause delays; however, the percentage of possible cases is ex-
tremely small in comparision to INS's failure to remove non-detained aliens with final orders 
of removal. Further, even with a minute number of cases seeking judicial review, the current 
legislation still does not reach Congress' goal of streamlining since it does not have the power 
to eliminate the writ of habeas corpus. As discussed in Part V, habeas corpus can be used to 
delay and frustrate expeditious removal. 
160. Former section 106 of the INA was repealed and replaced by new INA § 242. 
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IV. THE JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS OF nm 
1996 IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 
In AEDPA, Congress focused on the deportation of noncitizens 
convicted of crimes. Congress amended the general grant of jurisdic-
tion contained in former section I 06 to limit the scope of judicial re-
view of deportation or exclusion orders. AEDPA provided that persons 
convicted of "aggravated felonies"161 and ordered deported after a de-
portation hearing and administrative review before the Board of lmmi-
grati(;m Appeals could not seek judicial review. 162 The exact language 
of the bar is "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any final order 
of removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having 
committed a [statutorily covered] criminal offense."163 
When Congress enacted AEDP A, there were several other immigra-
tion bills pending in the House and Senate. 164 These bills were not 
161. AEDPA expanded the definition of an aggravated felony. See AEDPA § 440(e). The 
definition was amended again in IIRAIRA § 321, codified as INA § 101(a}(43). See infra 
note 164. 
162. AEDPA, also removed several forms of relief from deportation for people convicted of 
crimes. One form of relief eliminated was the discretionary waiver available to long-term per-
manent resident aliens, known as the 212(c) waiver. See infra note 276 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the bar to section 212(c) relief in exclusion proceedings. 
The BIA interpreted AEDPA as preserving 212(c) relief in exclusion proceedings. See Jn 
re Fuentes-Campos, Int Dec. 3318 (BIA 1997). The statutory disparity between relief available 
to people in exclusion versus people in deportation had led the Second Circuit to find that 
failure to extend 212(c) relief to people in deportation would violate equal protection. See 
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). Because of Francis, the INS eventually allowed 
lawful residents in either exclusion or deportation to apply for the waiver. The new disparity 
has ·a1so lead to equal protection challenges. See Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. 
Cal. 1997) (finding BIA interpretation irrational given the subsequent repeal of section 212(c) in 
IIRAIRA). Congress also repealed section 212(c) and replaced it with a cancellation of remov-
al for lawful permanent residents. See INA § 240A. IIRAIRA purports to eliminate the dis-
tinction between exclusion and deportation proceedings. It is much more difficult to meet the 
statutory prima facie requirements under the new cancellation of removal provisions. For a 
very clear examination of the relief available after IIRAIRA, see Nadine Wettstein, The 1996 
Immigration Act: New Removal Proceedings, . Cancellation of Removal, and Voluntary Departure, 
73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1677 (Dec. 9, 1996). 
163. See AEDPA § 440a. 
164. See, e.g., S. 269, 104th Cong. (1995) (introduced by Sen. Alan K. Simpson in early 
1995), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 169, 653 (1995); s. 1394, 104th Cong. (1995) (re-
form bill aimed at legal immigration, also introduced by Senator Simpson}, discussed in 72 INTER· 
PRETER RELEASES 1605; S. 754, 104th Cong. (1995) (the Administration's Immigration Reform 
Bill), discussed in 72 INTERPETER RELEASES 377 (1995); H.R. 1915, 104th Cong. (1995) (intro-
duced by Rep. LaMar Smith of Texas), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 943 (1995), H.R. 
2202, 104th Cong. (1995) (also introduced by Rep. Smith), discussed in 72 INTERPRETER RELEAS· 
ES 1303, 1371, 1447, 1481 (1995); and S. 1664, 104th Cong. (1995) (which passed the Senate 
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limited to restricting judicial review for people convicted of aggravated 
felonies. At the end of the session, the Congress adopted IIRAIRA 
and its sweeping changes to judicial review. 
IIRAIRA eliminates the former section 106 entirely and replaces it 
with a provision which, in some circumstances, allows judicial review 
in the circuit courts of appeals. 165 However, the new provision limits 
the availability of the petition for review for people in disfavored 
groups or for people presenting disfavored claims. 166 
A. Disfavored Groups 
1. People with Criminal Convictions 
The principally disadvantaged group contains people in regular 
removal proceedings who have been convicted of crimes.167 It is diffi-
on May 2, 1996 and, along with H.R. 2202, became the basis for IIRAIRA). 
165. See infra Chart 1 (illustrating the general judicial review process under INA § 106 (re- · 
pealed 1940)). For additional diagranis of the prior judicial review process, see ALEINIKOFF ET 
AL., supra note 36, at 932-33. IIRAIRA also revised INA § 279, which gave federal district 
courts subject matter jurisdiction over some types of immigration claims. The amendment elim-
inates the jurisdiction except for claims brought by the United States government Section 279 
was used in support of lawsuits which were not seeking judicial review of deportation or exclu-
sion orders, but were challenging some type of INS action outside the scope of an exclusion or 
deportation order. See discussion of INA § 279 supra note 115. For a discussion of the im-
pact of the elimination of section 279 as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction for claims 
against the United States government, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION LAW & POLI-
CY 350-53 (1992). 
166. See INA § 242. In the general case, where the petitioner is not one of the disfavored 
groups or making a disfavored claim, the petition for review is filed in the circuit court of 
appeals within thirty days of the final order of removal. See id. § 242(b )(1 ). Most impor-
tantly, the filing of the petition no longer creates an automatic stay of removal, although a stay 
may be requested. See id. § 242(b )(3)(8}. For a discussion of the petition for review process, 
see Benson, supra note 115, at 32. A· diagram of the judicial review process for the general 
case is found in Chart 2 at the end of this Article. Note that the use of italic type in the 
chart represents my analysis of additional avenues for judicial review via the writ of habeas 
corpus. The petition for review must be filed within thirty days of the BIA's final order. 
This is a reduction from the 90 days previously authorized in section 106. Section 242 also 
changes the venue for the petition. It must be filed in the circuit where the removal hearing 
took place. See INA § 242(b}(2). Previously, the petition could also be filed in the circuit 
where the noncitizen resided. See INA § 106(a)(2) (repealed 1940). This may be a great 
tactical advantage for the INS because of the increased used of detention in connection with re-
moval proceedings. When a noncitizen is detained, the INS can select the site of the deten-
tion. Some of the largest detention centers are located in Oakdale, in rural Louisiana, and 
Krone, in Southern Florida. These centers are within the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, respec-
tively. These particular circuits have generally been viewed as less willing to overturn INS ad-
ministrative decisions. The INS regularly limits the application of cases to the physical juris-
diction of each· circuit See Steve Y. Koh, Nonacquiescence in Immigration Decisions of the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 430 (1991). 
167. See Chart 3 at the end of this Article for a diagram of the judicial review process for 
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cult to summarize the types of convictions which will result in the bar 
to judicial review. It is misleading to say that the bar applies only to 
those with felony convictions or particularly serious crimes. The stat-
ute lists a broad range of criminal conduct that can lead to the applica-
tion of this bar.168 Relatively minor criminal offenses can result in the 
loss of the right to file a petition for review. 169 
people convicted of certain crimes as expressly provided in the INA. Chart 4 provides my 
analysis of the judicial review process when the writ of habeas corpus is added and the ability 
to contest inclusion in the disfavored group is preserved in the petition for review. These 
default grants of jurisdiction are explained later in this section. 
Judicial review for people in judicial removal or ministerial removal is described below. 
"Ministerial" removal refers to a procedure that replaces the "administrative deportation" proce-
dure set forth in INA § 242A (repealed 1996). Although these procedures have been usually 
referred to as administrative removal, I have used the term "ministerial removal" to distinguish 
them from the standard removal proceeding which occurs before an immigration judge. In 
ministerial removal, the removal decision is handled solely by non-judicial officers of the INS 
and no admini~trative hearing or administrative appeal is a part of the procedure. It is possible 
that the failure to have an independent hearing officer may in and of itself present a constitu-
tional procedural due process violation. In Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955), the Su-
preme Court had rejected a challenge to immigration proceedings which were presided over by 
hearing officers who were not independent of INS management or control. In 1984, the De-
partment of Justice reorganized the INS to create the Executive Office of Immigration Review 
("EOIR"). EOIR hires and manages the Immigration Judges and the staff of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. EOIR's management and hiring procedures differ from those of the gen-
eral INS. This structure is described in Forum Choices, supra note 114. The ministerial pro-
cedure would be conducted without the participation of any member of EOIR. 
168. Moreover, the statute broadened the definition of conviction to include a wide variety of 
criminal sentencing procedures, such as deferred adjudication of guilt or suspended sentences 
which in standard criminal law might be thought to abate the collateral consequences of a 
regular conviction. See INA § 10l(a)(48)(A). As one commentator has noted: 
Section 10l(a)(43) of the INA ..• began as one paragraph in 1988. Eight 
years later the provision consists of twenty-one paragraphs . . . . In 1988 the statute 
identified three general crimes. Today over fifty crimes or general classes of crimes 
are enumerated. 
[A]lmost all crimes in which the sentence [could be] over one year probation or 
prison time will be considered aggravated felonies . . . . 
Richard L. Prinz, Criminal Aliens Under the 1996 Immigration Reform Act, In INTRODUCING 
nm 1996 IMMIGRATION Acr 62, 64-66 (1996). For a general discussion of criminal convic-
tions and collateral consequences, see Susan L. Pilcher, Justice Without a Blindfold: Criminal 
Proceedings and the Alien Defendant, 50 ARK. L. REV. 269 (1997). See generally DAN 
KEsSELBRENNER & LoRY D. ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES (1997). 
169. For example, under these provisions, 
a legal permanent resident convicted of one minor drug possession charge, or two 
misdemeanor petty theft or public transportation fare evasion charges-turnstile jump-
ing in the New York City subway system leading to a crime of 'theft of services' 
misdemeanor conviction is considered a crime of 'moral turpitude'-is now subject to 
automatic deportation without any opportunity to [apply for § 212(c) relief]. 
Yesil v. Reno, 1997 WL 394945, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 1997) (quoting Moiica v. Reno, 
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Congress simultaneously preserved judicial review for two groups of 
people in immigration proceedings.17° First, judicial review is preserved 
for a noncitizen, of any immigration status, who is convicted of a 
crime in a federal court and who is ordered removed as part of the 
judicial proceeding. These individuals may challenge the conviction 
and the order of removal in the court of appeals. 171 The second group 
includes those individuals who are processed in the special ministerial 
administrative deportation procedure which eliminates the immigration 
judge and Board of Immigration Appeals. 172 In this procedure, a re-
moval or deportation officer presents the nonresident with a written 
notice of intent to remove. The nonresident is then afforded ten days 
to present written rebuttal to the notice. The rebuttal is reviewed by a 
second deportation officer who is empowered to issue a final order of 
removal.173 This procedure can be selected by the INS for use with 
people who have not acquired lawful permanent resident status and 
have been- convicted of an aggravated felony. Although this purely 
ministerial removal process bypasses the administrative hearing and 
administrative appeals, it does expressly mention judicial review of the 
administrative action. 174 It seems anomalous that a resident alien is 
refused direct judicial review, while a person who may have no legal 
status receives it. 175 
Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 
1997)). 
170. See infr'O Chart 3. 
171. See INA § 238(c)(3)(A)(i). The appeal is to be "considered consistent with the require-
ments of section 242." See id. § 238(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
172. See id. § 238. 
173. See id. § 238(b) 
174. See INA §§ 238(b)(4)(E). This language bolsters the analysis that at least removability 
is subject to review. See discussion infra text accompanying note 179. 
175. Noncitizens may prefer the administrative hearing procedures and administrative appeal to 
the ministerial procedure in INA § 238 as the administrative process provides more opportuni-
ties to defeat removability or takes longer. Why would Congress afford an express right to 
judicial review for the individual with no legal status? If efficiency was the primary goal, 
why did Congress provide for appellate review of judicial deportation orders originating in dis-
trict court? Perhaps lawful permanent residents would make an equal protection argument that 
Congress has no rational reason for eliminating judicial review for the lawful permanent resi-
dent while preserving this right for the nonresident alien in judicial removal proceedings. Such 
an argument was upheld in Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976), to establish the right 
of lawful permanent residents to apply for the discretionary waiver of excludability found in 
former INA § 212(c). Congress had provided for a waiver for legal residents in exclusion pro-
ceedings but not in deportation proceedings. The court found no rational reason for the dis-
tinction. In section 238, the lawful permanent resident appears to lose direct (other than ha-
beas) judicial review, while the nonresident in judicial removal is expressly granted a right to 
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Although Congress may have wanted to prevent litigation over the 
issue of when the bar on judicial review applies, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that the court has jurisdiction to determine if 
the statutory bar was applicable. 176 In Coronado-Durazo, the petitioner 
disputed that his conviction for solicitation to possess cocaine was sub-
ject to the jurisdictional bar on judicial review under AEDP A. Given 
the use of imprecise terms such as "crimes of moral turpitude" to de-
fine who is within this disfavored group, it can be expected that other 
petitioners will dispute their inclusion in the barred group. 177 It is also 
probable that petitioners will seek judicial review of the merits of the 
order of removal, arguing that they cannot be subject to the bar on 
judicial review until it is judicially established that the predicate facts 
and legal issues establish.their membership in the disfavored group. 178 
judicial review. 
176. Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 108 F.3d 210 (9th Cir. 1996), petition for rehearing denied 
and new opinion substituted 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 26900 (Sept 28, 1997). The Ninth Cir-
cuit exercised the jurisdiction granted under fonner INA § 106 in order to detennine if the 
convictions had stripped the court of its jurisdiction. See also Choeum v. INS, 113 F.3d 17 
(1st Cir. 1997) (court retained jurisdiction to consider whether noncitizen was member of barred 
class); Anwar v. INS, 116 F.3d 140, 141-44 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that conviction did not 
meet the definition of preclusion statute). But cf. Berehe v. INS, 114 F.3d 159 (10th Cir. 
1997) (finding that Congress meant to preclude challenges to the finding of deportability as 
well as to claims for reliet). 
177. There are many circuit court of appeals decisions which discuss the BIA's evaluation of 
the nature of moral turpitude or other issues about the classification of the crimes. See, e.g., 
Goldeshtein v. INS, 8 F.3d 645 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting INS conclusion that conspiracy to 
violate the federal currency laws and violations of currency reporting laws were crimes of mor-
al turpitude rendering the noncitizen deportable under fonner INA § 2421(a)(4)). See also 
KEsSELBRENNER & ROSENBERG, supra note 168, § 6.7, App. E. In the casebook IMMIGRATION 
PROCE.SS AND POLICY, the authors question whether Congress has invited the agency and courts 
to legislate by using such a vague tenn as "moral turpitude." See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra 
note 36, at 551. 
178. This challenge might be based on both statutory and constitutional claims. The statute 
requires the evidence of removability to be supported by clear, convincing, and probative evi-
dence. See INA § 240(c)(3)(A). In Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 277 (1966), the Supreme 
Court interpreted this phrase to require "clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence." It is 
unclear whether the Woodby ruling is based on an interpretation of the statute or whether this 
standard is mandated by the due process clause, but nothing in IIRAIRA alters the statutory 
standard of proof. Noncitizens will certainly argue that the holding of Woodby requires judicial 
review to test whether the evidence meets this standard. Hiroshi Motomura discusses Woodby 
and the Supreme Court's avoidance of direct reliance on the Fifth Amendment. See Motomura, 
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 572-74. The Tenth Circuit ruled that IIRAIRA 
(AEDPA) removed the jurisdiction of the courts of appeal to consider the merits of the depor-
tation (removal) order. See Berehe, 114 F.3d 159. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit exercised 
its jurisdiction to detennine whether the convictions were "crimes of moral turpitude" which 
would eliminate the petitioner's claims for discretionary relief. The petitioner had also not 
challenged the grounds of deportability but conceded them in the immigration hearing. 
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2. People Subject to Expedited Removal 
One of the most controversial areas of eliminating judicial review 
concerns the lack of administrative and judicial review for persons 
subject to the new expedited removal provisions. 179 These individuals 
have been refused entry by an admission officer because the officer 
finds they lack valid entry documents180 or have made a misrepresenta-
tion in seeking admission. 181 The statute grants a limited form of ad-
ministrative review of the inadmissibility determination before an immi-
gration judge only if the applicant is making one of two "special 
claims": (1) a new claim of asylum, or (2) prior admission as a lawful 
permanent resident, asylee, or refugee. 182 From this limited administra-
179. See infra Chart S for a diagram of expedited removal and judicial review as envisioned 
by llRAIRA and the implementing regulations. The text in italics represents my analysis of 
available judicial review via habeas corpus and declaratory judgment actions. 
180. This Article has not explored the use of habeas corpus by noncitizen "stowaways" who 
have traditionally had few statutory or constititonal rights. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 469 
U.S. 1311 (198S) (allowing habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and INA § 106(a), but 
limiting the scope of review to the jurisdictional facts which lead to the preclusion of review 
or statutory relief). Due to the special status of stowaways, I am not suggesting that these are 
the appropriate precedents for the determination of the future scope of review under the habeas 
statute. See 3 GoRDON ET AL., supra note 2, at § 81.04[b]. INA § 23S(a)(2) contains provi-
sions for stowaways which state that they are not eligible to apply for admission, nor are they 
eligible for a section 240 hearing. They may, however, apply for asylum and this may lead to 
bring this claim before an immigration judge. See Fang-Sui Yau v. Gustafson, 623 F. Supp. 
ISIS (C.D. Cal. 1985) (granting a writ of habeas corpus and remanding for a hearing before 
the IJ to determine eligibility for asylum). 
181. Section 23S refers to inadmissibility pursuant to sections 212(a)(6)(C) and 212(a)(7). 
These grounds of inadmissibility are broader than they may first appear. The grounds have 
been used to exclude persons who present a valid, unexpired nonimmigrant visa. If the inspec-
tor does not agree that the visa category is appropriate for the purpose of the applicant's visit, 
the inspector may find the person inadmissible for lack of documentation. See INA § 
212(a)(7). For example, a business person with a valid B-1 business visitor visa may be re-
fused admission if the officer believes that the business person will actually perform "work" 
and be compensated for that work in the United States. Before expedited removal, the busi-
ness visitor could challenge the admission decision in an exclusion hearing before an immigra-
tion judge. The visitor could also appeal the judge's ruling to the BIA. See, e.g., Matter of 
Opferkuch, 17 l&N Dec. IS8 (BIA 1979) (employee of foreign-owned business may use the 
business visitor visa when his sole purpose is to gather information for his company on a tem-
porary basis). But cj Matter of Neill, 15 l&N Dec. 331 (BIA 1975) (engineer denied admis-
sion as business visitor because his visit to consult with clients in the United States was not of 
a temporary nature). See infra note 182, for a discussion of possible habeas challenges to ad-
mission decisions. 
182. INA § 242(e)(4) creates a very limited form of habeas corpus petition. People who 
have been granted asylum or permitted to enter the United States as refugees are not yet per-
manent resident aliens. They are entitled to seek adjustment as a lawful permanent resident 
once they have resided in the United States as a refugee or asylee for a period of one year. 
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tive· review, only the person making a "special claim" may seek judicial 
review of the order of expedited removal. 183 Even when judicial re-
view is granted, the statute limits the relief to an order of remand for a 
full administrative removal hearing. 184 The INS regulations have also 
added limited administrative review for persons making claims of Unit-
ed States citizenship. 185 
If the noncitizen is not a returning resident, asylee, or refugee, the 
statute does not provide for administrative or judicial review of the 
expedited removal order. However, noncitizens who wish to contest 
See INA § 209(b)(5). Section 242(e)(4) allows the petitioner to dispute the allegation of alien-
age. Perhaps, then, citizenship claims will also be heard in this habeas proceeding. Whether 
this type of habeas proceeding must include an evidentiary hearing is unclear. In 1905, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an exclusion act which insulated from judicial 
review the factual determinations of the inspecting administrative official. See United States v. 
Ju Toy, 198 U.S. 253 (1905) (This case is also discussed supra Part II.). Yet under the ex-
clusion statute applicable at the time, the person claiming citizenship was allowed an opportu-
nity to present witnesses and develop evidence before the administrative officer and the statute 
created an administrative appeal. The new statute and regulations do not afford an equal 
amount of administrative procedure. See supra note 181, for a discussion of the regulations 
and other issues concerning citizenship claims. 
183. See INA § 242(e)(4)(B) 
184. See id. 
185. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.6. Under the regulations, a person making a claim of United States 
citizenship which is not verifiable by the admission officer will be referred to an immigration 
judge for a review of the expedited removal order. There is no further administrative review 
of the IJ determination that the person is not a citizen. People who wish to challenge the INS 
determination of citizenship in an expedited removal proceeding should file in federal district 
court using the provisions of the Declaratory Judiment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. and ha· 
beas corpus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Prior to llRAlRA, section 360 of the INA 
had not. permitted a Declaratory Judgment challenge if the issue of citizenship arose in connec-
tion with "any exclusion proceeding." But cf. Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962) (allowing 
some claims of citizenship to be made in declaratory judgment proceedings notwithstanding the 
limits of section 360). The holding in Rusk also casts doubt on the continuing validity of Ju 
Toy. 
In a "housekeeping" provision of llRAIRA, directed at conforming the new term of "re-
moval," Congress amended INA § 360 to refer to "removal" proceedings. INA § 360 does not 
refer to "expedited removal." Congress appears to have failed to realize that citizenship claims 
might be made in expedited removal proceedings. On its face, the limits of INA § 360 do 
not apply. The absence of discussion of citizenship claims in section 235 might be a basis to 
argue that citizenship claims must be heard in regular section 240 hearings; however, the INS 
disagrees and the interim regulations provide for an extraordinarily streamlined administrative 
process with review only before an IJ. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5)(iv). Further, section 360 
seems to be specifically contradicted in section 242(b)(5), which provides for judicial review of 
citizenship claims in the court of appeals and if a fact finding hearing is required, for remand 
to the federal district court. See INA § 242(b}(5). Cf Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 
(1922) (judicial fact finding required for persons making a citizenship claim inside the U.S.). 
For excellent material on citizenship claims, see Gary Endelman, How to Prevent loss of Citi-
zenship, 89-11 to -12, IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (1989). 
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the officer's decision may be able to file for habeas corpus review.186 
The possibility of habeas review does not remove the practical difficul-
ty of filing the habeas petition.187 
Additionally, Congress limited challenges to the expedited removal 
system as a whole in section 242(e)(3) by providing that any challenge 
to the constitutionality of the system must be brought within sixty days 
of the implementation of the program.188 A suit was filed by several 
186. In Kamuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231 (1929), Preston Albro, an attor-
ney from Buffalo, New York, filed a habeas petition on behalf of Mary Cook and Antonio 
Danelon. Both Cook and Danelon were lawfully domiciled in Canada. Cook was a citizen of 
the United Kingdom and Danelon of Italy. They sought daily admission to the United States 
as business visitors pursuant to the Immigration Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 153, § 3. This statute 
contained no express provision for judicial review of admission decisions. Although the peti-
tioners had been crossing the border from the Canadian side of Niagra Falls to the New York 
side for some time, a border inspector refused their admission as nonimmigrant business visi-
tors. See Karnuth, 279 U.S. at 234. The petitioners challenged the border inspector's deci-
sion. The petitioners filed a habeas petition in district court instead of appealing to the Secre-
tary of Labor. The district court entertained the petition, despite the fact that the petitioners 
had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies (today, exhaustion would be required in most 
cases). The habeas petition was eventually appealed to the Supreme Court. Although the 
Court upheld the exclusion order, the Court reviewed the agency's interpretation of the immi-
gration laws notwithstanding the habeas context The Court also rejected the petitioners conten-
tion that they were business visitors as defined by the 1924 Immigration Act, § 3. See id. at 
242-44. Many years later, the Supreme Court held that Congress could authorize exclusion 
without an administrative hearing or judicial review. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. 
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44 (1950). Abra is not mentioned in the Knauff decision. 
The 1961 amendments to the INA granted administrative and judicial review of an exclusion 
determination. See former INA § 106. In future challenges to expedited removal, it may be 
that Knauff will be limited to its national security context and that Abra will provide authority 
for habeas review of the admission decision. But cf Meng Li v. Eddy, A97-231 CV (JKS) 
(D. Alaska July 2, 1997) (unpublished order) (finding that section 242 precluded all habeas 
challenges to expedited removal orders except for the limited provisions found in the statute). 
Meng Li had a valid B-1 visitor visa and was refused entry by the inspector on the ground 
that he did not believe she was entering the United States for a business trip. He ordered her 
removed for visa fraud or willful misrepresentation of fact See INA § 212(a)(6)(C). She 
spent one month in detention while awaiting the outcome of the habeas petition. See Jailed 
Beijing Woman Heading Home, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, July 3, 1997, at B-3. The denial 
of habeas relief is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Telephone interview 
with Margaret Stock, Esq., attorney for Meng Li (July 21, 1997). 
187. Albro is an example of a habeas proceeding involving a third-party petitioner. See 
LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, § 8.3 (discussing third-party petitioners in habeas corpus 
proceedings). See also United States ex rel. United States Lines v. Watkins, 170 F.2d 998 (2d 
Cir. 1948) (transportation company acted as petitioner for noncitizen). The INS is not uniform-
ly granting attorneys access to noncitizens or putative citizens who are being detained pending 
their expedited removal. See Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained 
Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997), for a discussion 
of detention and legal representation. 
188. See INA § 242(e)(3)(A) and (B) 
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non-profit organizations even before the implementation.189 It is possi-
ble that future claims might be barred as following outside the statute 
of limitations for the challenge. 190 
B. Disfavored Claims 
1. Claims for Discretionary Relief 
Section 242 attempts to remove judicial review of most claims for 
discretionary relief. 191 This is a very important limitation. I believe 
that the vast majority of cases involve review of the denial of discre-
tionary relief. 192 Th~ statute does preserve judicial review of claims 
189. AILA v. Reno, CA 97 CV 00597 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 27, 1997). 
I90. A similar time bar to litigation was included in section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act. 
That section provided: 
(I) A petition for review of action of the Administrator [regarding any emission 
standard] may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia .•.. [Any such petition] shall be filed within sixty days from the date 
notice of such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, 
except that if such petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, 
then any petition for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days 
after such grounds arise . . . . 
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been ob· 
tained under paragraph (I) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal 
proceedings for enforcement . . . . 
Notwithstanding this statutory bar, the Supreme Court allowed a limited form of review of the 
agency action in a criminal prosecution alleging a violation of an "emission standard." See 
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). Later, in Un/led States v. 
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Supreme Court held that where an administrative 
finding would later be a critical element in a criminal prosecution, "there must be some mean· 
ingful review of the administrative proceeding." Id. at 837-38. These cases suggest that pros-
ecutions for criminal re-entry after expedited removal may necessitate judicial review of the INS 
determination. It is beyond the scope of this article to consider avenues of judicial review of 
immigration decisions which may arise in subsequent criminal or civil proceedings. 
191. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii). 
192. I cannot provide detailed empirical evidence to support this claim. However, the Schuck 
and Wang study, see supra note 159, at 142, includes an analysis of immigration litigation in 
both the district courts and circuit courts from 1979 to 1990. This study indicates that 54% of 
the cases involved requests for relief from deportation. See id. at 144. A large percentage of 
these cases involved claims for political asylum. See id. IIRAIRA does not remove judicial 
review of most issues in political asylum cases. A search of the electronic databases of 
LEXIS and Westlaw revealed that 73% of the immigration cases for 1996 involved judicial 
review of the abuse of discretion in denying relief. These cases were found by conducting the 
same search used by Schuck and Wang, see id. at 126 n.55, and adding the following focus 
request: "abuse Is discretion Is deny or deni!." 
The relief available under the immigration laws is often committed to the discretion of 
the agency. See, e.g., INA § 240A (cancellation of removal). Daniel Kanstroom has carefully 
cataloged the types of discretionary decision making in the immigration laws. See Daniel 
Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Jmmlgra-
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that the INS improperly denied an application for political asylum. 193 
However,. Congress may not have successfully eliminated all judicial 
review in these cases. Judicial review should be available to test the 
agency's interpretation of statutory eligibility for the relief. In many 
cases involving discretionary relief, the noncitizen must first establish 
prima facie eligibility for the relief. Only after this prima facie case is 
met does the agency exercise its discretion by deciding whether the 
noncitizen should receive the relief. 194 For example, if a noncitizen 
wishes to apply for Cancellation of Removal, the noncitizen must estab-
lish that she: (1) has been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence for not less than five years, (2) has resided in the United 
States continuously for seven years after having been admitted in any 
status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony. 195 
There are many cases where the noncitizen has disputed the INS's legal 
conclusion that he or she was statutorily ineligible to request the discre-
tionary relief. 196 
lion Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 767-71 (1997). Given the new congressional limits on judi-
cial review, he calls on the agency to exercise self-restraint and to promulgate rules to limit 
and guide the exercise of discretion. See id. at 717, 805. See also Michael G. Heyman, Judi-
cial Review of Discretionary Immigration Decisionmaking, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1994) 
(criticizing existing "discretion talk" as inappropriately determinate and suggesting that judicial 
review is essential to a dialogue that supports the development of law). 
193. See INA § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii). There are specific limits on the scope of judicial review in 
the statute governing asylum claims. The statute also precludes judicial review of some of the 
issues concem:iig statutory eligibility to request asylum. See id. § 208(a)(3). See also id. § 
208(d)(7) ("Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to create any substantive or procedural 
right or benefit that is legally enforceable by any party against the United States or its agen-
cies or officers or any other person."). 
194. The government appears to agree that the noncitizen may seek review of statutory eligi-
bility. See Tefel v. INS, No. 97-0805-ClV-KING, 1997 WL 369980, at *42 (S.D. Fla. May 
20, 1997). Although section 242(a)(2)(8) is not expressly discussed in the court's opinion, the 
government argued that noncitizens would be abfe to file petitions for review in the courts of 
appeal to challenge the agency's interpretation of statutory eligibility for discretionary relief. 
Professor Kanstroom suggests that discretionary decision making would have much greater 
clarity if the two step process were labeled "interpretive discretion" when the agency is deter-
mining statutory eligibility and "delegated discretion" when the agency is determining whether 
the noncitizen should receive the relief. He explains that these labels would then guide the 
appropriate judicial deference afforded to the agency action. See Kanstroom, supra note 192, 
at 751-66. He also notes that in the absence of judicial review, these distinctions would also 
help Congress set standards for the proper exercise of discretion and that the agency through 
regulations should also clarify and cabin its own discretionary decision making. See id. at 805. 
195. See INA § 240A(a). This statute replaces the former waiver for long-term residents 
founci in former INA § 212(c). 
196. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (challenging the INS defini-
tion of seven years of "lawful unrelinquished domicile" necessary to establish eligibility for for-
mer INA § 212(c) relief). See also LEGOMSKY, supra note 22, at 621-24 (additional arguments 
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The language of the statutory bar to judicial review is also impre-
cise. The statute provides that there shall be no judicial review of 
"any judgment regarding the granting of relief under [INA] section 
[212(h), 212(i), 240A, 240B, or 245]."197 A possible construction of 
this provision would be that it bars judicial review only when the agen-
cy grants relief. The statute refers solely to decisions "regarding grant-
ing" relief. It says nothing about "denial." In another provision, the 
statute bars judicial review of decisions granting or denying relief. 198 
Advocates will argue that this language demonstrates that Congress 
knew how to preclude all judicial review of claims denying relief.199 
2. Claims for Injunctive Relief 
In section 242(f), Congress sought to prevent injunctions which 
would limit the INS's implementation of the provisions of IIRAIRA. 
The statute states that no court, except the United States Supreme 
Court, may grant an injunction "to enjoin or restrain the operation of 
the provisions of part IV of this subchapter ... other than with respect 
to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against 
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated."20° Congress 
probably intended this provision to prevent class-wide injunctions such · 
as those which have prevented the INS from removing large numbers 
of people or from implementing changes in the past.201 Part IV of the 
subchapter of the amended INA covers inspection, apprehension, deten-
tion, and removal of aliens.202 It does not cover subchapter I which 
contains provisions concerning the authority of officers, the implementa-
tion of regulations, and the operation of the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review. Litigants will argue that they seek to enjoin the im-
plementation of the law or the regulations and not the particular statu-
tory provision included in the subchapter.203 
limiting this bar to review). 
197. INA § 242(a){2)(B)(i). 
198. See, e.g., id. § 212(h} C'No court shall have jurisdiction to review a decision of the 
Attorney General to grant or deny a waiver under this section."); § 208(a)(3) ("No court shall 
have jurisdiction to review any determination of the Attorney General under paragraph (2)."). 
199. This argument was made by Lucas Guttentag in The 1996 Immigration Act: Federal 
Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions and Constitutional Rights, 14 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
245, 250 (Feb. IO, 1997). 
200. INA § 242(f){I}. 
201. See the discussion of the legalization litigation supra Part II. 
202. Title II (now subchapter II} includes sections 231-44. 
203. This argument was already successfully presented in Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-0805-CIV-
KING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 1997). Tefe/ is discussed more in Part IV.B.3. 
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This section also seeks to limit injunctive relief in individual cases 
by requiring that the noncitizen establish that his or her removal would 
be "prohibited as a matter of law."204 The application of this subsec-
tion is unclear. It may have been meant as a guide to the court of 
appeals in granting discretionary stays of removal while a petition for 
review is pending. This subsection might also be used to argue that · 
Congress anticipated continuing habeas corpus jurisdiction and wished 
to set standards for the granting of a stay of removal in that context. 
If this construction is correct, the articulated standard of proving an 
error of law is much broader than the government position that habeas 
review is limited to cases where removal would result in a "manifest 
injustice" or "s!.!bstantial constitutional error."20s 
3. The "Catch-All" Barriers 
Congress apparently created two subsections of section 242 as 
"catch-all barriers"206 that would gather all other possible claims and 
either restrict or eliminate judicial review of these claims. The most 
important barrier is found in section 242(g): 
Exclusive Jurisdiction: Except as provided in this section and 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have 
jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any 
alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney Gener-
al to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute re-
moval orders against any alien under this chapter. 
The effectiveness of this catch-all subsection will depend on the 
ability of lawyers to argue that the express provisions do not apply or 
that the provision is insufficient to eliminate other grants of jurisdic-
Similar language was used in the fonner version of section 279 which had previously been 
used by litigants to assert federal court jurisdiction. In that statute, jurisdiction was available 
for decisions within Title II of the INA. Courts sometimes refused to exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to section 279 and read it as a restraint on general federal question jurisdiction when 
the noncitizen was challenging an action or regulation governed by Title I (now subchapter I). 
See, e.g., Yim Tong Chung v. Smith, 640 F. Supp. 1065, 1069 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding re-
view of denial of work authorization precluded because it was not within Title II of the INA); 
Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding jurisdiction of the court 
limited to Title II). 
204. INA § 242(f)(2). 
205. Part V provides a discussion of the types of claims and fonns of habeas review which 
survive the 1996 legislation. 
206. The "catch-all" appellation merely describes the probable intent of Congress, for as l 
will show, many types of claims will evade these barriers. 
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tion.207 Congress does not clearly bar all judicial review because it 
uses language which itemizes the types of decisions covered by the bar. 
Therefore, it is not clear that this provision prohibits claims that do not 
arise in the context of removal or claims that do not directly concern 
the Attorney General's treatment of proceedings or removal orders 
against aliens. 
The second subsection does not directly forbid judicial review but 
rather tries to gather all other permissible claims and channel them into 
review of the final order of deportation. Those noncitizens who have 
any express right to judicial review of the final order may file a peti-
tion for review in the court of appeals.208 Section 242(b)(9) provides: 
Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including inter-
. pretaticn and application of constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to 
remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall 
be available only in judicial review of a final order under this 
section. 
This subsection was apparently meant to overturn the holdings in 
Cheng Fan Kwok v. JNS1-09 and McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center2 10 
and to follow the reasoning suggested in Thunder Basin Coal Mining 
Co. v. Reich.211 These decisions allowed litigants to evade the "sole 
207. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wallis, No. 96-3518-CIV-DAVIS (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 1997) (rul-
ing that even if section 242(g) were effective at that time, bond determinations would be out-
side the scope of the actions covered by the subsection). But cf Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 
1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that section 242(g) precludes jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 of claims that the Department of Justice breached agreement not to commence deportation 
proceedings but acknowledging that jurisdiction remains in habeas to consider "substantial" con-
stitutional questions). Rama/lo is discussed in the text beginning infra note 235. 
208. See INA § 242. If the noncitizen is one of the people barred from judicial review, 
subsection 242(b )(9) does not appear to apply as the subsection assumes some form of judicial 
review. 
209. 392 U.S. 206 (1968). See supra text accompanying notes 106-10. 
210. 498 U.S. 479 (1991). See supra text accompanying notes 126-39. 
211. 510 U.S. 200 (1994). In Thunder Basin, the plaintiff filed a pre-enforcement injunction 
against the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA"), alleging both statutory and con-
stitutional violations if MSHA was allowed to enforce an administrative order. The Mine Act 
provided for administrative review before an independent commission and then a petition for re-
view in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court found that Congress had intended to pre-
clude pre-enforcement district court jurisdiction. The Court stated that "whether a statute is 
intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute's language, structure 
and purpose, its legislative history, Block [v. Community Nutrition Inst., 461 U.S. 340, 345 
(1984)], and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review." Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. 
at 207. The Court distinguished McNary by stating that the language of the INA "did not evi-
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and exclusive" procedures set forth in fonner section 106. Asserting 
Cheng Fan Kwok, some litigants successfully characterized the nature of 
their district court action as outside the scope of a removal order and 
therefore not limited to the section 106 petition for review procedure.212 
Relying on McNary, federal district courts entertained challenges to INS 
enforcement practices when the allegations require a trial court and 
evidentiary hearings to develop an adequate record for review.213 In 
dence an intent to preclude broad 'pattern and practice' challenges ... and acknowledged that 
'if not ailowed to pursue their claims in the District Court, [litigants] would not as a practical 
matter be able to obtain meaningful judicial review."' Id. at 213 (quoting McNary, 498 U.S. 
at 494, 496, 497). 
212. The noncitizens usually asserted that the district court had jurisdiction based on the APA 
combined with general federal question jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has held that the AP A 
lacks an express grant of jurisdiction. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (interpret-
ing 5 U.S.C. § 703 and ultimately rejecting the assertion of jurisdiction as precluded by the 
Social Security Act). Federal question jurisdiction is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The APA 
recognizes that Congress may also preempt agency action from APA judicial review. Where 
Congress appears to do this, courts usually read the preclusion statute as impliedly precluded 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(I). See generally 2 KENNETH 
DAVIS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11 (3d ed. 1997) (addressing judicial review 
of agency adjudications). Another exception to judicial review under the APA arises when the 
court finds that the decision has been completely committed to agency discretion and there is 
no meaningful standard of review to apply. See 5 U.S.C. § 70l(a)(2). This exception is 
sometimes used in immigration cases challenging discretionary waivers such as waiver of the 
home resiqency iequirement for certain exchange visitors (J-1 visas). See, e.g., Korvah v. 
Brown, 66 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1995). See also the critique of similar reasoning in Nafziger, 
supra note 22. 
213. See, e.g., Campos v. Nail, 43 F.3d 1285 (9th Cir. 1994). Campos discusses the 
McNary exceptions to the section 106 review and distinguishes Thunder Basin on the ground 
that McNary allows district court jurisdiction over both statutory and constitutional claims which 
could not be developed in an individual case or required a factual record in a trial court. In 
Campos, the plaintiffs asserted that Immigration Judge Nail, who sat in Arizona and Nevada, 
had failed to exercise independently his discretion to grant change of venue requests for any 
Central American who had not established a residence in the United States prior to apprehen-
sion in Arizona or Nevada. The district court had ruled that the individual plaintiffs could not 
establish the factual record necessary to the resolution of their claims if they were only allowed 
to challenge Judge Nail's practice before the court of appeals in individual petitions for review. 
The Ninth Circuit agreed. 
Not all noncitizens succeed in distinguishing Thunder Basin. In Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d 
416 (3d Cir. 1996), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned a district court's grant of 
jurisdiction where the noncitiz~n sought to enjoin the INS deportation proceedings. Mr. 
Massieu, the former Deputy Attorney General of Mexico, had fled after his resignation and 
allegations of criminal conduct A few days after his arrival in the United States, the Mexican 
government charged Massieu with several crimes. The United States government brought four 
unsuccessful extradition proceedings. On the same day as the dismissal of the last extradition 
proceeding, the government commenced deportation proceedings. Massieu had alleged that the 
deportation proceedings were a sham for an "illegal de facto extradition" to Mexico. The INS 
alleged that Massieu was deportable under section 24l(a)(4)(C)(i), which states "[a]n alien 
whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds 
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cases that arose outside of the direct review of removal orders, litigants 
also used other grants of jurisdiction to seek mandamus and declaratory 
judgements. 214 
Litigants are likely to find a variety of ways to try to evade the 
strictures of section 242 due to these precedents. They will also rely 
on the long line of cases which hold that courts should narrowly con-
strue statutes which seek to limit judicial review and, absent the express 
intent of Congress, should preserve review of constitutional challeng-
es. 215 Congress may have thought that these catch-all barriers would 
to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United 
States is deportable." INA § 241(a)(4)(C)(i). Massieu also sought to enjoin the deportation 
proceedings alleging, among other things, that section 241(a)(4)(C) was unconstitutional. The 
district court accepted jurisdiction, enjoined the deportation proceedings and found section 
241(a)(4)(C} unconstitutional for three reasons: void for vagueness, a violation of due process as 
the Secretary of State's detennination is allegedly unreviewable, and the provision is an uncon-
stitutional delegation of power which lacks sufficiently intelligible standards to direct the Secre-
tary's actions. See Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 711 (D.N.J. 1996). The Third Circuit 
reversed, stating that Thunder Basin required the Court to assess carefully the intent of Con-
gress in delaying judicial review of administrative action. The Court found that Congress had 
meant to create an efficient and streamlined procedure which avoided unnecessary delay when it 
enacted fonner INA § 106 in 1961. The Third Circuit ruled that Massieu had failed to ex-
haust his administrative hearings and that his constitutional claims, unlike those in McNary, 
could be dealt with in the petition for review following the deportation hearing, notwithstanding 
the inability of the IJ or BIA to consider constitutional challenges to the statute. See Mass/eu, 
91 F.3d at 422-23. The deportation hearing proceeded in the Spring of 1997, and in late 
May, the IJ ruled that Massieu was not deportable as charged because the government failed to 
meet its burden of proof. (Unpublished order). The Mexican government has reported that 
they will continue to seek his deportation. See Robert L. Jackson, Mexico Official Caught Up 
in U.S. Legal Maze Crime, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1997, at Al4. 
214. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651, 2201; Kummer v. Shultz, 578 F. Supp. 341 (N.D. Tex. 1984) 
(attempting to use mandamus to compel adjudication of an immigrant visa petition). In an un-
usual case, mandamus was used to prevent the INS from commencing a second deportation 
proceeding where the government was barred by res judicata principles. See Ramon-Sepulveda 
v. INS, 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987) (mandamus relief granted to prevent INS from bringing 
new deportation proceedings based on assertion of a res judicata defense). In a case pending 
in federal district court, a Rwandan petitioner sought mandamus to compel the administrative 
adjudication of an asylum claim pending before an asylum officer for over twelve months. 
Among other r.laims, the petition alleges that the INS is intentionally delaying the adjudication 
of Rwandan asylum claims and thus impennissibly discriminating against Rwandan applicants on 
the basis of national origin. See Karani v. Reno, CV 97-619 (D.D.C. 1997); see also Lee J, 
Teran, Obtaining Remedies for INS Misconduct, 96-5 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS (May 1996) (dis-
cussing mandamus, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and other actions to remedy agency miscon· 
duct). 
215. See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The Abbott opinion quotes a state-
ment in Rusk v. Cort, a case concerning limits on the use of declaratory judgements to assert 
claims of citizenship: "[O]nly upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary 
legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review." Id. at 141 (quoting Rusk 
v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)). Other famous cases also reflect the presumption of 
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demonstrate an intention to block judicial review, but as several recent 
cases illustrate, the attempt may have failed.216 
In Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno,211 the 
government used section 242 to support its motion to dismiss a suit 
and injunction, alleging that the INS had been motivated to instigate 
deportation proceedings against eight members of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine ("PFLP") engaged in activities protected by 
the. First Amendment.218 The case has a long history in the federal 
courts.219 After the passage of IIRAIRA, the government moved to 
dismiss the suit, arguing that the recent amendments eliminated the 
federal court jurisdiction and the substantive claims of the litigants. In 
an unpublished order, the district court rejected the government's mo-
tion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court 
preserving judicial review, especially for constitutional questions. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 
486 U.S. 592 (1988) (continuing to consider constitutional allegations of denial of equal protec-
tion notwithstanding congressional statute, which insulated the actions of the Director of the 
CIA from judicial review); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 
(1986) (interpreting statutory preclusion of judicial review of Medicare claims as not.excluding 
judicial review of regulations promulgated under the Medicare statute); Johnson v. Robison, 415 
U.S. 361 (1974) (notwithstanding statute precluding review of claims for veterans' benefits, 
jurisdiction remained to consider constitutional issues); see also Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 
535 (1988) (notwithstanding statutory prohibition of all judicial review of Veterans Administra-
tion benefit rulings, statute did not preclude collateral statutory claim); Lindahl v. Office of 
Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 791 (1985) (statute which made all disability determina-
tions final, co:iclusive and not subject to review was not a bar to claims of departure from 
substantial procedural rights or claims of error "going to the heart of the administrative deter-
mination") (internal quotations omitted). Cf Thunder Basin Coal Mining Co. v. Reich, 510 
U.S. 200 (1994) (finding that statutory scheme reflected congressional intent to preclude pre-
enforcement judicial review; discussed supra note 211). 
216. This Article was completed in August 1997. 
217. Nos. 96-55929, 97-55479, 1997 WL 395300 (9th Cir. 1997) 
218. See id . . at *I. Six of the noncitizens are lawful permanent residents and two were in 
lawful nonimmigrant status_ at the time that the deportation proceedings began. See id. 
219. The INS began deportation proceedings in 1987, claiming that the members of the PFLP 
were deportable under current immigration laws for advocating communism. The eight mem-
bers of the PFLP and a committee of United States citizens filed an action in federal district 
court claiming that this sectfon of the Immigration Act was unconstitutional. These particular 
charges were subsequently dropped, leaving only charges based on certain technical visa viola· 
tions. Later, the government once again initiated deportation proceedings, alleging "terrorist 
activity" against two of the members of the PFLP. In response, all eight members filed an 
action in federal district court, asserting general federal question jurisdiction, alleging that the 
INS had engaged in unlawful selective prosecution. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, 
the district court enjoined the continuation of the deportation. The Ninth Circuit had affirmed 
the granting of the injunction in a 1995 opinion which held that noncitizens could assert First 
Amendment protections and that there was sufficient evidence that the INS had targeted the 
Palestinians for speech and associational activities to support the issuance of a preliminary in· 
junction. See id. at * 1-2. 
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order, finding that section 242(f) specifically granted jurisdiction to en-
join deportation (now removal) proceedings in cases where the proceed-
ing was contrary to law.220 The PFLP members had met this standard 
by proving that the government was motivated to commence the depor-
tation proceedings by the First Amendment protected activities. In a 
careful analysis of section 242, Judge Nelson found that Congress must 
have meant to preserve federal court jurisdiction, given the presumption 
of the preservation of judicial review and the explicit exclusions from 
jurisdiction found elsewhere in section 242 and other provisions of 
IIRAIRA. She rejected the government's assertion that section 242(g) 
removes jurisdiction in cases denying commencement of removal pro-
ceedings because deportation proceedings had already begun when the 
federal court action was filed. She also ruled that the bar to jurisdic-
tion in subsection (g) specifically preserved the grant of jurisdiction 
found in other parts of section 242 such as the provision of subsection 
(f), applicable in this case, which allowed injunctions in individual 
cases. 
Judge Nelson also found that the catch-all consolidation subsection 
in section 242(b)(9) did not remove the district court's jurisdiction nor 
did it require the PFLP members to have to submit to a deportation 
hearing and administrative review before they could make their consti-
" tutional selective prosecution challenge. Judge Nelson concluded: 
Even if subsection (b)(9) applies along with subsection (g), we 
believe that subsection (f) must be incorporated as well, and 
that (f) must be read to preserve judicial review of constitution-
al claims such as the ones at issue here. Any other reading 
would present serious constitutional problems.221 
Judge Nelson goes on to explain that some claims require factual proof · 
which could not be established in the administrative proceedings nor 
developed on review in the court of appeals.222 
220. See id. at *4. 
221. Id. at *5. The opinion is also following the well established maxim that courts should 
construe stal!Jtes to avoid constitutional doubts. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Flori-
da Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
222. See id. at *5-6. Judge Nelson notes that in llRAIRA, Congress specifically forbids the 
remand to the agency or district court for the development of a factual record which was pre-
viously allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c). Thus, this change, which Congress probably 
meant to expedite judicial review under new section 242, may have created a basis for assert-
ing alternative jurisdiction in the federal district courts. For a case which generally discusses 
remand under former INA § 106 using 28 U.S.C. § 2347(c), see Makonnen v. INS, 44 F.3d 
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The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of section 242 is an example of 
the ways in which courts read preclusion statutes to preserve their juris-
diction. This case suggests that other noncitizens may file federal dis-
trict court actions seeking to enjoin removal proceedings where the 
noncitizen can establish selective prosecution or assert some other con-
stitutional or statutory right which would render removal "contrary to 
law." Generally, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 
would preclude preemptive suits, yet there are enough recognized ex-
emptions to this doctrine223 to suggest that litigants, especially those 
seeking to vindicate constitutional claims, may use this strategy to 
evade the limits on judicial review. 
In Tefel v. Reno,224 a class action including approximately 40,000 
noncitizens,225 Judge King found that the federal courts retain jurisdic-
tion to issue an injunction restraining the INS from removing 
noncitizens.226 The government argued that either subsection 242(f) or 
(g) eliminated the federal court jurisdiction. Although he found that 
section 242(f) was not applicable to actions filed before April 1, 1997, 
King also ruled that this provision did not apply where the noncitizens 
"seek to enjoin constitutional violations and policies and practices of 
the [INS] . . . . Rather than seeking to enjoin the statute, they are 
seeking its implementation under the appropriate standard."227 The 
plaintiffs asserted that the BIA's decision that found that Congress 
meant to preclude retroactively applications for suspension of deporta-
1378 (8th Cir. 1995). 
223. Exhaustion is generally not required when agency precedent clearly indicates it is useless 
to exhaust, or when the party is asserting constitutional claims that the agency has no power to 
hear. See, e.g., Farhoud v. INS, 114 F.3d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1997) (exception to the exhaus-
tion requirement for constitutional claim); Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187, 1188 n.I (9th Cir. 
1994) (willing to consider constitutional claims not raised before the BIA due to inability of 
BIA to consider equal protection challenge); Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d 1562, 1567 (9th Cir. 
1994) (discussing the exception for most constitutional claims); El Rescate Legal Servs. v. Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review, 959 F2d 742, 746-47 (9th Cir. 1992) (exception to ex-
haustion for constitutional challenge to procedures raising due process issues). 
224. No. 97-0805-CIV-KING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla. May 20, 1997). 
225. See id. at *5. A similar class action is pending in California. See Barahona v. Reno, 
CV No. C97-0895 CW (N.D. Cal. 1997). On March 28, 1997, in an unpublished order, Judge 
Wilken granted class certification and a preliminary injunction enjoining deportation of class 
members. The INS appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal is 
still pending as of July 1997. 
226. See Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *5. The INS filed an appeal of Judge King's order but 
Attorney General Reno also appeared to wish to resolve the issue through other means. See 
infra note 230. 
227. Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *6. 
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tion under former INA section 244 was violative of several constitu-
tional rights. They argued that the INS should be estopped from ap-
plying this ruling to cases where noncitizens have relied on the avail-
ability of this relief in abandoning claims for political asylum or other 
forms of relief from deportation. The plaintiffs similarly argued that 
the removal of the relief constituted a denial of due process and equal 
protection. The government responded that the parties would have the 
ability to present constitutional and nonconstitutional claims as a part of 
their petition for review before the court of appeals.228 The district 
court concluded that these types of claims require the development of a 
factual record which could not be created before the agency and would, 
therefore, not be reviewed as part of the administrative record before 
·the court of appeals. "[R]equiring [the plaintiffs] to raise such claims 
only before the Court of Appeals is tantamount to denying Plaintiffs' a 
forum before which they can raise their constitutional claims. "229 
Judge King also rejected the government's argument that the plain-
tiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. He found that 
exhaustion would be futile because the BIA had issued an opinion 
which would definitively bar their applications for suspension of depor-
tation.230 Further, he found that exhaustion is not required where the 
party is challenging the constitutional implementation of the law, not 
228. See id. at *3. Inherent in the government's argument of continuing jurisdiction in the 
court of appeals is the assumption that noncitizens seeking to challenge their statutory eligibility 
for discretionary relief may continue to do so notwithstanding the bar on judicial review of 
decisions "regarding the granting" of relief. See supra Part IV.B.I. 
229. Tefe/, 1997 WL 369980, at *4. 
230. The petitioners were seeking to overturn the BIA decision Matter of NJB, Int. Dec. 
3309 {BIA 1997). In this case, the BIA held, in a 7-5 ruling, that pending cases would be 
bound by the new provisions in llRAIRA that discontinued the practice of counting the time 
spent in deportation proceedings towards the minimum seven year residency requirement for 
suspension of deportation. On July 10, Janet Reno announced that she would review the BIA's 
decision. In doing so, Ms. Reno noted, "[w]e must recognize the special circumstances of 
individuals whose cases were pending when the new law was enacted, and avoid any unfairness 
that could come from applying new rules to pending cases. We want to ensure that 
[llRAIRA] will not have an unduly harsh effect ...• " Depiirtment of Justice News Release, 
Administration ·Proposes Finetuning for 1996 Immigration Law to Mitigate Harsh Effects of 
Applying New ilules to Pending Cases, 1997 WL 381828 {D.OJ. July 10, 1997). The Admin-
istration announced a legislative proposal which would essentially apply the old law on a case-
by-case basis to applicants whose cases were pending prior to April I, 1997. See id. at •J. 
The Attorney General vacated Matter of NJB on July JO, 1997, in a one paragraph order. 
One possible explanation of the administration's reaction may be that if Tefel or similar cases 
continued, noncitizens might have established some substantive due process rights to combat 
retroactive elimination of relief from deportation. 
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the particµlar outcome of any case.231 Judge King also noted that the 
plaintiffs presented substantial evidence that many people would never 
be able to wait for judicial review of their administrative removal order 
because they would lack the funds to pursue an individual appeal. 
Judge King concluded that without representation in the class action, 
"these Plaintiffs will be denied any forum to raise their constitutional 
and statutory claims. "232 , 
Judge King also held that subsection {g), the catch-all barrier, ap-
plied to cases filed before April 1, 1997; however, he determined that 
the suit before him was not, in fact, within the "catch-all" barrier. He 
accepted two arguments presented by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs ar-
gued that the plain language of subsection (g) only covered the actions 
of the "attorney general" and therefore did not cover decisions of the 
BIA or other subordinate officials.233 Second, the plaintiffs relied on 
McNary to argue that section 242(g) could only preclude judicial re-
view of those matters within the scope of a final order of removal and 
that it did not limit pattern and practice challenges which cannot be 
litigated as part of the administrative proceedings. They argued that a 
broader reading of section 242(g) would bar judicial review of any 
claim that was not part of the administrative order. Adopting the 
broader reading would render the statute unconstitutional as a violation 
of separation of powers. Judge King agreed that the statute must be 
interpreted based on the plain language of the provision and construed 
to avoid an abolition of federal court jurisdiction to present constitu-
tional claims. "Although the Congress may define the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts, it may not intrude upon the judiciary's essential 
function by denying any judicial forum to a plaintiff who asserts a 
violation of constitutional rights."234 -
Not all litigants are successful in characterizing their claims as 
falling outside of the scope of section 242. In Ramal/o v. Reno, 235 the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that section 242(g) 
barred general federal question jurisdiction where a noncitizen tried to 
enjoin deportation proceedings. Ramallo sought to enforce an agree-
ment with the INS in which the agency agreed not to enforce an out-
231. See supra note 223 (discussing the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement). 
232. Tefel, 1997 WL 369980, at *5. 
233. The INA contains the following definition: "'Attorney General' means the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States." INA § 10l(a)(5). 
234. Tefe/, 1997 WL 369980, at *4. 
235. 114 F.3d 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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standing order of deportation.236 The district court granted specific 
perfonnance of the oral agreement based on the theories of promissory 
and equitable estoppel.237 The government appealed this decision, and 
during the appeal Congress enacted IIRAIRA. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected 
Ramallo's arguments that her lawsuit arose in a context which was 
outside of the intended bar of section 242(g).238 Judge Edwards said 
that regardless of Ramallo's characterization of her claims, in essence, 
she sought to prevent the INS from executing an outstanding order of 
deportation. Given the express language of sub~ection (g), he ruled 
that neither the district court nor the court of appeals could entertain 
her suit. He noted that Ramallo was not precluded from all fonns of 
judicial review and suggested that she could raise any substantial con-
stitutional claims in the a writ of habeas corpus.239 
Although Congress may have been intending the 1996 legislation to 
236. In 1986, Marlena Rarnallo, a lawful pennanent resident, was convicted of conspiracy to 
import cocaine. Following her conviction, the INS commenced deportation proceedings against 
her, and she sought a section 212(c) waiver. Before the deportation proceedings could con-
clude, Rarnallo, the INS, and the Drug Enforcement Agency, entered into an agreement that In 
exchange for Rarnallo's testimony against certain drug traffickers, the INS would not deport 
her. As part of the agreement, she withdrew her application for section 212(c) relief. As a 
result, a final order of deportation was entered against her. It was her understanding that the 
final order would be quashed at a later date. In recognition of her cooperation, the INS filed 
a motion to reopen the deportation proceedings on February 10, 1992 on Ramallo's behalf. 
The IJ granted the motion and set a deadline for the submission of a new section 212(c) appli-
cation. Rarnallo's counsel failed to submit the application on time and the IJ denied the appli· 
cation both for lack of prosecution and because the Judge found her to be statutorily ineligible 
for the relief because she had lost her pennanent resident status in 1988 when the deportation 
order became final. Rarnallo appealed the denial of the section 212(c) waiver to the BIA. 
The government reversed its earlier support of her application and moved to dismiss the appeal 
on the ground that Rarnallo had traveled outside the United States subsequent to the entry of 
the final order of deportation, thereby executing the order and vacating all BIA jurisdiction to 
consider an appeal. The BIA granted the INS motion to dismiss the appeal on March IO, 
1994 and Rarnallo filed a timely petition for review with the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Rarnallo then moved to hold the petition for review in abeyance while the parties negotiated a 
settlement Ultimately, settlement negotiations failed and she brought an action in the federal 
district court seeking specific perfonnance of the INS promise not to deport The INS began 
deportation proceedings seeking Rarnallo's deportation as an aggravated felon. Rarnallo filed an 
action in the federal district court seeking to enjoin the deportation proceedings. See id 
237. Questior.s were also raised as to the district court's jurisdiction under fonner INA § 106. 
The government argued that the court of appeals, and not the district court, had jurisdiction 
pursuant to section I 06. The district court rejected this argument noting that the case did not 
involve a question as to the deportation; rather, it dealt with a contract dispute between 
Rarnallo and the Government See Rarnallo v. Reno, 918 F. Supp. 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
238. See Ramallo, 114 F.3d at 1213. 
239. See id at 1214 (citing Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
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limit judicial review of INS action, the reality is that the removal of 
express provisions in the INA will encourage litigants to reframe their 
claims to take advantage of alternative grants of jurisdiction. Tefel and 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee present examples of the 
types of challenges that focus on constitutional issues in an effort to 
distinguish· the case from judicial review of a final order of removal. 
As Congress eliminates the forms of relief from removal and tightens 
the issues which may be appealed in the petition for review, litigants 
may resort to these pattern and practice or constitutional challenges to 
both the substantive and procedural provisions of the law. The same 
pattern of forcing the litigation into constitutional arenas also appears in 
those cases which seek judicial review of a final order via the writ of 
habeas corpus. The opinion in Ramallo illustrates this pressure to ere~ 
ate a constitutional issue in habeas corpus review. In the next part, I 
will explore both statutory and constitutional habeas corpus as the most 
likely basis for judicial review of final removal orders. The impact of 
the constitutionalization of immigration litigation, both under habeas 
corpus and the pattern and practice litigation, is explored in Part VI. 
V. BACK TO THE FUTURE: THE RETURN OF HABEAS CORPUS 
To remove a person from the United States or to bar entry, the 
governmeqt must have actual or constructive custody over that per-
son. 240 Consequently, noncitizens have used habeas corpus petitions to 
obtain judicial review of deportation and exclusion orders for over one 
hundred years. This section will discuss the statutory and constitutional 
sources of habeas corpus jurisdiction. It will also discuss the types of 
claims which a court may entertain as part of habeas review.241 In the 
last part of this section, I explore some of the ways that Congress de-
feated its goal of streamlining judicial review by ignoring habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction. Further, if the government succeeds in asserting that 
the scope of review in habeas corpus should be limited to "serious 
constitutional issues," Congress and the Executive will have created a 
system which may lead to the constitutionalization of ·immigration law. 
240. See discussion of custody requirement infra note 306. 
241. For clarity and to mirror the more common judicial usage, I will use the phrase "scope 
of review" instead of the term "cognizable claims." The scope of review depends, in part, on 
whether the habeas petition is based on 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or whether it is a pure constitutional 
habeas. See the discussion of Constitutional habeas in the next section. 
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A. Statutory Habeas Corpus in Immigration Cases 
Although Congress repealed the grant of habeas jurisdiction fonner-
ly found in INA section 106,242 it did not alter the habeas corpus juris-
diction found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241.243 Section 2241 grants jurisdiction 
to federal district courts to issue writs of habeas corpus for persons "in 
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United 
States" and for persons "in custody under or by color of the authority 
of the United States."244 Section 2241 was the jurisdictional basis for 
judicial review in the earliest immigration cases and continued to be the 
principal method of testing the legality of immigration orders until the 
1952 Act allowed declaratory judgment actions and APA review.24s In 
an effort to remove declaratory judgments and to streamline review, 
Congress created fonner section 106 which moved most review to the 
courts of appeal but also created specific habeas corpus jurisdiction in 
the district courts. 246 Habeas corpus under section 106 was the only 
242. Fonner INA § J06(a)(IO), which provided for habeas review of aliens "in custody," was 
modified in AEDPA § 440(a) and removed in IIRAIRA. Section 106 also provided for habeas 
corpus review of exclusion orders. Deportation orders were reviewed via petitions for review 
in the court of appeals. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102 (discussing fonner INA § 
106). See also infra Chart I (depicting fonner INA § 106 review procedures). 
243. The constitutional guarantee of the writ of habeas corpus is discussed below. In one 
instance, IIRAIRA creates a special fonn of habeas for lawful pennanent residents and asylees 
who are challenging expedited removal under INA § 235. See INA § 242(e)(2). This provi-
sion is discussed in Part IV, supra text accompanying notes 179-84. Whether this limited 
habeas impliedly repeals the general grant of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will have to be 
litigated. Given the precedents which found no implied repeal of section 2241 in other con-
text, I believe it is unlikely that the statute is effective to limit the nature and scope of habeas 
relief. When section 106 created habeas review of exclusion orders, litigants often asserted 
both section 106 and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction. See GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, § 
81.03. See also Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8959, at *77-103 (E.D.N.Y. July 11, 1997) {affinning habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 and noting prior practice). The APA also mentions habeas corpus in its judicial review 
provisions, see 5 U.S.C. § 703, however, this may be a reference to habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 as the APA does not independently confer jurisdiction. See discussion of APA jurisdic-
tion supra note 212. 
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). This statute also confers jurisdiction on circuit court judges In 
their individual capacity and to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) provides, "Writs of 
habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and 
any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions." 
245. See disc.ussion of these cases supra Part II. 
246. In 1961, Congress adopted fonner INA § 106. See discussion of this change in Part II. 
The 1961 amendments and legislative history are also discussed in Continuing Dialogue, supra 
note 26. 
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fonn of review for orders of exclusion, but habeas was also authorized, 
in addition to the petition for review, when the alien was taken into 
custody pursuant to an order of deportation.247 
Nothing in AEDPA or IIRAIRA specifically amended 28 U.S.C. § 
2241, nor does the legislative history indicate that Congress considered 
habeas under this statute.248 The Supreme Court has rejected arguments 
that other provisions of AEDP A concerning federal habeas review of 
state criminal convictions were effective to impliedly restrict 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241.249 Moreover, the Supreme Court has long read statutory limits 
on habeas corpus jurisdiction narrowly, refusing to find implied repeals 
of alternative avenues of habeas corpus jurisdiction.250 
In AEDP A, Congress barred a class of noncitizens convicted of 
certain crimes from the fonns of review previously available in § 106. 
The express language provided that final orders "shall not be subject to 
review by any court."251 In the litigation concerning the effect of this 
provision, several courts of appeal found that although this bar did 
repeal the authority to hear a petition for review, some fonn of habeas 
corpus review remained.252 In a ~ew cases, the noncitizen sought habe-
247. See fonner INA §§ 106(b), 106(10). The government has argued that Congress repealed 
the authority for habeas in immigration cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 when it created section 
I 06. There is no mention of general habeas statutes in INA, nor is there a clear discussion in 
the legislative history surrounding section I 06, of how Congress thought section 106 would 
revise habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See supra Part II. Some courts continued to 
use section 2241 with section 106 when exercising habeas review. See Mondragon v. Ilchert, 
653 F.2d 1254 (9th Cir. 1980). See also the discussion in Mojica v. Reno of the 1961 legis-
lative history and the government argument .that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was impliedly repealed at 
that time. See Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *32-34. 
248. Judge Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, makes similar findings in Mojica; 
"There was no mention of section 2241 of title 28 in AEDPA .... Neither the [IIRAIRA's) 
transitional rules, nor its pennanent provisions, specifically address or amend the habeas juris-
diction of the district courts under section 2241 of title 28." Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 
8959, at *85. "[T)here is nothing in either the text or history of the AEDPA or the 
[IIRAIRA] that specifically mentions section 2241, much less limits or repeals it" Id. at *101. 
See also discussion of prior congressional considerations of habeas limitation infra note 293. 
249. See Lindh v. Murphy, 19n U.S. LEXIS 3998 (June 23, 1997); Felker v. Turpin, 116 
S. Ct 2333, 2338 (1996) (Court held that under the well established "clear statement" rule, 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 jurisdiction cannot be repealed by "implication"). 
250. See, e.g., F.x Parle Yerger, 75 U.S. 85, 105 (1868). 
251. AEDPA § 440a. 
252. The government argued that section 440a of AEDPA actually repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
and that only a limited fonn of constitutional habeas review remained. See, e.g., Figueroa-
Rubio v. INS, 108 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997); Boston-Boilers v. INS, 106 F.3d 352 (11th Cir. 
1997) (per curiam) (dismissing petition for review but referring to statutory habeas); Kolster v. 
INS, 101 F.3d 785 (1st Cir. 1996) (dismissing the petition for review, but finding some fonn 
of habeas review remains); Salazar-Haro v. INS, 95 F.3d 309 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 
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as review in the federal district court without attempting to file a peti-
tion for review in the court of appeals.253 Thus the result of the lan-
guage of AEDPA was not elimination of judicial review, but rather a 
shift of forum and form.254 
The statutory preclusion in IIRAIRA is much broader than the 
AEDPA provision because of the language of section 242(g) which 
states: "Except as provided for in this section and notwithstanding any 
other provision of law" no court shall have jurisdiction to review final 
orders of removal.255 In some cases, the government has argued that 
this phrase is meant to override or impliedly repeal the grant of juris-
diction in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, as well as other forms of federal court 
jurisdiction.256 At the same time, the government maintains that the 
repeal of the statutory basis for habeas corpus is not a violation of the 
suspension clause of the Constitution257 because some form of limited 
S. Ct 1842 (1997); Hincapie-Nieto v. INS, 92 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing petition for 
review and referring to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 
(9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing petition for review and acknowledging statutory habeas); Medcz-
Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 694 (1997). I am one of 
the law professors who joined in filing an amicus brief in Duldulao when it was before the 
Ninth Circuit Following the Ninth Circuit decision dismissing his petition for review, Mr. 
Duldulao sought habeas review in the federal district court in Hawaii. See Duldulao v. Reno, 
958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (allowing habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, but limiting the 
scope of review available to "grave constitutional claims" and denying the petition). 
253. Some cases were filed directly in the district courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See, 
e.g., Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Mbiya v. INS, 930 F. Supp. 609 
(N.D. Ga. 1996). See also Vakalala v. Schiltgen, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2101 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 
26, 1997). 
254. In some cases, the government argued that the court of appeals, rather than the district 
courts, should exercise this limited habeas review in order to preserve the intent of Congress to 
streamline judicial review. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 828, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(rejecting the government's argument in light of the Second Circuit's dismissals of petitions for 
review under AEDPA). The issue of the appropriate forum for habeas review is pending be-
fore the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a consolidated petition for review and appeal from 
a denial of the writ of habeas corpus in Magana-Pizano v. Sonchik, Nos. 97-15676 and 97-
70384 (9th Cir. 1997). I am one of the law professors who joined in filing an amicus brief 
in these consolidated appeals. 
255. The full text of section 242(g) is found in Part IV.B.3 supra. 
256. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
8959, at *78-86 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) and cases supra note 252. The government has 
also argued that statutory habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remains, but asserted that the scope 
of review is limited to a constitutional minimum. See, e.g., Vakalala v. Schiltgen, No. C-97-
042 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2101, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (government argued 
that assuming section 2241 continues, the petitioners' claims were not within the residual con· 
stitutional habeas function); Moore v. District Dir., 956 F. Supp. 878, 882 (D. Neb. 1997) (INS 
conceded that district court maintained habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to extent 
required by the Constitution). 
257. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, provides that the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
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constitutional habeas continues to exist.258 
Putting aside the argument of a complete repeal of statutory habeas 
which will be explored in the next section, the next question is what is 
the scope of the review authorized by the statute. The litigation to 
date and the general history of habeas corpus review suggest that pre-
cision in defining the scope of habeas corpus will be unattainable.259 
As I have discussed, habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was the 
vehicle for judicial review of immigration orders until Congress created 
the petition for review process in 1961. Habeas corpus was clearly 
used to mount constitutional challenges to the substantive immigration 
laws and to the procedures used in implementing the statutes.260 But 
habeas. was not solely limited to constitutional challenges. Habeas was 
also used to review the agency's statutory interpretation,261 to review 
whether the agency failed to exercise discretion granted under the stat-
utes,262 and to review claims challenging the evidence presented in the 
administrative hearing.263 
The federal district courts that have heard habeas corpus petitions 
following the passage of AEDPA and IIRAIRA reflect the difficulty in 
detennining the exact scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Some 
district courts have felt compelled to construe statutory habeas very 
narrowly in order to preserve the intent of Congress to generally limit 
pended except where "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it" 
258. See Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997). In Yang, Judge Easterbrook agreed 
with this construction of llRAIRA and wrote that "effective April I, 1997, [section 306(a) of 
llRAIRA] abolishes even review under § 2241, leaving only the constitutional writ unaided by 
statute." Id. at 1195. See also Keister v. INS, IOI F.3d 785, 790 n.4 (1st Cir. 1996) (sug-
gesting a "free standing" authority to hear constitutional habeas claims). This view of continu-
ing habeas corpus jurisdiction is discussed in the next Part. 
259. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1487-1505 (discussing judicial and scholarly 
debates about the historical role of habeas corpus). One author, in trying to determine the 
types of issues which might be considered in habeas corpus review of military courts martial, 
commented that beyond constitutional issues and issues of pure jurisdiction "lies fog." See D. 
CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 874 (3d ed. 1982). Professor Fallon uses 
the confusion and possible limitations inherent in habeas corpus review to support his argument 
that appellate review of administrative agencies is the best vehicle to protect judicial review and 
separation of powers values. See Fallon, supra note 18, at 967-70. 
260. See Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (hearing challenges to the grant of plenary 
power to the inspection officer in the 1891 Immigration Act). 
261. See cases discussed supra note 54. 
262. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954) (habeas review 
of alleged failure to exercise discretion). CJ Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi, 349 
U.S. 280 (1955) (accepting refusal to grant relief from deportation based on finding that BIA 
had exercised discretion). 
263. See cases and authorities cited supra note 55. 
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judicial review in the type of immigration cases before them. For 
example, some courts refuse to use 28 U.S.C. § 2241 where the non-
citizen seeks to review some other agency action such as the denial of 
a stay of deportation while a motion to reopen is adjudicated by the 
BIA. Under the prior section 106(a)(l 0), noncitizens often filed a ha-
beas petition and sought a stay of the order of deportation while the 
agency adjudicated a motion to reopen. These courts read the elimina-
tion of the special form of habeas in former section 106 as evidence of 
the intent of Congress to limit habeas availability.264 These courts are 
drawing a distinction between review of a final order and review of 
stays pending adjudication of a discretionary motion or action. The 
courts rejecting habeas jurisdiction apparently believe that the repeal of 
section 106(a)(l0) ended habeas jurisdiction, or that they must read 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 restrictively to fulfill congressional intent to avoid delay 
in the execution of removal orders.26s 
The federal district courts do not appear to dispute that habeas can 
be used to review a final order of deportation, but they disagree on 
what claims may be heard in those petitions. Some opinions have 
concluded that even under statutory habeas, the court can only consider 
264. See, e.g., Lalani v. Penyman, 105 F.3d 334, 336 (7th Cir. 1997} (finding federal district 
courts had the authority to issue habeas corpus stays in this situation but noting that when 
section 242(g) became effective on April 1, 1997, it would eliminate the basis for the court's 
jurisdiction); Vayspitter v. United States Attorney Gen., 1997 WL 299372, at •3 (E.D. La. June 
3, 1997} (section 242(g) divested the court of jurisdiction to review the execution of deporta-
tion orders by the Attorney General); Fedossov v. Penyman, 969 F. Supp. 26, 29 (N.D. Ill. 
1997} (finding that section 242(g) barred habeas review of the district director's denial of a 
stay of execution); Benziane v. United States, 960 F. Supp. 238, 240 (D. Colo. 1997} (finding 
section 242(g) eliminates federal court jurisdiction to issue a stay of deportation and habeas 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and would only allow a stay where petitioner challenges the underly-
ing deportation order). Cf Ugwoezuono v. Schiltgen, 1997 WL 142804, at •1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
19, 1997} (upon order of the Ninth Circuit vacating prior refusal to grant habeas, accepted 
habeas to review denial of stay of deportation}. 
265. See cases supra note 264. The immigration statutes no longer remove federal court juris-
diction when the noncitizen leaves the country or is removed by the INS. As a result, the 
noncitizen could theoretically file a petition for review regarding the denial of a motion to , 
reopen or of some other action even if the order is executed. This assumption presumes that 
the noncitizen is not otherwise barred under section 242 from filing a petition for review and 
that the motion is not vacated by departure. The current agency regulations continue to vacate 
motions to reopen or reconsider when the noncitizen departs the United States or is removed 
by the INS. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1997). 
Denial of a motion to reopen has been held to create an independent right to file a peti-
tion for review because the denial constitutes a new final order. See Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 
U.S. 18 (1964). The IJ or BIA has discretion to grant motions to reopen. See INS v. Jong 
Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139 (1981). See also United States v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 451-52 
(1985) (denial of a motion to reopen is based on abuse of discretion, not de novo review). 
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challenges which articulate a "grave constitutional error or a fundamen-
tal miscarriage of justice."266 Other courts have adopted a similar stan-
dard, requiring the articulation of a "substantial constitutional issue,"267 
while other courts have adopted a standard from criminal law habeas 
jurisprudence, finding that review is limited to whether the execution of 
the removal order would constitute a "manifest injustice."268 As of July 
1997, only one district court opinion has stated that statutory habeas is 
not limited and covers a broad array of legal issues.269 
At first glance, it might seem that these narrow constructions of 
habeas review would achieve the congressional goal of streamlining or 
curtailing judicial review. ;However, certain habeas decisions reflect a 
broader type of review taking place under the label of restrictive re-
view. For example, in Eltayeb v. Ingham,210 the district court an-
nounced that habeas review after AEDP A was limited to determining 
whether the deportation would result in a miscarriage of justice. The 
court then reviewed the allegation of the alien that the INS had erro-
neously denied his request for a motion to reopen.271 The district court 
concluded that the petitioner had failed to show that the denial of the 
m<;>tion to reopen was abusive and therefore had not presented a case 
where deportation would constitute a miscarriage of justice.272 Thus 
266. See, e.g., Vakalala v. Schiltgen, No. C-97-0492 SI, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 2101, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 1997) (grave constitutional error or fundamental miscarriage of justice); 
Duldulao v. Reno, 958 F. Supp. 476, 479 (D. Haw. 1997) (same); Powell v. Jennifer, 937 F. 
Supp. 1245, 1252-53 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (same). 
The apparent origin of the "fundamental miscarriage of justice" standard is Hill v. United 
States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962). Hill concerned federal post conviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 and requ:red that the petitioner prove that the violation of a nonjurisdictional federal stat-
ute or rule in federal criminal conviction created a "fundamental defect which inherently results 
in a complete miscarriage of justice . . . ." Id. at 428. The standard is misapplied in habeas 
review of administrative action where there has been no judicial process or review. 
267. See Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1997) (habeas review remains for 
substantial constitutional errors); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I, 7 (D.D.C. 1997) (substantial 
constitutional claims). 
268. See Eltayeb v. Ingham, 950 F. Supp 95, JOO (S.D.N.Y. 1997); see also Mbyia v. INS, 
930 F. Supp. 609, 612 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Note, The Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Re-
view for Administrative Deportation Decisions, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1850, 1859-62 (1997). 
(critiquing Mbyia as applying an inappropriate scope of review). 
269. See Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at 
*100-03 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997). 
270. 950 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
271. This type of question would have previously been heard in a petition for review and the 
court of appeals would have determined if the denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion. 
See discussion of motions to reopen as new final orders supra note 265. 
272. See Eltayeb, 950 F. Supp. at JOO. 
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habeas review appeared to mirror both the scope and standard of re-
view which might have occurred via a petition for review. 
Yesi/ v. Reno213 presented another case where the district court 
judge considered what type of claims might be presented in a statutory 
habeas petition after the passage of AEDPA. Mr. Yesil alleged that the 
agency had erroneously interpreted his statutory eligibility for a discre-
tionary waiver of deportation. Judge Chin of the Southern District of 
New York found that he did not have to decide the exact nature of 
habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and whether it allowed 
review of statutory interpretation because the allegation of an erroneous 
statutory violation depriving a long-term resident of any possibility of 
relief from deportation could constitute a due process violation. There-
fore, Mr. Y esil had presented a constitutional claim which clearly sup-
ported statutory habeas corpus jurisdiction.274 
In contrast, Judge Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, 
found that statutory habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is not limited to 
pure constitutional issues but may be used to challenge the agency's 
interpretation of statutes. In Mojica v. Reno,215 the petitioners sought 
review of the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of Soriano,216 which 
273. 958 F. Supp. 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
274. See id. at 839. As this Article was nearing completion, Judge Chin issued a second 
order denying the government's motion to reconsider. The government had asked him to re-
consider his finding that· Mr. Yesil should be allowed to apply for section 212(c) relief given 
the Attorney General's opinion in Matter of Soriano, slip op. Att'y Gen., 1997 WL 159795 
(Feb. 21, 1997). Judge Chin found that the Attorney General had improperly interpreted 
AEDPA as requiring retroactive application of the bar to section 212(c) relief. Further, he 
found that even if the provision were meant to apply retroactively, "it would be manifestly 
unjust to apply" the bar to Yesil. See Yesil v. Reno, No. 96 CIV 8409, 1997 WL 394945, at 
*29 (S.D.N.Y. July IS, 1997). "[F]airness requires that Yesil be returned to the position he 
would have been in had the law properly been applied by the IJ and BIA." Id. 
275. Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997). 
Mojica involves review of the habeas petitions of two noncitizens, both long term permanent 
residents of the United States. 
276. Slip op. Att'y Gen., 1997 WL 159795 (Feb. 21, 1997) (reversing the vacated decision 
by the BIA, Int Dec. 3289 (BIA 1996)). The Attorney General concluded that imposing the 
new limits on § 212(c) relief to pending cases would not have an impermissible retroactive 
effect in violation of the Supreme Court's analysis in Landgraf v. US/ Film Products, 511 U.S. 
244 (1994). In that case, the Supreme Court set forth a test to determine impermissible retro-
active effect in statutes that have no express effective date. Courts must first consider whether 
the application would impair rights a party possessed when she acted, increase liability for past 
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. See id. at 280. 
The Attorney General concluded that retroactive loss of the possibility of a section 212(c) 
waiver did not alter the consequences of the noncitizen's behavior. The mere possibility of 
relief from deportation did not impair a right, increase liability, or impose new duties. See 
Matter of Soriano, supra, at *6. Some federal courts have agreed with the retroactive applica-
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held that the elimination of section 212(c) relief in AEDPA was meant 
to apply retroactively to pending cases. In addition to this statutory 
issue, the petitioners raised several constitutional challenges to the At-
torney General's decision and to the e1imination of judicial review. 
Judge Weinstein found that he had jurisdiction to consider the statutory 
issues and did not address the additional constitutional challenges.277 
Judge Weinstein rejected the government's arguments that the scope 
of habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 could be limited by "accom-
modation" to congressional policy goals.278 "Fidelity to Felker and 
Yerger and the requirements of the clear statement rule militates against 
reading such limitations into the scope of section 2241. By its terms, 
section 2241 is not limited to constitutional claims or claims of funda-
mental miscarriage of justice."279 
After determining that he could review the statutory claim under 
section 2241, Judge Weinstein rejected the Attorney General's decision 
in Soriano.280 He also refused to accord her interpretation of the stat-
ute any deference because he found that the statute was unambiguous 
and that her opinion was based on her application of Landgraf and 
other judicial precedents rather than an interpretation of an ambiguous 
provision of the statute authority delegated to her.281 After discussing 
the serious consequences of criminal convictions for noncitizens and the 
possible reliance noncitizens in the criminal justice system may have 
placed in the availability of a waiver of deportation, he concluded that 
tion. See, e.g., Vargas v. Reno, 966 F. Supp. 1537 (S.D. Cal. 1997) (applying AEDPA bar to 
alien convicted of drug possession before enactment). 
277. Although Mojica appears to have been resolved on statutory grounds, Judge Weinstein 
provides a detailed analysis of the international law and constitutional law background: 
In construing a statute courts approach their task with the assumption that Congress 
and the President acted with sensitivity to the fundamental thrust of our history as 
one of the world's foremost proponents of the rule of law and human rights, includ-
ing fairness to all within our borders. It is therefore appropriate when deciding the 
meaning of the important new statutes dealing with legal permanent residents to put 
these provisions in their historical and constitutional setting. 
Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *28. Unlike other courts, Judge Weinstein appears to 
be expressly acknowledging the constitutional (and international human rights) norms which 
inform his reading of the immigration statute. See id. at *3-4. See generally Motomura, 
Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9. 
278. See Mojica, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959, at *IOI. 
279. Id. 
280. See id. at *169. Judge Weinstein also found that her opinion lacked legal support and 
had not articulated a rational basis for the retroactive application. He did not reach the issue 
of whether the Attorney General had the statutory authority to overturn the BIA decision. See 
id. 
281. See id. at * 165-68. 
316 
1474 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1411 
Congress did not make the section 212( c) bar retroactive. "It is not for 
the Attorney General to usurp Congress's obligation to think seriously 
about whether any national interest is served in the upsetting of past 
law including the past bargains ·that underlie the criminal justice system 
and international concerns. "282 
The government may continue to argue that the provisions of 
IIRAIRA intend to restrict judicial review to the constitutional mini-
mum. As has been noted, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals accepted this reading and suggested that the language 
of section 242(g) has impliedly repealed 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for review 
of immigration orders. 283 The next section considers some of the juris-
dictional and functional issues concerning constitutional habeas corpus. 
B. Constitutional Habeas Corpus 
If the 1996 immigration legislation did repeal the statutory form of 
habeas corpus in 28 U.S.C. § 2241, is there any basis for federal court 
habeas jurisdiction?284 The Constitution does not expressly provide a 
grant of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions; rather, the Constitution 
preserves access to habeas corpus in the Suspension Clause.285 The 
exact nature of the writ of habeas corpus preserved by the Suspension 
Clause itself is debated.286 Some interpreters of the Constitution will 
282. Id. at * 168. See the continued discussion of constitutional implications infra Part VI 
and text accompanying notes 356-59. 
283. See Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997). 
284. This issue may also become important if Congress explicitly repeals 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
in future immigration statutes. 
285. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. The writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended 
except where "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." 
286. The respected immigration law treatise, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE, notes 
[m]ost of the time it has not been important to distinguish between statutory and 
constitutional habeas corpus: habeas corpus has generally conformed to the outlines 
established in the general federal habeas corpus statute. But some proposals for 
immigration reform, including a bill that passed the Senate in 1983, would have 
limited the writ in deportation and exclusion cases to its minimum content "under the 
Constitution. 
3 GoRDON ET AL., supra note 2, § 81.04 (footnote omitted) (specifying that content would not 
be easy) (citing to S. 529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REc. 56970 (1983)). 
Professor Legomsky briefly considered the question of the suspension clause limits on 
habeas corpus jurisdiction in his comprehensive article concerning judicial review of immigration 
cases: "That question -is difficult enough to answer in the abstract. The history of constitution-
al prohibition is sparse, and the existence of a broadly construed federal habeas statute has 
enabled the Supreme Court to avoid the constitutional issue." Forum Choices, supra note 114, 
at 1342 (footnotes omitted). 
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argue that the Suspension Clause only protects the type of common law 
writ of habeas corpus available in 1789 when the Constitution was 
adopted.287 Others may look to the Supreme Court's discussions of the 
history of the writ of habeas corpus and the prior periods when Con-
gress limited federal court jurisdiction and the ability of federal courts 
to exercise the writ.288 
The Supreme Court hinted at a distinction between statutory and 
constitutionally minimal habeas corpus review in Heikkila v. Barber. 289 
In that opinion, Justice Clark found that in several immigration laws, 
Congress had intended to preclude judicial review "to the fullest extent 
permitted under the Constitution," yet federal courts continued to re-
view the legality of ·deportation and exclusion orders in habeas corpus 
proceedings because of the constitutional guarantee of habeas corpus.290 
Congress has struggled to understand the distinction between statu-
287. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1465-77 (discussing development of the writ 
of habeas corpus); LIEBMAN & HERlZ, supra note 31, at ch. 2. See also, Developments in the 
Law Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 31. · Even if a narrow view of habeas is accepted, it 
may be very difficult to describe the scope and application of the writ Historical interpreta-
tions will undoubtedly vary. See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS 
& IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITIJTION (1996). . 
288. Judicial debates about the meaning of constitutional habeas corpus are also common. 
See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (debate between Brennan and Harlan over the his-
torical development of the writ of habeas corpus to review state criminal convictions). The de-
bate is excerpted in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 11, at 1488'-97. Scholarly criticism of the 
Supreme Court legal history appears in Lewis; Mayers, The Hal"Jeas Corpus Act of 1867: The 
Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33' U. CHI. L. REv. 31 (1965), and Dallin H. Oaks, Legal 
History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 451 (1966). Cf Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Remov-
al and Habeas.Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793 (1965); 
Gary Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
579 (1982). 
One district court has already concluded that the only form of habeas which survives is 
the type of writ which existed at the time of the Constitutional Convention. See Charan v. 
Schiltgen, No. C 96-3061 FMS, 1997 WL 135938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1997). In this opinion, 
Judge Smith finds that IIRAIRA removed jurisdiction to hear habeas under any federal statute 
and thus only the form of habeas protected by the Suspension Clause of the Constitution re-
mains available. He concluded that this constitutional form of habeas only allows the federal 
court to inquire whether the INS has custody pursuant to an order issued by the proper juris-
dictional body. This form of habeas would not allow the district court to correct any action of 
the INS even if it was based on errors of law or fact See id. at *4. Judge Smith appears 
to disregard the Supreme Court debates referenced above that have often resulted in a broader 
reading of the common law writ of habeas corpus. 
289. 345 U.S. 229 (1953) (considering the availability of habeas corpus review for aliens 
facing exclusion or deportation). 
290. Id. at 235 (aliens historically have been able to "attack a deportation order" by habeas 
corpus). 
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tory and constitutional habeas corpus review in prior years when they 
considered proposed statutory refonns of judicial review. The 1961 
creation of section 106, with its provisions for appellate court review 
and a separate guarantee of habeas corpus review,291 appears to have 
been motivated by concerns that eliminating habeas corpus would be 
unconstitutional.292 In the early 1980s, Congress c_onsidered refonns of 
section 106 which would have limited habeas to the "constitutional 
minimum."293 The congressional hearings indicate a grave concern that 
the elimination of habeas corpus review would not withstand judicial 
scrutiny.294 Ultimately the IRCA did not contain any significant alter-
nations to judicial review.295 In contrast, there is no record of congres-
sional consideration of the possible role of habeas corpus jurisdiction 
291. In 1961, fonner INA § 106 was created. This section specifically referred to habeas 
corpus as the fonn of review for exclusion orders and whenever an alien was in the custody 
of the INS. Under the fonner statute, an alien in deportation proceedings could file a petition 
for review. If she lost that petition, she could file a writ of habeas corpus once the INS 
moved to execute the final order of deportation. In cases where the alien did not have a stay 
of deportation, the writ of habeas corpus was filed under section I 06(a)(I 0) to prevent the re-
moval of the aiien even while the petition for review was awaiting adjudication. 
292. See Continuing Dialogue, supra note 26. 
293. Several different restrictive fonnulations were proposed in various Senate bills between 
1982 and 1984. Some proposals limited judicial review of exclusion orders to ,"the right of 
habeas corpus under the Constitution of the United States." See S. 2222, § 123(b), as ana· 
lyzed in S. REP. No. 97-485, at 35 (1982). The Senate bill introduced in the 98th Congress 
also included this provision. See S. 529, 98th Cong. (1983). At the same time, the House 
bills made statutory review in the court of appeals the "sole and exclusive procedures" for ex-
clusion cases. This would have made the review procedure identical for both exclusion and 
deportation cases. See H.R. 1510. 
In hearings on S. 529 before the judiciary committee, David Martin, then a professor at 
the University of Virginia law school and currently INS general counsel, testified that the 
phrase "under the constitution" is a "delphic phrase," but he admired the Senate's "boldness" 
for incorporating the phrase directly in the legislation. See Immigration Refo1m and Control 
Act: Hearings on S. 529 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refagee Policy of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., at 331 (1983) (statement of David Martin, 
then Professor at the University of Virginia Law School) [hereinafter "March 1983 Senate 
Hearings on S. 529"]. Professor Martin also testified that the scope of review required "under 
the Constitution" was clarified by the Senate Committee Report which stated that habeas could 
be used to examine only questions of procedural due process which were fundamentally and 
clearly prejudicial to the noncitizen. See S. REP. No. 97-485, supra, at 13-14. 
See also GORDON ET AL., supra note 2, § 81.04. These proposed limits arc discussed in 
ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 36, at ch. I. 
294. Several prominent immigration lawyers and scholars testified about the consequences of 
the limits on judicial review and the likely revival of habeas corpus review. See, e.g., March 
I983 Senate Hearings on S. 529, supra note 293, at 345 (testimony of David Carliner on be· 
half of the ABA). 
295. The Immigration Refonn and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986), 
was enacted after nearly ten years of refonn proposals. 
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when it adopted the sweeping limitations in the 1996 legislation.296 
Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of current legislative intent 
and the evidence of past legislative concerns and the historical use of 
habeas corpus in immigration cases, the government has continued to 
argue that the catch-all language in section 242(g) effectively eliminates 
the statutory right to a writ of habeas corpus and that habeas is limited 
to its constitutional minimum.297 In Yang v. INS, Judge Easterbrook of 
the Seventh Circuit seemed to have no difficulty· in defining the types 
of justiciable claims which are not available under the constitutional 
writ of habeas corpus. He wrote that noncitizens could not assert 
claims solely challenging statutory or regulatory interpretations, nor 
could a noncitizen seek review of discretionary actions.298 His opinion 
acknowledged that procedural due process challenges would be included 
in constitutional habeas review. 299 
If Judge Easterbrook is correct,300 what are the implications of this 
interpretation? Litigants will be compelled to characterize their claims 
as constitutional claims, and courts will exercise habeas corpus juris-
diction if only to determine that the claim is not of constitutional mag-
296. The Congressional Record does not reveal a discussion of habeas corpus in immigration 
cases during the consideration of the 1996 legislation. The only mention I found was in the 
explanation of the Administration's proposed refonn bill which would have substituted the peti-
tion for review to the court of appeals for habeas corpus review for exclusion cases. See 
Hearings on H.R. 1915 and H.R. 1929 Before the House Subcomm. on Immigration and 
Claims, 1995 WL 407976 (June 29, 1995) (testimony of T. Alexander Aleinikofi). The lack 
of discussion of habeas corpus in immigration cases during the consideration of the AEDP A 
legislation is particularly interesting, as much of AEDPA concerned congressional limits on 
federal habeas review of state criminal convictions. See generally Note, Rewriting the Great 
Writ: Standards of Review of Habeas Corpus Under the New 28 US.C. § 2254, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 1868 (1997) (describing the AEDPA changes). The author was among other professors 
who wrote letters to Congress about the ill-advised nature of the judicial review restrictions and 
suggested that habeas corpus jurisdiction would be implicated. One of these letters was intro-
duced into the Congressional Record by Senator Leahy. See 142 CONG. REC. Sll906-07 (daily 
ed. Sept 30, 1996). Further, the IIRAIRA provisions were adopted following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct 2333, 2338 (1996), which held that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 would not be repealed by implication. Given the presumption that Congress knows the 
state of the law, and if the past consideration of specific exclusions are read to limit implied 
exclusion, courts should be reluctant to find an implied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 
297. This argument was accepted in Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997). 
298. See id. at 1195 (citing United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration, 
273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927) and United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131, 132 (1924)). 
299. See Yang, 109 F.3d at 1196-97. 
300. I do not agree with his assessment and believe his opinion is wrong in assuming an im-
plied repeal of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In an opinion issued several weeks following Yang, the 
Seventh Circuit appeared to leave open the possibility of asserting habeas jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241. See Chow v. INS, 113 F.3d 659 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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nitude. The stakes for the government are that the habeas corpus form 
raises issues of constitutional power. Further, if the litigant is success-
ful, the precedent would be established on constitutional grounds and 
thus have much greater implications for the adjudication of other simi-
lar petitions.301 
But perhaps the issue of repealing 28 U.S.C. § 2241 will be re-
solved in another way. If IIRAIRA repeals the statutory basis for 
habeas corpus jurisdiction, then the question is what gives a federal 
court jurisdiction to hear constitutional claims of habeas corpus? Fed-
eral Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.302 Where the Constitution 
does not expressly create original jurisdiction, Congress must create a 
statute conferring federal court jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this general 
proposition, one circuit court of appeals has referred to a "free stand-
ing" power in the federal courts to hear a constitutional writ of habeas 
corpus.303 This also appears to be the position of the government in 
arguing that IIRAIRA repealed habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, 
but acknowledging that some limited habeas corpus review for pure 
constitutional questions remains. This reading may be necessary to 
avoid the construction of the statute as a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus and thus avoids the finding that the provision is uncon-
stitutional as a violation of the Suspension Clause.304 
301. These implications and others are further examined in Part V.C. 
302. See Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. {I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
303. See Kolster v. INS, IOI F.3d 785, 790-91 n.4 (!st Cir. 1996). 
304. There is another way to read the elimination of federal court jurisdiction of habeas cor-
pus without finding that it suspends the writ. The statute might be construed as eliminating 
federal court jurisdiction, but allowing the states to exercise habeas corpus over immigration 
cases. This is a difficult construction, for the heading of section 242(g) reads "Exclusive Juris-
diction," which at least implies an intent to have exclusive federal court jurisdiction. This con-
struction would require a reexamination of the ruling in Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 
(1871). The Supreme Court held that no state court has the power to use habeas corpus to re-
lease an individual from federal custody. The reasoning of the court in Tarble 's Case appears 
to rely in part on the availability of a federal writ' of habeas to test the validity of the deten-
tion. See id. at 409. Professor Hart also suggested that state courts would ensure judicial 
review in situations where Congress eliminated federal court jurisdiction. See Hart, supra note 
18, at 1363-66. He did not specifically discuss state court judicial review as a solution for 
immigration cases although a significant portion of his article concerns federal court review of 
immigration issues. Congress would clearly want to avoid the possibility of habeas review in 
state and territorial courts in immigration cases and the possible dilution of federal power over 
immigration. 
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C. How Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction Defeats Streamlining and Creates 
Constitutional Challenges 
Even if habeas is limited to its narrowest fonn, there are many 
reasons why this type of judicial review will not result in the certain, 
efficient removal adjudication system that Congress desired. · 
1. The Evolution of the Custody Requirement 
The traditional strict custody requirement, which was part of the 
early habeas corpus jurisdiction, has been greatly expanded over the 
past forty years. In the criminal law context, the Supreme Court has 
dramatically extended the right to seek habeas corpus review by ex-
panding the conception of "custody." The modern trend has been to 
recognize general constraints on liberty as sufficient to create habeas 
corpus jurisdiction.305 Today, most courts recognize that constructive 
custody is sufficient for habeas corpus subject matter jurisdiction.306 
305. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1973) (holding that a person 
conditionally released on his own recognizance pending execution of sentence is "incustody" 
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 241-43 (1963) 
(holding that a state parolee, under a parole order that imposed numerous conditions and re-
strictions on his liberty, was "in custody" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to entitle 
him to habeas review). 
306. See, e.g., Yesil v. Reno, 985 F. Supp. 828, 837-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (petitioner under 
final order of deportation but not in actual custody of the INS; applying 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
Cf. United States ex rel. Marcello v. District Dir., 634 F2d 964, 966-72 (Sth Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that "actual, physical custody in a place of detention," or release on bail or personal recog-
nizance after such, is required for district court habeas jurisdiction, yet allowing habeas review 
because alien was under supervised parole and thus "in custody"). The Fifth Circuit may have 
read a strict custody requirement into former INA § I 06 because the Court was trying to un-
derstand why Congress allowed both a petition for review and habeas jurisdiction to review 
deportation orders under the former INA § I 06. The Fifth Circuit coupled a strict custody 
requirement with a broad scope of review in habeas to reconcile the "streamlining" goals of 
Congress in adopting section 106 in 1961. See the discussion in El-Youssef v. Meese, 678 F. 
Supp. 1508, 15!3-17 (D. Kan. 1988) (not determining custody issue but addressing the scope 
of review in habeas corpus under former INA § 106). See, e.g., Galaviz-Medina v. Wooten, 
27 F.3d 487 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the combination of an INS detainer and a final 
deportation order lodged against petitioner met the custody requirement of the former INA § 
106(a)(IO), even though petitioner "[was] serving time for a criminal conviction and [sought] 
relief not from the conviction itself, but from orders [that arose] from his deportation proceed-
ings). See also Flores v. INS, "524 F.2d 627, 629 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (finding depor-
tation order was significant interference with freedom to support habeas jurisdiction); Lieggi v. 
INS, 389 F. Supp. 12, IS (N.D. Ill. 1975) (resident alien only under demand to surrender for 
deportation allowed habeas), rev'd without opinion, 529 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1976); Varga v. 
Rosenberg, 237 F. Supp. 282, 285-86 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (holding that the requirement of custody 
was satisfied since petitioner was subject to a deportation o~der, even though he was not in 
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The government will undoubtedly try to establish a very strict custody 
requirement to narrow the ability of aliens to seek judicial review and 
even to avoid review.307 Actual custody may also become the rule 
rather than the exception given the new statutory requirements of deten-
tion and the immigration policies increasing discretionary detention.308 
_2. Removal Does Not Defeat Jurisdiction 
The right to habeas corpus review attaches with the custody of the 
noncitizen but is not defeated by removal of the person from the juris-
diction of the court or the territory of the United States. There are 
early cases allowing habeas corpus jurisdiction to continue even after 
the petitioner's departure.309 Continuing jurisdiction is also consistent 
with the statutory change which repealed the former elimination of 
federal court jurisdiction when the noncitizen left or was removed from 
actual physical custody due to posting of a bond). For additional cases, see LIEBMAN & 
HER1Z, supra note 31, § 8.2(d)(18), at 206 & n.42. 
Courts have also relaxed the venue requirements of habeas jurisdiction. See, e.g., Braden 
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 493-501 (1973) (concerning habeas review 
of a state criminal conviction). In contrast to the new section 242, which seeks to restrict 
venue selection to the location of the immigration proceedings and thus gives the INS great 
control over th~ forum, venue under habeas may be appropriate wherever the attorney general 
or her delegates exercise control over the noncitizen or where he resided before custody was 
established. See, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 8959, at * 116-20 (E.D.N.Y. June 24, 1997) (absent specific statutory restrictions, venue 
is appropriate based on "traditional venue considerations" of location where the material events 
took place, convenience of the forum, location of witness, etc.); Nwankwo v Reno, 828 F. 
Supp. 171, 174-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding, limited to its facts, that venue proper where alien 
fonnerly resided although not in custody in that district; Attorney General was appropriate offi· 
cer where writ presented solely questions of law and did not require production of the alien). 
Cf. Ozoanya v. Reno, No. 96-1985, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *24-25 (D.D.C. June 25, 
1997) (transferring pro se habeas petition filed to the United States District Court for the West-
ern District of Louisiana because petitioner was incarcerated in the INS Oakdale, La., detention 
center). 
There are also issues of personal jurisdiction. See Carvajates-Cepeda v. Meissner, 966 F. 
Supp. 207, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding the court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner's 
custodian); Ozoanya, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9101, at *24-25 (holding the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over the petitioner's custodian and transferring the case accordingly). Cf. Yesil, 958 
F. Supp. at 835-36 (finding personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York over the 
New Orleans INS District Director). 
307. Even if courts do not require actual custody, the INS appears to demand it. In New 
York, attorneys report that the INS is issuing a surrender notice to all noncitizens who file 
petitions for habeas corpus and the noncitizen must submit to detention. See Memorandum of 
Ken Schultz, President New York Chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, 
May 1997 (on file with author). 
308. See Margaret H. Taylor; The 1996 Immigration Act: Detention and Related issues, 14 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 209 (Feb. 3, 1997). 
309. See LIEBMAN & HER1Z, supra note 31, at § 8.2(b). 
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the United States.310 Of course, if removal is the principal goal, then 
this factor does not defeat Congress' plan. But, nevertheless, the con-
tinued appeals will result in administrative costs and possible further 
government expense.311 
3. Multi-Tiered Review 
Habeas decisions under 2S U.S.C. § 2241 may be appealed to the 
circuit courts of appeals and by certiorari to the Supreme Court.312 The 
creation of multiple levels of review is one of the reasons the govern-
ment is arguing that the limited form of constitutional habeas review 
should take place in the courts of appeals.313 Judge Easterbrook has 
also noted lhat Congress could not have intended for habeas review in 
the general case because multiple layers of review defeat the very effi-
ciency Congress sought to create.314 Multi-tiered review obviously 
requires more time and resources for all of the parties. In the past, 
reform bills would have eliminated habeas review in the district court 
and moved all review to the courts of appeals.315 
Even if noncitizens are limited to habeas under the Constitution, the 
cases are likely to be appealed. The jurisdictional authority for an 
appeal is as unclear as the jurisdictional authority for constitutional 
310. Fonner section 106(c) provided that the voluntary or involuntary departure of the alien 
during the pendency of judicial review tenninated the federal court jurisdiction. Most circuit 
courts interpreted this departure requirement strictly. See, e.g., Quezada v. INS, 898 F.2d 474 
(5th Cir. 1990); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993). For a discussion of the prior 
statute which eliminated jurisdiction upon departure, see Peter J. Spiro, Leave for Appeal: 
Depalure as a Requirement for Review of Deportation Orders, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 281 
(1988). A few circuit courts recognized a narrow exception to the tennination of jurisdiction. 
These courts allowed continuing jurisdiction where the alien was removed in violation of her 
statutory, due process or other constitutional rights. See Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956 (9th 
Cir. 1977). These cases are discussed in Lenni B. Benson, By Hook or By Crook: Exploring 
the Legality of an INS Sting Operation, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 813 (1994). 
311. For exa."Tlple, in Singh v. Waters, 87 F.3d 346 (9th Cir. 1996), the court pennitted the 
INS to locate and return Mr. Singh to the United States at the government's expense. 
312. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a). 
313. To date, the courts of appeals have dismissed petitions for review and referred the peti· 
tioner to the district court to file a habeas petition. See, e.g., Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396, 
400. (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing appeal of deportation hearing based on criminal felony charg· 
es); Duldulao v. INS, 958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (habeas writ dismissed on grounds 
that abuse of discretion by officials and improper admission of hearsay at hearing could not be 
the basis for a habeas claim but were a veiled attempt at direct review). See also supra note 
254 (discussing of the pending consideration of this issue in Magana). 
314. Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185, 1195 (7th Cir. 1997). 
315. See, e.g., Forum Choices, supra note 114, at 1345-48 (discussing advantages and disad· 
vantages with exclusive review of habeas corpus orders by courts of appeal). 
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habeas/16 
4. Lack of General Res Judicata Principles 
Traditionally, res judicata principles have not been applicable in 
habeas corpus. The very purpose of the writ is to establish the legality 
of the underlying custody and not to protect the efficiency or finality 
concerns served by the res judicata doctrine.317 To avoid repetitious 
litigation in the new section 242, Congress incorporated res judicata 
type limits on judicial review of immigration cases.318 If Congress had 
provided for habeas review under section 242, then habeas petitions 
would have been limited by these statutory limits. But when the de-
fault grant of habeas jurisdiction is asserted, it is not at all certain that 
the same restrictions on relitigation of issues will apply. Of course, 
courts may use other devices such as the "successive petitions" or the 
"abuse of the writ" doctrines319 to limit habeas petitions, but the point 
is that Congress, by failing to specifically address habeas corpus juris-
diction, has thrown open this issue at least for the near future. 
5. Evidentiary Hearings 
Habeas corpus jurisdiction might also lead to the possibility of 
expansion of the administrative record by new evidentiary hearings. 
Congress avoids this result for those proceedings covered by section 
242.320 Possibly, federal district courts may order discovery or eviden-
tiary hearings in habeas proceedings. Habeas corpus is a civil proceed-
ing and the rule of civil procedures apply.321 In other areas of habeas 
corpus, special rules of civil procedure apply.322 However, it is not 
316. See discussion of jurisdiction for constitutional habeas supra text accompanying notes 
302-04. 
317. See LEIBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, §§ 2.4(b), 2.4(d), 28.2. 
318. See INA § 242(c)(2). These same limits were also in the section 106 statute and were 
designed to limit the scope of habeas review following consideration of a petition for review. 
319. LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 31, § 28.4. The "miscarriage of justice" standard is 
also used in these doctrines which limit repetitious review. See supra note 266 for a discus-
sion of the origin of the "miscarriage of justice" standard. 
320. See INA § 242(b)(4)(A). 
321. FRCP Rule 8l(a)(2) provides in pertinent part: 
· These rules are applicable to proceedings for· . . . habeas corpus . . . to the extent 
that the practice in such proceedings is not set forth in statutes of the United States 
and has heretofore conformed to the practice in civil actions. The writ of habeas 
corpus, or the order to show cause, shall be directed to the person having custody of 
the person detained. 
322. See, e.g., Rule 6 for 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (state criminal habeas review); 28 U.S.C. § 
2243 (federal prisoner habeas). 
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clear that those restrictions should apply to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. It is 
also not clear that pure constitutional habeas review includes a right to 
evidentiary hearings. 
Certainly, cases which have invoked 28 U.S.C. § 2241 as a part of 
their jurisdictional authority have resulted in discovery and evidentiary 
hearings, but these cases also asserted general federal question jurisdic-
tion. 323 Although Congress may, by implication, repeal section 1331 
jurisdiction, it has not impliedly repealed some form of habeas jurisdic-
tion.324 Thus, district courts will develop individual rules for the han-
dling of these cases until Congress acts to clarify the jurisdiction and 
procedure. 
6. Expansion of Constitutional Rights for Noncitizens 
Prior to 1961 when habeas corpus was the main vehicle for review, 
courts were interpreting a "different" constitution. There has been an 
expansion of many constitutional rights and evolving concepts of proce-
dural due process, equal protection and other constitutional doctrines 
which protect individual rights. In the general arena of administrative 
law, there has been a vast expansion of procedural due process guaran-
tees.325 Despite the rhetoric of the immigration plenary power doctrine, 
some recent Supreme Court cases have applied constitutional due pro-
cess to immigration cases.326 
Faced with the confusion over the type of issues which can be 
heard in habeas corpus petitions, litigants will attempt to assert constitu-
tional claims to preserve the court's jurisdiction.327 Of course, not 
323. See, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985) (remanding for consideration of habeas 
relief; jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 3331). 
324. See supra note 212. 
325. See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (creating a.balancing test to deter-
mine procedural due process in administrative proceedings). Even with subsequent retrench-
ment, contemporary constitutional rights analysis is much broader than the case law of the early 
part of this century. 
326. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982) (finding that returning lawful perma-
nent resident was entitled to procedural due process in exclusion proceedings at the border). 
This case has Ii'- direct implication for the expedited removal proceedings which is why the 
statutory scheme contemplates a referral for a full removal proceeding when a claim of lawful 
permanent resident status is made. But perhaps future courts will find other aliens with signifi-
cant ties to the United States have significant due process claims notwithstanding a lack of 
formal immigration status. See also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 1997 
WL 395300 (9th Cir. 1997) (1st Amendment); Rafeedie v. Reno, 880 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (1st Amendment); Garberding v. INS, 30 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 1994) (equal protection); 
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976) (equal protection). 
327. See, e.g., In re Low Yam Chow, 13 F. 605 (Cir. Ct. Dist. Cal. 1882) (reading Chow's 
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every case will contain a constitutional claim. However, where it is 
possible for litigants to allege a constitutional violation, they will do so 
to support the court's exercise of jurisdiction.328 The unintended result 
may be that some judges, in an effort to overturn abusive discretionary 
actions or erroneous statutory interpretations, may base their decisions 
on constitutional grounds. This constitutionalization of immigration law 
is explored in the next section. 
VI. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF 
AITACKING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Less than one year after the passage of IIRAIRA, it is too soon to 
predict all of the consequences of the congressional attack on judicial 
review in immigration cases. This Article has focused on the probable 
judicial reaction of both reviving habeas corpus jurisdiction and finding 
jurisdiction to review cases presenting "pattern and practice" constitu-
tional challenges to the immigration laws or procedures. But limiting 
judicial review to constitutional claims necessarily invites the courts to 
evaluate the constitutional rights of noncitizens. The 1996 legislation 
expanded the grounds of deportation and eliminated or altered many 
forms of discretionary relief. Given the possible lifetime banishment of 
long-term permanent residents or other sympathetic noncitizens, courts 
may look for ways to limit the government's power over immigra-
tion.329 It ·may be that some courts will feel compelled to curtail the 
immigratiod plenary power doctrine and to allow noncitizens to assert a 
full array of substantive constitutional rights. . 
In the past, due to the immigration plenary power doctrine and its 
restraint on the development of substantive constitutional rights, courts 
employed a variety of stat~tory construction techniques or procedural 
due process surrogates that resulted in the protection of noncitizens. In 
claims as presenting a due process challenge to the nature of the deportation hearing itself and 
suggesting habeas review would be available but not deciding the jurisdictional authority for 
habeas); Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1997) (transferring the petition for adjudica-
tion but finding that the noncitizen had raised the following possible constitutional challenges: 
due process right to counsel, due process refusal to change venue, due process right to appeal 
a deportation order, equal protection denial of relief). 
328. See Leoni Benson, Surviving to Fight Another Day: Preserving Issues for Appeal, in II 
1995-1996 IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK 353-66 (R. Patrick Murphy et nl. 
eds., 1995). In that article, I. discuss how to preseive constitutional claims in administrative 
hearings before an agency not empowered to rule directly on constitutional claims. 
329. See INA § 212(a)(9). 
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two important articles, Hiroshi Motomura documented both of these 
approaches. He first wrote of the presence of "phantom norms," repre-
senting constitutional values in immigration decisions that influenced 
judicial interpretation of statutory and regulatory provisions. These 
phantom constitutional norms sometimes led courts to shield the noncit-
izen from the harshness of the plenary power doctrine without ruling 
on the substantive constitutional claim.330 In a second article, Professor 
Motomura explored how courts in immigration cases sometimes relied 
on procedural due process surrogates for substantive constitutional 
rights.331 Both of these approaches avoided the substantive constitution-
al issues. Professor Motomura gave several reasons why judicial analy-
sis distorted by phantoms or surrogates is problematic and ultimately 
ill-advised.332 This analysis is a helpful starting point for evaluating the 
impact of the constitutionalization of immigration cases. 
The constitutionalization of.immigration law will distort the devel-
opment of immigration law by limiting judges to exclusively consider 
"substantial constitutional issues." Constitutionalization may eliminate 
the technique of relegating constitutional norms to influential phantoms. 
If courts cannot rely on statutory or regulatory construction then, in 
some cases, the phantom substantive constitutional norms will be made 
"real" and the substantive constitutional rights of noncitizens will be 
directly enforced.333 The ironic result may be that Congress, in exercis-
ing both its plenary power over lower court jurisdiction and its plenary 
power over immigration, has created an environment which might ulti-
mately lead the judiciary to reduce congressional and executive power 
over immigration through vigorous protection of the habeas corpus 
petition or by preservation of other types of jurisdiction to consider 
constituitonal claims. The more likely, immediate result may be that 
lower courts will follow the precedents of the plenary power doctrine 
and therefore reject substantive constitutional challenges.334 Neverthe-
330. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutionql Norms, supra note 9. 
331. See Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 9. 
332. Professor Motomura recognized that even if courts abandoned these strategies, they 
might not necessarily also abandon the plenary power doctrine. However, he argued that opin-
ions which openly confronted the lack of substantive constitutional rights for noncitizens would 
lead to a more honest and thoughtful development of immigration law. See id. at 1699-1704; 
Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 612-13. 
333. A recent example is the protection of First Amendment rights in American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee v. Reno, discussed in Part IV. 
334. See, e.g., Yang v. INS, 109 F.3d 1185 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting elimination of petition 
for review as a violation of due process or the separation of powers and partially relying on 
the plenary power doctrine deference to Congress); Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Reno, No. 96-
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less, the direct consideration of these issues may lead to a "steady 
erosion" of the plenary power doctrine.335 
Given that procedural due process is one of the only constitutional 
protections courts have recognized, constitutionalization of immigration 
litigation will also lead to a dramatic increase in claims based on pro-
cedural due process. In some cases, these claims will be based on 
recognized procedural rights, but in others, the claim will be meant as 
a replacement for some other substantive constitutional right or even as 
a substitute for the lack of substantive statutory protections.336 While I 
hope that courts will vigorously preserve the due process rights of 
noncitizens, inappropriate reliance on procedural due process can have 
negative consequences for all parties. 
In the landmark case Mathews v. Eldridge,331 the Supreme Court 
created a three-part balancing test for detennining whether an adminis-
trative procedure meets the requirements of procedural due process. 
The first factor is to identify the individual's interest at stake in the 
administrative adjudication or application of a rule. Second, the court 
should examine the probable value of additional procedural safeguards 
and the ability of these safeguards to ensure accurate decisionmaking. 
These two factors must be balanced against the governmental interests 
at stake. The government's interest includes the burdens on efficient 
enforcement and the cost of additional or substitute procedures. The 
Supreme Court specifically referred to these balancing factors in 
Landon v. Plasencia,338 a case which established that lawful pennanent 
residents were entitled to procedural due process in exclusion proceed-
ings. In several different contexts, lower courts have used the Mathews 
v. Eldridge factors to order new and different procedures. These 
15495, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 9094 (9th Cir. Feb. 11, 1997) (rejecting the claim that the 
retroactive statutory change concerning eligibility to contest the government regulations concern-
ing eligibility for legalization partially relying on plenary power rationale); Duldulao v. Reno, 
958 F. Supp. 476 (D. Haw. 1997) (district court rejected ex post facto challenge to elimination 
of relief from deportation). 
335. This description is the hopeful prognosis of Professor Legomsky in his article Ten More 
Years of Plenary Power, supra note 6, at 936-37. He reluctantly buries his prior hopes of 
complete abandonment and suggests that the transformation of immigration law will come from 
a continued weakening of the doctrine. See id. He wrote the article before the current attacks 
on the courts' jurisdiction to conduct any review at all. 
336. Professor Motomura thoroughly documented this point in Motomura, Procedural Surro-
gates, supra note 9. 
337. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
338. See supra note 9, at 34-35. The Supreme Court did not decide what procedures were 
necessary but remanded to the lower courts to consider the Mathews v. Eldridge factors. 
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changes were necessary to protect the due process rights of noncitizens; 
nevertheless, the court ordered changes led to years of delay in adju-
dication. 339 Of course, Congress and the INS might have avoided the 
litigation by adequately protecting these rig~ts. Several scholars have 
noted that where Congress delegates almost unlimited control to the 
INS and does not carefully delimitate the scope of the agency's powers, 
courts are likely to ·~ump in" to create new procedural due process 
limitations in an effort to protect the interest of the noncitizen and to 
try to ensure accuracy in decisionmaking.340 
Judicial creation of new procedural due process protections can lead 
to reluctance to create new substantive statutory rights. For example, 
Congress may have created bars to eligibility for relief from removal 
for certain aliens with criminal convictions out of a perception that 
these people abused procedural protections to delay their removal. By 
eliminating the statutory relief, Congress may have believed they elimi-
nated all of the substantive rights which required procedural protections. 
Long-term permanent residents will now present substantive due process 
claims to remain in the United States. In the past, these claims have 
not prevailed.341 
Procedural due process: can also add to the cost of programs. If 
courts create new. procedures, Congress cannot anticipate the cost of the 
immigration enforcement or adequately define the administrative struc-
ture. Yet Congress should recognize that it bears at least partial re-
sponsibility for the courts stepping in to determfoe the appropriate pro-· 
cedure. A partial remedy for the uncertainty created by judicial en-
forcement of procedural due process norms is congressfonar enactment 
of legislation that both clearly defines eligibility for relief· from removal 
and includes detailed, fair procedures that the agency must follow in 
implementing the Jaw.342 
339. See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Seivs., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993). See also discussion 
supra Part 11. 
340. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ;}.liens, Due Process and "Community Ties": A Re-
sponse to Martin, 44 U. Pm. L. REv. 237, 259 (1983); Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, 
supra note 9, at 1701; Motomura, Phantom Constitutional Norms, supra note 9, at 606; 
Verkuil, supra note 116, at 1179-82. See also Martin, supra note 112, at 1267. 
341. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (no substantive right to re-
main in the United States upholding retroactive deportation for past membership in the Commu-
nist Party and rejecting claim that deportation is a form of ex post facto punishment prohibited 
by the Constitution). 
342. Congress has, from time to time, taken greater care in specifying procedural protections 
for noncitizens. For example, Congress clarified the notice and procedural protections required 
in dc;portation hearings in former INA § 242, amended and recodified in new INA § 240. 
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Constitutionalization of immigration litigation also raises troubling 
problems for noncitizens. Establishing a substantive constitutional claim 
or a procedural due process claim often requires that the noncitizen 
develop a factual record in a district court.343 It can be difficult, even 
impossible, to develop a sufficient record to assert either a substantive 
or a procedural due process claim in the administrative proceeding. As 
noted previously, neither the Immigration Judge nor the BIA has the 
authority to hear or decide many forms of constitutional questions.344 
·In these administrative proceedings or in appellate review specifically 
limited to the administrative record, the noncitizen will not have had an 
opportunity to develop the factual predicates necessary to the finding 
that some constitutional right has been harmed. Many of the recent 
constitutional challenges have been brought in class action suits in dis-
trict court where advocates have directly challenged the agency's imple-
mentation of the law or the lack of procedural protections in the stat-
utes. 345 To present these types of claims, teams of lawyers have had to 
conduct factual investigations, formal discovery, and survive rounds of 
procedural motions. Similarly, where attorneys wanted to protect sub-
stantive rights, they have frequently used an offensive strategy by filing 
actions to enjoin the INS from initiating or continuing removal ac-
tions.346 These strategies also require sophisticated counsel. Pro se 
petitioners are unlikely to adequately assert "selective prosecution," First 
Amendment protections, lack of substantive or procedural due process 
or arguments based on principles of equitable estoppel.347 
343. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 104S, JOSS (9th 
Cir. 199S} (selective enforcement claims cannot be heard or developed in administrative pro-
ceedings}, reaffd, 1991 WL 39S300 {9th Cir. 1997). 
344. See supra cases discussed in note 223. But cf. Rashtabadi v. INS, 23 F.3d IS62, IS67 
(9th Cir. 1994} (some due process objections must be raised in the administrative process to 
allow the agency an opportunity to cure the procedural defect}. 
34S. See, e.g., Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Reno, S09 U.S. 43 (1993} (considering due process 
challenge to INS implementation, but remanding for determination of standing}; Reno v. Flores, 
S07 U.S. 292 (1993} (reviewing and rejecting due process challenge to juvenile regulation}; INS 
v. National Ctr. for Immigrant Rights, S02 U.S. 183 (1991} (due process challenge to INS 
bond and work authorization avoided by statutory interpretation}; McNary v. Haitian Refugee 
Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991} (holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hear due process 
challenges to the manner in· which the INS administered statutory procedures}. 
346. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, No. 96-SS929, 1997 WL 
39S300 (9th Cir. 1997}; Tefel v. Reno, No. 97-080S-CIV-KING, 1997 WL 369980 (S.D. Fla. 
May 20, 1997). 
347. For example, in a recent case, a detained lawful permanent resident filed a pro se habe-
as corpus petition and the district court judge appointed pro bono counsel to brief the argu-
ments in support of the habeas petition. See Ozoanya v. Reno, 968 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 
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Finally, exclusive constitutional decisionmaking may lead to a fonn 
of balkanization where parties assert competing views of the constitu-
tional rights of noncitizens.348 Constitutionalization does not allow for 
the same variety of nuanced analysis or the careful development of 
rights and interests that a traditional judicial process includes.349 Con-
stitutional adjudication can be a blunt instrument which creates both 
constitutional winners and losers and then enshrines the victory in stare 
decisis. . 
If full substantive constitutional rights are established, Congress and 
the Executive may have a diminished capacity to develop immigration 
policies or to respond to particular emergencies. Although I support 
the abolition of the plenary power doctrine, I recognize that the estab-
lishment of full constitutional rights may weaken the ability of the 
government to use categorical approaches that, in many instances, have 
been unobjectionable.3so For example, suppose that the Supreme Court 
1997). Mr. Ozoanya was particularly fortunate to have had Robert E. Juceam, Douglas W. 
Baruch, and R. Patrick Murphy of the finn of Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson and 
Kimberly Kolch of Proyecto Libertad. Robert Juceam has litigated several immigration cases 
before the Supreme Court. Both he and Mr. Murphy, another very experienced immigration 
attorney, have edited the Annual Conference Books of the American Immigration Lawyers' 
Association for many years and are respected for the breadth of their knowledge. Mr. Ozonaya 
and his attorneys were able to amend his pleadings and to articulate a number of constitutional 
challenges, including a due process challenge to the retroactive elimination of relief from depor-
tation and lack of counsel, an equal protection challenge to the BIA's interpretation of the 
elimination of the fonner INA § 212(c) relief, and a due process challenge to the failure of 
the INS to adequately infonn noncitizens of their appellate rights. These claims were not re-
solved but transferred with the habeas petition to the Western District of Lousiana because the 
court concluded that it lacked personal jurisdiction over Mr. Ozoanya's custodian. See id. at 8. 
The Court ordered a stay of Mr. Ozoanya's removal pending the adjudication of his habeas 
petition. It is not likely that Mr. Ozoanya would have had the legal expertise to raise these 
Constitutional issue had he continued pro se. 
348. The judicial avoidance of constitutional decisionmaking in statutory interpretation is moti-
vated in part to avoid a confrontation with the political branches. See Ashwander v. Tennessee 
Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (courts should construe stat-
utes to avoid constitutional doubts). The same prudential reasons which support such a canon 
argue against exclusive constitutional litigation. There is a large body of literature concerning 
the efficacy and role of the canons in statutory and constitutional construction. See, e.g., Sym-
posium, A Reevaluation of the Canons of Statutory Construction, 45 V AND. L. REV. 529 
(1992). See also KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 521-35 (1960) (canons on 
statutes); RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 285 (1985) (criticizing the inappropriate 
avoidance of c:mstitutional issues). 
349. Professor Motomura described the. problem of developing a clear and honest dialogue as 
occurring because the immigration plenary power doctrine precluded the enforcement of consti-
tutional nonns, and modern courts, in trying to evade the strictures of the doctrine, evaded the 
full discussion through subconstitutional rationales. See Motomura, Phantom Constitutional 
Norms, supra note 9, at 549, 607-13. 
350. Unfortunately, history shows many examples of racist and ethnic discrimination in our 
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had been limited to consideration of the equal protection question -raised 
in Jean v. Nelson.351 In that case, a group of Haitians challenged the 
INS policy of routinely refusing "parole" admission to people from 
Haiti when the agency routinely released others from custody. The 
petitioners alleged that this distinction was based on impermissible 
national origin discrimination in violation of their Fifth Amendment 
rights to equal protection of the law. The Supreme Court did not 
reach the constitutional issue but found that the facially neutral deten-
tion regulations prohibited discrimination in the implementation of the 
immigration laws and remanded the case to allow the lower court to 
determine if the INS had actually discriminated. Justice Marshall filed 
a detailed dissent, arguing that the statutes and regulations challenged 
could not be read as precluding national origin discrimination and that 
the Court had to reach the constitutional claims. Justice Marshall 
found that even aliens seeking initial entry to the United States are 
entitled to due process and equal protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment. He recognized that his holding might restrict the ability of Con-
gress or the Executive to base some aspects of immigration policy on 
national origin distinctions: 
This dissent is not the place to determine the precise contours 
of petitioners' equal protection rights, but a brief discussion 
might clarify what is at stake. It is clear that, consistent with 
our constitutional scheme, the Executive enjoys wide discretion 
over immigration decisions. Here, the Government would have 
a strong case if it showed that (I) refusing to parole Haitians 
would slow down the flow onto United States shores of undoc-
umented Haitians, and that (2) refusing to parole other groups 
would not have a similar deterrent effect. Then, its policy of 
detaining Haitians but paroling other groups might be sufficient-
immigration laws. I do not mean to ignore the errors of the past. Even when discrimination 
may not have been intentional, considerations of national origin and race appear to have inap-
propriately influenced the enforcement of the immigration laws. See Martin, supra note 112, at 
1305 (including statistics that might indicate disparate treatment in the adjudication of asylum 
applications based on nationality of applicant}. This point was noted in Kevin R. Johnson, Re-
sponding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over 
Immigration, 11 N.C. L. REv. 413, n.151 (1993} (analyzing Supreme Court decisions which use 
plenary power doctrine or similar constructions to discourage immigration litigation and to over-
turn judicial challenges}. Professor Johnson interprets Professor Martin's statistics as indicating 
disparate treatment in adjudication of asylum applications based on the nationality of the appli· 
cant. 
351. 472 U.S. 846 (1985}. 
333 
1997) BACK TO THE FUTURE 1491 
ly related to the valid immigration goal of reducing the number 
of undocumented aliens arriving at our borders to withstand 
constitutional scrutiny . . . . 
It is also true that national origin can sometimes be a per-1 
missible consideration in immigration policy. But even if entry 
quotas may be set by reference to nationality, national origin 
(let alone race) cannot control every decision in any way relat-
d . . . 352 e to 1mm1gration .... 
Of course, the Supreme Court's recognition of equal protection rights 
does not necessarily mean that the Court would establish a strict scruti-
ny test for national origin discrimination in this context. Perhaps the 
court would only require a form of intermediate scrutiny or, most prob-
ably, adopt a form of a low level rational basis test.353 
National origin is one of the characteristics which affects many 
aspects of immigration law and policy. For example, nationals of cer-
tain countries are exempt from visa requirements for nonimmigrant 
visits of less than ninety days.354 As Justice Marshall mentioned, our 
immigrant quota system is based on categories of preferential qualifica-
tions such as employment or family relationship, but all of these prefer-
ences are limited by overall national origin country quotas.355 Congress 
has sometimes used national origin considerations to dictate special con-
sideration of claims of religious persecution or political asylum.356 
Supporters of full equal protection rights for noncitizens will applaud 
the judicial scrutiny of these national origin classifications, but even a 
low level rational basis test may mean increased litigation which in and 
of itself might unduly frustrate the statutory or regulatory scheme.357 
352. Id. at 880. 
353. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (suggesting that the decisions 
of the government excluding aliens on ideological grounds need only be supported by some fa-
cially legitimate and bona fide reason). 
354. See INA § 217. Canadians are exempt from the visa stamp requirement except for 
treaty trader or treaty investor petitions and for immigrant visa entry. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.1. 
355. See INA § 203. These quotas are set by birth in a country, not citizenship. There are 
few exceptions to the national origin quota rules. See INA § 202(b) ( cross-chargeability based 
on marriage or transient birth}. 
356. See, for example, the Lautenberg amendment granting Jews, Orthodox Christians, and 
Ukrainian Catholics special consideration in requesting refugee status in the former Soviet Union 
and other former communist countries. See Act of Nov. 21, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-167, tit. 
V, § 5990, 103. Stat. 1261 (1989), codified at INA § 207. 
357. Perhaps it was concern about the possible establishment of Fifth Amendment protections 
that led the government to pursue the strategy of interdiction at sea and to rely on the Su-
preme Court jurisprudence which has led to a lessening of constitutional protections for gov-
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Although this is not the time or place to begin a detailed analysis 
of predicting exactly how the constitutionalization of immigration law 
may effect immigr~tion adjuciation, I will briefly explore one other 
example. In Mojica v. Reno,358 Judge Weinstein found that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241 allowed him to consider the statutory challenges of the petition-
ers, and he found that the Attorney General had improperly interpreted 
AEDPA tc require application of the bar to section 212(c) relief to 
cases pending when AEDP A was enacted. He stated repeatedly that 
the case involved an issue of statutory interpretation. The petitioners 
raised several constitutional challenges, including a claim that retroac-
tive application of the bar to relief would deny substantive and proce-
dural due process. Ultimately, he ruled that retroactive denial of sec-
tion 212(c) relief to the petitioners was prohibited as an improper inter-
pretation of the statute and that a retroactive interpretation was constitu-
tionally prohibited.359 Judge Weinstein's opinion leaves little doubt that 
he was prepared to find that if the statute required retroactive applica-
tion, it would violate due process.360 If this holding was ultimately 
sustained, noncitizens would undoubtedly challenge the elimination of 
other statutory forms of relief and retroactive grounds of deportability. 
Again, although I would agree that Congress should be limited in the 
adoption of retroactive legislation as it is in other areas of law, I recog-
nize that the establishment of this constitutional right for noncitizens 
would significantly alter the ability of Congress to define the member-
emment conduct outside the territory of the United States. The interdiction programs withstood 
statutory and treaty challenges in Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). For a 
critique of these geographical limits to constitutional obligations, see NEUMAN, supra note 6. 
358. Mojica is discussed in the text beginning supra note 275. 
359. Judge Weinstein's opinion clearly indicated that retroactive application of the bar would 
violate due process. He distinguished Harisiades as concerning only whether the ex post facto 
clause prohibited retroactive grounds of deportability and as failing to address the lawful perma· 
nent resident's due process interests. A thoughtful examination of the constitutional illegitimacy 
of retroactivity in immigration law is found in Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Ex Post Facio 
Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv (forthcoming 1997) (unpub· 
lished manuscript on file with author). 
360. Justice Weinstein discusses the constitutional restraints on retroactive legislation at length. 
See Mojica v. Reno, Nos. CV 97-1085, CV 97-1869, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 8959 (E.D.N.Y. 
June 24, 1997). He also seemed equally willing to consider international treaty obligations 
owed to lawful permanent residents and to base his rejection of the retroactive application of 
the bar on those grounds. See id. I have not considered how international treaty obligations 
might also restrict congressional power to eliminate judicial review. For a discussion of mod-
em international law restraints on immigration power based on traditional notions of sovereign-
ty, see Henkin, supra note 6. See also Michael A. Scaperlanda, Polishing the Tarnished Gold-
en Door, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 965. 
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sh~p of our community.361 
The constitutionalization of immigration law is a far cry from the 
stated congressional goal of "streamlining" judicial review. To some 
degree,362 the integrity of our immigration laws and the continued sup-
port of the people of the United States for future immigration, requires 
that the government improve its ability to remove people who have 
violated our laws and its efficient use of immigration laws to prevent 
abuse of the system. Yet Congress has failed to consider adequately 
how the strong presumption of continuing judicial review over constitu-. 
tional questions and the availability of habeas corpus jurisdiction will 
alter the streamlined design. A better approach would be to recognize 
the protected spheres of jurisdiction in habeas and constitutional adjudi-
cation and build a system which also allows consideration of important 
subconstitutional issues.363 
361. For example, until 1972, there was no ground of deportability for active participation in 
Nazi persecution during World War II. See INA § 237(a)(4)(D). The retroactive application 
of this statute was upheld in several challenges. See, e.g., Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d 
Cir. 1986) (rejecting challenge to retroactive ground of deportation based on due process, equal 
protection, and the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder). 
362. As I have explained earlier, I do not believe that Congress can fairly accuse judicial 
review for the problems of delay or inefficiency in immigration law enforcement And even if 
some individuals did use the statutory appeals to delay removal, other provisions of IIRAIRA 
would appear to frustrate the tactics of delay. For example, the fact that the statute no longer 
eliminates jurisdiction when the noncitizen departs helps to preserve the right to judicial review 
and yet allows the government to execute the final administrative order. I recognize that many 
people will not be able to afford attorneys to pursue the judicial proceedings if they are re-
moved, but this is a practical obstacle not a statutory preclusion. 
363. Perhaps immigration law will follow the course of judicial review of administrative deci-
sions regarding the award of benefits by the Veteran's Administration. Congress tried to elimi-
nate all judicial review of administrative benefits determinations. That attempt led to some of 
the same problems created by the 1996 immigration legislation. The former 38 U.S.C. § 
211 (a) barred review of decisions of the Administrator on benefits questions. However, in 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), the Supreme Court held that a federal court could 
review constitutional claims of the benefit recipients. This, in turn, led to increasing numbers 
of constitutional challenges. In Ryan v. Cleland, 531 F. Supp. 724 (ED.N.Y. 1982), the court 
noted the appearance of regular claims being brought as constitutional issues. In rejecting the 
claim that Veterans Administration's (VA) failure to provide medical care and treatment violated 
the Supremacy clause, the court noted, "[P)laintifrs attempt to elevate their claims to a consti-
tutional level is certainly inventive, after careful consideration the court concludes that no bona 
fide constitutional issue [has been] presented." Id. at 730. For a contemporary discussion of 
how this precl:ision statute might lead to constitutionalization, see Robert L. Rabin, Preclusion 
of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 905 (1983). 
In 1988, Congress passed the Veterans Judicial Review Act, 102 Stat 4105. This Act 
established an Article I court called the Court of Veterans Appeals. The Act gave this court 
jurisdiction to hear review of direct challenges to the VA regulations, and review of benefit 
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If the present attacks on judicial review are left undisturbed, it may 
be that over time, with enough case Jaw, the contours of judicial re-
view of immigration cases will result in the efficient removal of 
noncitizens. But until that theoretical day of legal certainty, it is my 
belief that what Congress has done in trying to limit judicial review is 
to move many of the battles into the ever changing territory of habeas 
corpus jurisdiction and to create an environment that may lead to the 
inappropriate constitutionalization of immigration cases. 
adjudications. Perhaps the return to judicial review was motivated by the fear of the growing 
constitutionalization of benefis adjudications. The return of judicial review is discussed in Jona· 
than Goldstein, New Veterans Legislation Opens the Door to Judicial Review • . • SLOWLY!, 
67 WASH. U. L.Q. 889 (1989). 
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CHART 1 POSSIBLE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
UNDER OLD§ 106 (1961-1996] 
Exclusion · 
Habeas Corpus 
U.S. District Court 
Writ of Certiorari 
U.S. Supreme 
Court 
BIA ORDER 
{~., ...... "":;"' .... ~~ -~~ 
!. Motion to Reopen or 
! · Reconsider if denied 
~:. triggered new § 106 
review 
Deportation 
t 
~ ~· 
X' 
Petition for 
Review 
Circuit Court 
of Appeals 
Writ of 
Certiorari 
U.S. 
Supreme 
Court 
' lfdenied, ~ noncitizen might 
}. file motion to 
.~.: reopen before the . BIA and/or habeas 
,.. 
~- Stay of 
~ Deportation 
> Habeas 
i· 
!: 
Corpus 
District Court 
If denied, 
back to the 
Circuit Court 
of Appeals 
Notes: Automatic stay of removal upon filing petition for review 
for most cases.1996 Regulations limited timing and number of 
motions to reopen/reconsider. With rare ·exception, departure 
from the U.S. vacated federal court jurisdiction. 
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CHART 2 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN GENERAL 
CASES: INA § 242 
(Not including claims of U.S. Citizenship) 
Removal Order 
Immigration Judge 
0 
Administrative Appeal 
~ .. 
Board of Immigration 
Appeals 
Petition for Review 
:: Court of Appeals ~ 
,,. 0 
f_...,_. .. ., ... , .... .,. ... ,•.•.•v.•/',•,•.l',•,•,o.-,•.•.•.•J'/'.•.•,•,•,.,.,•,•,o,•,o,•.•.-.•,•,•,••••,• 
' Writ of Certiorari 
United States 
Supreme Court 
Notes: One motion to reopen/reconsider may be filed within 
a limited period. Denial of motions may be reviewed as final 
orders. No automatic stay of removal, but federal court jurisdiction 
continues in federal court. Habeas corpus review may still exist 
when custody requirement is met. 
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CHART 3 
TREATMENT OF "CRIMINALS" 
UNDER INA§ 242, § 238(b) 
AND§ 238 (c) 
§242 
Regular Removal 
Order of Removal 
:--.~·· 
Immigration 
Judge 
Administrative 
Appeal 
Board of 
Immigration 
Appeals 
Petition for 
Review 
Court of Appeals 
§ 238 (b) 
Non-LPR 
Aggravated Felon 
!: 
~ 
f: l 
Notice of Intent to 
Remove 
Removal Officer 
0 
.. 
v 
...... 
Final 
Administrative 
Order by 
Removal Officer 
Petition for 
Review 
Court of Appeals 
I·.__ ____ __, 
!"" 
~ v 
~ Writ of Certiorari 
~ 
t i' United States Supreme Court 
§ 238 (c) 
Judicial Removal 
Removal order 
Issued in Federal 
District Court 
during sentencing 
0 
Appeal of 
Sentence and 
Order of Removal 
x Court of Appeals · 
Note: No BIA 
Review 
Note: There are no express provisions for judicial review in 
either§ 242 or§ 238(b), however the court of appeals may 
have jurisdiction to determine removability or membership in 
the barred class. 
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CHART 4 · 
INTERPRETIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW FOR CERTAIN "CRIMINAL" NON-CITIZENS 
~~·y.•,•,•,• ....................................... , ... ,,, ................ IYVY'I'> ................ /' ..... ,,.,., •• 
i' Order of Removal by 
l, Immigration Judge 
!· 
l: § 240 
Petition for 
RevievV § 242 
,, challenging 
r- membership in 
i barred class -
l if barred file 
~ habeas 
~ petition 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
APPEAL 
BIA 
: Writ of Habeas 
: Corpus in 
' Federal 
District Court 
. 0 
x . . ......... _ .. 
Review in 
Court of 
Appeals 
0 
Writ Certiorari 
United States 
Supreme 
Court 
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CHARTS INADMISSIBLE ALIENS AND 
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, INA § 235(b)(1) 
~ 
L=:_J 
Immigration 
Judge Re\iew 
8CFR§235.11 
Fed-.! 
Distriat Court 
Admission 
Officer and Supervisory 
-..- tCfRf23S.3(l>)(I) 
DtlennlnesNcmlnlbil ~ 
521Z(l)('Jot(l) 
Admit or refer 
to §240 
removal 
hearing 
Immigration 
Judge Re\iew 
8CFR§235.6 
Federal District 
Court 
E"rther remand 
for §240 
hearing or Deny 
Claim of 
Asylum 
Asylum Officer 
Fed en/ 
Distrial Court 
1499 
-
Dlatt:t cac.n 
PolenUal ff-• Rw1-
28 USC 
§2241 
Refer 
fO< 
§240 
he.mg 
